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SOUTH AFRICA

Botha in Vienna for Nuclear Nonproliferation Talks

MB1112162989 Johannesburg International Service in English 1100 GMT 11 Dec 89

[From the "Africa South" program]

[Text] South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha is in Vienna for talks with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Mr Botha is being accompanied by the minister of mineral and energy affairs, Dr Dawie de Villiers. Fritz Greutling reports:

[Begin Greutling recording] The talks with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union are in fact a continuation of similar negotiations held by Mr Botha with these countries in the Austrian capital last year. According the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, it is not expected that South Africa will sign the nonproliferation treaty at this stage.

The treaty was drawn up in 1968 and signed in 1970. So far South Africa has refused to join the more than 130 countries who have become signatories to the treaty, apparently because this would give international access to its secret uranium enrichment process. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty provides for non-nuclear-weapons states to forswear the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons in return for assistance from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, in their development of their ability to utilize nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

The treaty allows officials of the IAEA to visit nuclear plants to ensure that nuclear fuel and energy are not diverted to military projects. South Africa already allows representatives of the IAEA to visit a number of nuclear plants, but it has been reluctant about allowing visits to its uranium enrichment plant at Pelindaba.

Two years ago Nigeria led an attempt to have South Africa's membership of the IAEA terminated. The move followed unconfirmed reports that South Africa was working on nuclear weapons. Arab countries tried at the same time to have Israel expelled from the organization. At the time the United States threatened to terminate its membership if South Africa and Israel were expelled.

South Africa's delegates saw their credentials rejected by the IAEA's credentials committee on the eve of the organization's annual conference in 1977. However, the country continues to take part in other activities of the Vienna-based organization. [end recording]

Discusses Vienna Talks

MB1212214689 Johannesburg Television Service in English 1800 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Text] In Vienna, South Africa has begun talks with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain on signing a treaty banning the spread of nuclear weapons. Johan Ahlers reports on the negotiations from the Austrian capital:

[Begin video recording] [Ahlers] Mr Pik Botha met early today here in Vienna with Russian representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. The meeting took place in the buildings of the permanent mission of the Soviet Union here in Vienna. Similar meetings took place yesterday with a delegation from America and Britain.

This is not the first time that Mr Botha is meeting with the IAEA. In fact, a similar meeting took place in 1987, also here in Vienna. One hundred and three of the member countries of the IAEA are in fact urging South Africa to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, a move which has so far consistently been resisted by South Africa.

Mr Botha also addressed an international press conference in Vienna this afternoon, a conference which was also attended by the director general of foreign affairs, Mr Neil van Heerden, as well as the minister of mineral and natural resources and public affairs, Mr Dawie de Villiers. Also present at the conference was the South African ambassador to Austria, Miss Cecile Smitty. I asked Mr Botha after the conference why South Africa is still not prepared to sign the proliferation [as heard] treaty.

[Botha] There are two sides to it. I think, in general, the international community harbors a severe suspicion that South Africa, while it has the capability of producing, should she want to, with the explosives, would perhaps do so, and this is being used in an emotional campaign against South Africa. Very much like apartheid used to be and is still in certain quarters used against us. So we will have to take this into account.

We are concerned mainly about the privileges which the treaty accords to all states acceding to it. And we would like to be sure that our scientists will be allowed to work freely in terms of the treaty in the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and also in the international conferences and congresses on this whole issue of nuclear power. Yes, that is very important to us, and we are concerned about the interpretation of the treaty provisions and how this will be applied to South Africa. And this is as far as we are concerned one of the main purposes of our negotiations or rather discussions with the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the Soviet Union, who are the three depository states of the treaty.

[Ahlers] And after your discussions, Minister, what are your feelings; in which direction are you moving?

[Botha] These were very useful and substantial. Matters were raised during each discussion, and I can say that progress has been made and that we will be in touch with each other and exchange further views early in the next new year. [end video recording]

Notes 'Progress'

*MB1312082089 Johannesburg Domestic Service
in English 0600 GMT 13 Dec 89*

[Text] The minister of foreign affairs, Mr Pik Botha, says South Africa has made progress at the 2-day talks in Vienna with the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain on signing the 1969 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. At a news conference in Vienna, Mr Botha said the four delegations would meet again in 2 months time, but refused to say whether the South African Government would sign the treaty.

In terms of the treaty, signatories opened their nuclear facilities to inspection by experts of the International

Atomic Energy Agency. The treaty has not been signed by two known nuclear powers, France and China, nor by a number of other countries believed to have the capability to produce nuclear weapons.

Mr Botha denied that South Africa had produced a nuclear bomb, saying it was committed to the peaceful application of nuclear energy. He said South Africa had not signed the treaty because it wanted to be sure of the advantages of signing and that the treaty would be applied to South Africa as it was applied to other nations. He denied recent media reports that South Africa had received nuclear missile technology from Israel. Israel has also denied the reports.

Turning to the recent changes in Eastern Europe, Mr Botha told the news conference that the changes would have a tremendous effect on African countries. He said that in the light of the failure of Marxism in Eastern Europe, Marxist-oriented African countries would be foolish to continue to pursue such a system.

Pakistan Official on Joint-Nuclear Agreement

*OW0412184789 Beijing XINHUA in English
1655 GMT 4 Dec 89*

[Text] Islamabad, December 4 (XINHUA)—The signing of the agreement between Pakistan and China on the supply of a 300-megawatt nuclear power station is a landmark and significant development in transfer of technology to Pakistan, chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Commission Nunir Ahmed Khan said today.

Talking to reporters in Karachi, the largest city in Pakistan, Ahmed Khan said that the supply of the nuclear power station by China is a new start in Pakistan's nuclear program held in abeyance for the last several years.

The project was announced by Chinese Premier Li Peng when he visited Islamabad last month.

Ahmed Khan said that Pakistan's nuclear program was delayed because Western developed countries had imposed an embargo on the purchasing of equipment for building nuclear plants.

He noted that with the display of noble and friendly gesture by China, the Western countries will have to bring a change in their attitude towards Pakistan as far as its nuclear development program is concerned.

He pointed out that the plant is the first example of cooperation between two Third World countries in this field. This will also project China internationally in the field of nuclear technology, he added.

Ahmed Khan said that after finalizing preliminaries with China, work on the construction of the project will begin next year, and it is expected to be completed within six years.

Pakistan set up its first 137-megawatt nuclear power plant near Karachi in 1977.

JAPAN

U.S. Seeks Japan's Help for Atom Project

*OW1512011589 Tokyo KYODO in English 1423 GMT
14 Dec 89*

[Text] Tokyo, Dec. 14 KYODO—The United States has sought Japanese financial cooperation in its 4.4 billion dollar giant particle accelerator (atom smasher) construction project, government sources said Thursday. The sources said the project calls for the construction underground in Texas by 1996 of a ring-type superconducting supercollider (SSC), a kind of atom smasher, that has a diameter of 26 kilometers. The atom smasher is a device which accelerates electrically charged atomic or subatomic particles, such as electrons, protons or ions, to high energies in a basic experiment to shed light on the origin of matter.

A mission from the U.S. Department of Energy will come to Tokyo probably early next year to explain the project to Japan and ask it to provide about a quarter of the construction cost, they said. The sources said the Japanese Government is embarrassed at the request since the view is gaining ground in the U.S. Congress and other circles that Japanese cooperation would be undesirable, given the need to nurture the domestic industry and the fear of losing the high-tech expertise. Further, sources pointed out that the amount of money sought—about 1 billion dollars—is excessively large. The government also fears that Japan might become involved in the basic scientific research race between the United States and Europe.

The 12-nation European Council for Nuclear Research (CERN) earlier in the year completed the world's largest particle accelerator with a diameter of about 8 kilometers, near Geneva. The sources said the project is apparently based on the U.S. wish to secure an edge over Europe in basic scientific research. They said the U.S. has asked Canada, Italy, South Korea and India in addition to Japan, for fund cooperation in the project. India has replied that it is ready to offer 5 million dollars, the sources said.

Japan also has a ring-type particle accelerator with a circumference of about 3 kilometers in the scientific research center of Tsukuba.

NORTH KOREA

General Sends Letter to NNSC on U.S. Arms

*SK1612120289 Pyongyang Domestic Service
in Korean 1100 GMT 16 Dec 89*

[Letter of Maj Gen Choe Ui-ung, senior member of the DPRK side to the Military Armistice Commission, to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on 16 December—read by announcer]

[Text] To the NNSC [Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission]:

Expressing my respect to the NNSC, I send this letter in connection with the introduction of new arms and equipment into South Korea by the U.S. side which ignores the Armistice Agreement.

As you know, Subparagraph 13 D of the Armistice Agreement strictly prohibits additional introduction of arms and equipment from outside of the Korean boundary. However, the U.S. side, outrageously violating this subparagraph of the Armistice Agreement, is continuously dragging armed forces into South Korea. The U.S. side is now shipping many tanks of "M-1 Abrams super tanks" into Pusan, a port in South Korea, and is going to deploy them in places close to the Military Demarcation Line.

The U.S. side has already delivered six new-type war planes "C-130" planes to South Korea and is going to deploy 120 most modern-type fighters capable of carrying nuclear weapons in the near future in South Korea. We cannot but seriously regard such an act of increasing armed forces by the U.S. side as a military provocation stimulating and threatening us and as a criminal act running counter to easing tension on the Korean peninsula.

Ignoring our repeated proposals for equally reducing the armed forces by both sides and realizing disarmament, the U.S. side is constantly advancing along the road of increasing armed forces. Its act cannot be justified in any way. Its act does not correspond even to the trend of arms reduction and detente.

Our side expresses expectations that the NNSC, which is assigned with the responsibility for easing tension and safeguarding peace on the Korean peninsula, will pay careful attention to the continuous troop reinforcement by the U.S. side and will urgently take measures to check it.

I again express my respect.

[Signed] Maj Gen of the Korean People's Army Choe Ui-ung, senior member of the side of the KPA and Chinese People's Volunteers to the Military Armistice Commission

[Dated] 16 December 1989

U.S., South Seek Nuclear War 'More Desperately'

*SK1812056089 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0512 GMT 18 Dec 89*

["Unchanged War Stance"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang December 18 (KCNA)—Voices rang out of "a major commanders meeting" of the South Korean puppet naval and air forces on December 14 at which they "appraised" 1989 and discussed the "main policy" of next year that spurs should be put on the "buildup of naval force" and the "establishment of

ever-victorious posture" for a "perfect readiness" and "highest war posture" and that "all efforts should be exerted to increase combat capability" of the air force.

This suggests that the South Korean puppets mean to continue along the road of war against the North next year, too, at the instigation of the U.S. imperialists. This vividly reveals their belligerent nature, says NODONG SINMUN today.

The news analyst writes:

The puppets cried again that "buildup of combat power" was needed because someone's "provocation" was expected.

On the very day when brasshats of the puppet naval and air forces were holding the "meeting", formations of nuclear-capable "F-15" fighter-bombers and AWACS of the United States flew into South Korea to join "F-16" fighter-bombers and other fighter planes belonging to the airforce of the U.S. imperialist aggression forces in South Korea in a hysteric nuclear aerial joint exercise of criminal nature.

Particularly ill-boding is arms buildup which is getting more undisguised these days.

The U.S. imperialists intend to transfer a large number of M-1 Abrams "super" tanks of new type to be deployed for the U.S. Forces in South Korea beginning next year to their second infantry division close to the Military Demarcation Line.

They have already handed multi-purpose war planes "C-130" to the South Korean puppet army and scheme to transfer 120 nuclear-capable fighter planes of latest type to it in the near future.

Facts prove that the U.S. imperialist aggressors, together with the puppets, are pursuing more desperately a nuclear war against the North.

Those who engaged in provocations on the Korean peninsula are not us but the U.S. imperialists and the puppets. Danger of war is coming to the North from the South.

New U.S. Army Tanks in South Denounced

*SK1312082989 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0432 GMT 13 Dec 89*

[Text] Pyongyang December 12 (KCNA)—The U.S. imperialists should immediately stop introducing new-type tanks into South Korea and withdraw without delay the nuclear weapons and Armed Forces of aggression already introduced before they face a severe punishment by the Korean nation and the world peaceloving people.

The Secretariat of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland [CPRF] stresses this in its information No. 555 made public on December 12.

Noting that the U.S. imperialist aggressors have shipped new-type tanks "M-1 Abrams Super" into Pusan port to equip a U.S. Army unit occupying South Korea, the information says:

Their move is a vicious challenge to the desire of the fellow countrymen for peace in our country and its peaceful reunification and an unpardonable crime to round off a plan of nuclear war, a new war of aggression against our Republic.

They are deploying new-type tanks with high manoeuvrability in the area near the Military Demarcation Line, while reinforcing their Armed Forces of aggression in South Korea and getting frantic with nuclear war preparations. It is clear that this is a premeditated move to round off their nuclear war plan by raising the ground attack capacity.

These days war bosses of the U.S. imperialists are crying that the U.S. Forces' presence in South Korea is necessary to "deter war" and "maintain peace" and the like. This is a trick to cover up their crimes of shipping war means into South Korea and stepping up their preparations for a nuclear war.

Foreign Ministry Urges Nuclear-Free Zone Talks

*SK1312000189 Pyongyang Domestic Service
in Korean 2120 GMT 6 Dec 89*

[NODONG SINMUN 7 December special article: "Tripartite Talks for Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula Should Be Held at an Early Date"]

[Text] It will be a month since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK issued a statement proposing to hold tripartite talks among us and the United States and South Korea, in a bid to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone in order to ease the tense situation on the Korean peninsula and eliminate the danger of a nuclear war.

Recently, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK issued a press statement. In the statement, he urged U.S. and South Korean authorities to respond without delay to our just proposal for negotiation on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. And, if for some reason they are not in a position to respond to our proposal right now, he proposed that they should take at least practical measures to refrain from military actions practically fraught with the danger of a nuclear war. The U.S. authorities, however, have not responded to this.

Unanimously, the Korean people and world peace-loving people as well, warmly supporting and welcoming the peaceful proposal of the Government of our Republic, are urging the United States to respond to our proposal at an early date.

The great leader Comrade Kim Il-song has taught: Turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone

becomes a very urgent issue both in maintaining and consolidating the peace of Korea and in guaranteeing the peace of Asia and the world as well.

Turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone is a matter of eliminating a flashing point, one of the most dangerous in the world. Thus, this is a task that cannot be put off. This is a very urgent issue not only in maintaining and consolidating peace in Korea, but also in guaranteeing peace in Asia and the world.

Owing to the aggressive moves of U.S. imperialists, South Korea today has turned into a combined base of nuclear attack, filled with various types of nuclear weapons and means of nuclear delivery, and a flash point threatening the peace of Asia and the world.

The density of nuclear weapons installed in South Korea is four times that of countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations. The U.S. imperialists, who have turned South Korea into a nuclear advanced base, the largest in the Far East, with this as a signal, have continued to conduct large-scale military exercises aimed at triggering nuclear war in Korea in succession.

The "Team Spirit" joint military exercise, which the United States has conducted annually with South Korea using direct mobilization of ground, air, maritime, and nuclear attacks, including aircraft for nuclear war, and the large-scale "Pacex-89" military exercise, conducted in a large area of the Pacific, are not all the nuclear war preparations. There also is a nuclear test war simulating a surprise strike on our Republic.

Because of these adventurous war moves of U.S. imperialists, an acute situation has been created in which a war may break out at any moment. If a nuclear war spits fire on the Korean peninsula, it will spread into a worldwide nuclear war. Thus, it is clear that our people and mankind will face a catastrophic nuclear holocaust.

The way to prevent the outbreak of thermonuclear war, with the Korean peninsula as a flash point, is to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. If the Korean peninsula turns into a nuclear-free zone, the people in this zone will evade the danger of a nuclear war. In addition, this will make a substantial contribution to the cause of peace in Korea and the world.

In June 1986, the government of our Republic set forth a proposal to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone. In this proposal, the Government of the Republic clearly showed its attitude against testing, producing, stockpiling, and introducing nuclear weapons; against allowing any foreign military bases, including nuclear bases; and against permitting nuclear weapons of other countries to fly over our territorial land or air.

The proposal of the Government of the Republic to hold negotiations of concerned parties on the question of practical measures to establish a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula and firmly guarantee its status is an

expression of consistently sincere efforts to realize denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and remove any danger of nuclear war.

In view of the acute situation prevailing on the Korean peninsula at the present time, it is imperative to hold negotiations among the parties concerned to discuss and settle the issues of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

In conformity with ardent demands and desires of the Korean people and the world's peace-loving people and turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, whether or not the danger of a nuclear war will be removed and peace guaranteed depends entirely on the United States, since we put forward this reasonable proposal and made our stand clear.

The United States, which has turned South Korea into a nuclear base deploying about 1,000 nuclear weapons there, is the party chiefly responsible for the solution to denuclearizing the Korean peninsula. They can never evade this responsibility.

As a matter of fact, only if the United States takes measures not to introduce new nuclear weapons into South Korea, reduces all the weapons already shipped there, and completely withdraws, canceling all operational plans related to their use on the Korean peninsula, can the question of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone easily be resolved. There is no reason or circumstance for the United States to reject these measures.

In recent days, a spokesman of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supporting and hailing our peace proposal, said that the Soviet Union reaffirms its readiness to be a guarantor nation of the nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula, together with other nuclear-weapon nations. Under this condition, the United States must make the same guarantees early on.

If the United States genuinely wishes peace, it should respond to our proposal without delay. And, if it has reason for not responding to our proposal immediately, should above all, create an atmosphere of trust for tripartite talks. And it should at least take practical measures toward refraining from military actions conveying the danger of a nuclear war to have favorable influence on the North-South dialogues now taking place.

There is no reason why the United States, while reducing armaments and improving relations with other countries, does not reduce armaments and improve relations with our country which is no threat to the them. Today, the danger of war grows with each passing day, not merely because of confrontations among large countries that possess nuclear weapons, but mainly because of mobilization of the U.S. forces and disputes aggravated in the countries and regions where nuclear weapons have been installed.

Such being the case, if the United States genuinely wants to eliminate the danger of a war, maintain and consolidate peace, it should embark on the road towards settling disputes with small countries, not merely absorbing itself in improving relations only with large countries.

The South Korean people in authority should not try to leave South Korea as a U.S. nuclear advanced base forever, weaving a plot for grasping political power under their masters' nuclear umbrella. Instead, they should positively take steps to reduce the Korean peninsula to a nuclear-free zone.

In all continents of the world, peaceful settlement of disputes has been accelerated, and talks for disarmaments and processes of nuclear disarmaments are being pushed. In conformity with this trend of the times, tripartite talks for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula must be realized quickly.

The world is watching the attitude of the United States.

SOUTH KOREA

Reunification Minister on Arms Talks With North

SK1412013089 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES
in English 14 Dec 89 p 2

[Text] The government is preparing for possible dialogue with North Korea on arms reduction. Unification Minister Yi Hong-ku said, however, the dialogue had to be conducted on the basis of mutual recognition of the political systems of the other side. Otherwise, the dialogue will not get off the ground, he said. Then, he added, it is likely that the two sides will get down to the business of whittling down arms beginning in the early 1990's.

Yi went on to say that it is imperative for North Korea to cross out a clause in its constitution asserting the necessity of unifying the whole Korean peninsula under the communists terms. He revealed that the government had entrusted a study about arms reduction in South and North Korea to Stanford University. He then said arms reduction by the divided halves of Korea is so closely related to equilibrium in Northeast Asia that consultation with the United States and the Soviet Union is indispensable.

According to Yi, the United States and the Soviet Union hope for cuts in the arsenals of the two Koreas. However, they are not in a position to ask South Korea to reduce spending on arms because they are well aware of North Korea's wild policy of communizing South Korea by whatever means necessary.

Citing President No Tae-u's recent remarks that he would take a decisive measure to open up better relations with North Korea only if North Korea proves to have changed its policy against South Korea.

Meanwhile, Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun recently admitted the need for constant study of arms reduction saying that it would become a serious but unavoidable issue in the coming decade.

Editorial Discusses Readiness for Arms Talks

SK1512022889 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD
in English 15 Dec 89 p 8

[Editorial: "Disarmament in Korea"]

[Text] Government sources cautiously indicated a readiness to address the question of arms control in the Korean Peninsula. It certainly marked a forward-looking turn in the direction of the Seoul government on an issue that had been put on hold for good reasons.

Last weekend Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun broached the subject during a meeting of military commanders, suggesting a new approach to the confrontational posture between the two divided parts of Korea for the sake of flexibly adapting to the fresh challenges of Korean unification.

The statement by the defense chief was followed by a more specific mention by National Unification Minister Yi Hong-ku. He predicted full-scale disarmament negotiations between South and North Korea upon Pyongyang's renunciation of communized and revolutionary unification as laid down in North Korea's basic law and in the constitution of the (North) Korean Workers Party.

Yi said Wednesday that mutual recognition of the existing systems in South and North Korea should precede any inter-Korea talks. Such talks will require the cooperation of the surrounding powers as the state of armament in Korea decisively affects the balance of power in Northeast Asia.

The line of argument advanced by Minister Yi sufficiently explains why the vital issue has been kept on ice for long. North Korea has caused the deadlock of armed tension ever since it started the Korean War. In the meantime, North Korea continued its arms buildup and subversive provocation of South Korea.

Both in word and in deed, Kim Il-song and his war machine in Pyongyang have hardly ever desisted from their plan to turn the land and populace of North Korea into well-armed corps of revolutionary zealots poised to take over South Korea when it becomes ripe for the picking.

An ice-breaking process is necessary to build the base and atmosphere conducive to political and military relaxation and accommodation. It should begin with a rudimentary and humanitarian warming and exchange which could serve to remove distrust and promote mutual confidence.

Such a fundamental and practicable approach should be followed by political and legal changes in North Korea

which would make its pacific intent and open attitude toward the south more explicit and convincing.

It would be in accord with the international tide of the times and responsive to Seoul's positive stance for Pyongyang to help lay the groundwork for earnest disarmament negotiations.

Defense Minister Rejects Unilateral Disarmament

*SK1512131289 Seoul YONHAP in English
1234 GMT 15 Dec 89*

[Text] Seoul, Dec. 15 (YONHAP)—South Korean Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun denied Tuesday any unilateral disarmament of military force in South Korea in the 1990s.

He also hinted that South Korea will take over from the United States operational control over its armed forces in the forthcoming decade.

"Any disarmament cannot be considered at present because our military strength is still far from catching up with that of North Korea," Yi told in a luncheon meeting with a group of senior journalists.

"We are facing many obstacles in having defense budget bill passed at the National Assembly due to misinformed report on my previous remarks touching on possible pursuit of comprehensive arms control in 1990s," he said.

The top defense official also observed that the United States will "certainly" bring forth a "structural change" to its forces based in South Korea without using such terms as "pullout" or "reduction" in 1990s.

Touching on current military situation, the South Korean official said that North Korea resumed works for building Mt. Keumkang Dam after the Pyongyang youth festival ended in July, mobilizing tens of thousands of military personnel.

North Korea began constructing the dam, which can contain 20 billion tons of water, just north of eastern part of the demilitarized zone since October in 1986.

LAOS

PRC Peace, Disarmament Delegation Visits

Meets Trade Union President

*BK1512095489 Vientiane KPL in English
0915 GMT 15 Dec 89*

[Text] Vientiane, Dec 15 (KPL)—Bounthan Souvanna-souk, president of the Lao Federation of Trade Union

(LFTU) received here on December 13, Lin Hua Xuan, vice-president of the Association for Peace and Disarmament of the People's Republic of China.

On this occasion, the LFTU president hailed the visit to the Lao PDR [People's Democratic Republic] of the delegation. He also informed the delegation of the activities of the LFTU, the Lao working people in the past and at present. The host and the guest discussed various questions concerning the activities and role of the trade union organizations in their respective countries. The sides also spoke of ways for further developing the cooperation between the organizations of the two countries—Laos and China.

Talks With Vice Foreign Minister

*BK1612121589 Vientiane KPL in English
0907 GMT 16 Dec 89*

[Text] Vientiane, Dec. 16 (KPL)—Thongsavat Khaikhamphithoun, member of the LPRP CC [Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee], first deputy head of its Foreign Relations Board and first deputy minister for foreign affairs received here on Dec. 14 a delegation of the Association for Peace and Disarmament of the People's Republic of China headed by Lin Huaxuan, vice president of the said association.

The two sides exchanged views on the policy of restructuring and widening cooperation with foreign countries, upon which the sides agreed that it is correct action necessary for the present situation. The host and the guest highly valued the neighborly and friendly relations, solidarity and cooperation between the Lao and Chinese peoples during the struggle against the aggression of the imperialists for national independence in each country.

The sides stressed that the recent visit to China by Kaysone Phomvihane, general secretary of the LPRP CC, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Lao PDR [Lao People's Democratic Republic] constituted a basis for restoring and further promoting friendship and cooperation between Laos and China.

The sides also discussed international and regional situation that both sides were interested in. They hold the views that a move for making the Asia-Pacific a region of peace is the test of the nations in this region. To this end, Laos and China will continue such a policy in the common interest of the two countries and the world as a whole.

INTRABLOC

Borsits Attends Pact Meeting in Moscow

LD1112190189 Budapest MTI in English 1807 GMT
11 Dec 89

[Text] Budapest, December 11 (MTI)—The chiefs of staff of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty member states met in Moscow on December 11. They discussed preparations for the Vienna talks on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe to take place from January 11 to February 5, and for a simultaneous seminar on military doctrines. The Hungarian People's Army was represented by Lieutenant General Laszlo Borsits, chief of staff.

GDR's Hoffmann: NATO Must Also Disarm

AU0212151789 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 30 Nov 89 p 5

[ADN report: "GDR Defense Minister: NATO Should Also Disarm"]

[Text] Budapest—The defense ministers of the Warsaw Pact states attach great importance to constructive dialogue with NATO. The communique—which was published in Budapest on Wednesday [29 November] at the conclusion of the meeting of the Committee of Defense Ministers—stressed that, despite all positive changes in East-West relations, no fundamental changes have been achieved in the field of disarmament to date.

In a talk with Hungarian and GDR journalists, Defense Minister Admiral Theodor Hoffmann said in Budapest that the talks focused on the further implementation of the military doctrine aimed at preserving peace. It is high time for NATO to provide clear practical answers to the socialist states' unilateral disarmament steps, the minister asserted.

Referring to changes in the GDR, the minister pointed out that the National People's Army is studying the experiences of the other socialist countries' armies. As far as the military reform which has just been initiated in the GDR is concerned, special emphasis must be put on newly shaping the relations between the people and the Army, Defense Minister Hoffmann concluded.

BULGARIA

Daily Admits SA-10 Missile 'Really Deployed'

AU1212094989 Sofia BTA in English
0847 GMT 12 Dec 89

[From BTA Review of Sofia Press for 12 December]

[Text] Sofia, December 12 (BTA)—In connection with the recent publication in the WASHINGTON TIMES in which it was alleged that the Soviet Union has deployed new anti-aircraft missiles in Bulgaria, NARODNA

ARMIIYA runs an article by General Lyubcho Blagoev, commander of the Air Defence and Air Forces. The author says that an SA-10 anti-aircraft missile is really deployed in Bulgaria, but it does not belong to the Soviet Union, it is merely produced by the USSR.

Bulgarian Defense Minister on Military Reductions

AU1512172589 Sofia BTA in English
1640 GMT 15 Dec 89

["Parliament: One-Minute Silence Followed by Glasnost"—BTA headline]

[Excerpts] Sofia, December 15 (BTA)—The National Assembly resumed its session here this morning with a debate on the business on the agenda adopted yesterday. [passage omitted]

The total sum for the expenses of the Bulgarian Army for 1989 amounts to 1 billion and 605 million leva, said the minister of National Defence Army General Dobri Dzhurov. He said that at the same time the military budget of Turkey is 2 billions and 400 million U.S. dollars, and of Greece—2 billion and 240 million dollars. Besides, this year Turkey will receive only from the FRG 140 million dollars and Greece—75 million.

Dobri Dzhurov, who is a member of the Politburo of the CC [Central Committee] of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party], informed also that after the announcement at the beginning of this year reductions have already been made. By October 1 the Army has at its disposal 204 military aircraft, 51 helicopters, 72 launching grounds for tactical missiles, 2,000 tanks, 2,365 armored carriers, etc. The numeric strength of the Army is 107 thousand people.

Turkey's Army is 650 thousand strong (the largest in Europe), more than half of it is not far from the Bulgarian borders. The Greek Army is 190 thousand.

Emphasizing that Bulgaria does not look upon neither of its two southern neighbours as enemy and strives for good-neighbour relations, friendship and cooperation, Dobri Dzhurov proposed the drafting of a special law concerning the defence of this country.

The MPs endorsed the bills for amendments of the penal code and for amnesty.

The deputies discussed a statement sent by citizens of Ruse (at the Danube) in which they accuse their former local leader (since a month minister of construction, architecture and urbanization) of insufficient taking of measures for ecological protection of the city. On their insistence the parliament established a commission which will investigate the case.

The MPs adopted the plan for the legislative and control activity of the National Assembly during the next year. At the proposal of Petur Mladenov the deputies included in the agenda of the next parliamentary session the

discussion of the question for granting academic autonomy to the higher schools. "Yesterday we heard the motives," added he.

Independent societies and organizations presented declarations and documents to the parliament. In this connection the parliament entrusted its permanent commissions with their examination. At the next session they will inform of the results.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reportage on Planned Soviet Troop Withdrawal

Soviet Commander Cited

AU0412131689 Prague RUDE PRAVO
in Czech 1 Dec 89 p 7

["zr"-signed report in the "24 Hours Abroad" column]

[Text] Some 75,000 members of the Soviet Army will leave the CSSR once and for all. According to REUTER, this was declared by Lieutenant General Eduard Vorobev, commander of the Central Group of Soviet Forces in the CSSR, in an interview for British Television on Thursday [30 November]. He did not mention any exact date, however. He stated, furthermore, that Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia have in recent days limited their activities outside the barracks so as not to provoke the local population.

Vorobev Interview Denied

AU0412131989 Prague RUDE PRAVO
in Czech 2 Dec 89 p 7

["zr"-signed report in the "24 Hours Abroad" column]

[Text] A spokesman for the Central Group of Soviet Forces in the CSSR has informed RUDE PRAVO by telephone that Lieutenant General E. Vorobev, commander of this group, had spoken neither to a correspondent of the REUTER agency nor to any other journalist. RUDE PRAVO published the report of the REUTER agency yesterday in this column.

Johanes Names Troop Status Panel Head

LD0512223789 Prague Domestic Service
in Czech 2030 GMT 5 Dec 89

[Text] Today, Minister of Foreign Affairs Jaromir Johanes appointed his deputy, Evzen Vacek, as head of a group of Czechoslovak experts at the talks with the USSR on the temporary stay of the Soviet troops on our territory. At the same time he proposed to the Soviet side that experts of the two countries should meet in Prague as soon as possible.

Soviets Given Troop 'Departure' Note

LD0812163189 Prague CTK in English
1545 GMT 8 Dec 89

[Text] Prague Dec 8 (CTK)—Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Evzen Vacek received the Soviet Charge d'Affaires Marat Kuznetsov here today.

A note was handed over to the Soviet side suggesting to open in Prague negotiations of Soviet and Czechoslovak experts on legal, military, political, financial, and other aspects of the deployment and departure of the Soviet troops temporarily deployed on the territory of Czechoslovakia in the shortest possible time.

Talks Be Held 'Very Shortly'

AU1312205089 Prague RUDE PRAVO
in Czech 8 Dec 89 p 2

[Josef Vlcek report: "When Will There Be Permanent Visa-Free Travel With Austria?; On Czechoslovak Citizens' Traveling Abroad"]

[Excerpts] Prague (from our correspondent) — The Austrian side has responded positively to the Czechoslovak proposal to conclude an agreement on mutual visa-free travel. According to Austrian press reports, this Czechoslovak proposal has been welcomed by Alois Mock, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Austria. This was stated by Bronislav Kulawiec, director of the Consular Section at the CSSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at a news conference on Thursday [7 December]. [passage omitted]

Asked about alleged difficulties encountered by Soviet journalists traveling to the CSSR, B. Kulawiec said that Soviet journalists do not require a visa to travel to the CSSR. The whole matter has been examined by the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow, which has no information on any such case.

At the close of the news conference, Lubomir Marsik, spokesman for the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, informed journalists that a group of experts has started work at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs on considering questions connected with the stay of Soviet troops on our territory. Apart from Foreign Ministry staff, other government departments are also represented in the group, such as the CSSR Ministry of National Defense. The group will very shortly meet with Soviet experts in Prague. The spokesman described as a topical task for Czechoslovak diplomacy the recalling of staff from Czechoslovak representative offices abroad who were appointed to their posts after reaching retirement age. He said that Czechoslovak representative offices abroad were operating normally.

USSR Troop Withdrawal From CSSR on Agenda

AU0512151589 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
1 Dec 89 p 7

[Jelinek commentary: "On the Issue of Soviet Troops in the CSSR"]

[Text] In his speech on 29 November, Federal Premier Ladislav Adamec broached, among other issues, the issue of the presence of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory. It is a grave matter which involves a number of things.

Three facts are equally projected in this issue.

First, the developing disarmament process, or the negotiations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO states on troop and armament reductions.

Second, the political transformations in Europe and the demonstrable shift from the policy of confrontation to the establishment of a new system of international relations.

Third, provisions for ensuring the sovereignty of the Czechoslovak state under the new conditions.

As can be seen, the issue broached by the premier is a topical one and must be dealt with. In fact, the entire problem of foreign troops on the territory of other states has been a discussion topic for quite some time; the time has now come to find a solution.

The deployment of a group of Soviet troops on our territory is the consequence of the military solution of the situation existing in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. On 18 October 1968, the Soviet and Czechoslovak Governments, headed by Premiers Kosygin and Cernik, concluded an agreement on the temporary presence of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory, thus providing a legal foundation for the situation that had newly arisen. Let us underscore the term **temporary**, which clearly limited the stay of Soviet troops in terms of time. More than 20 years have passed since then.

The NATO member states have accepted the emergence of a new Soviet military grouping in central Europe as a fact. Regardless of their political protests, they included it in their military plans and doctrines. When the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact states opened their talks with NATO, on the basis of a Soviet initiative and in the spirit of new political thinking, on the need to reduce military forces and armaments in Europe, the Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia were already regarded as part and parcel of the Warsaw Pact's military force. Both sides include them in reckoning the overall balance of forces between the two military-political groupings. Within the framework of unilateral disarmament measures adopted by the USSR, the Soviet Union is now withdrawing one tank division and certain other formations from its troops stationed in Czechoslovakia. Here one should also note that, up to now, the Czechoslovak side has always maintained that it is the concern of the Soviet side to announce the number of Soviet troops on our territory.

That is why the official data are not known to this very day, so that we can merely quote foreign calculations, which assess the numerical strength of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia at 80,000.

Minister Shevardnadze has expressed the USSR's stand quite unambiguously: not a single soldier beyond the borders of the Soviet state. This is a goal which must be negotiated, and the Soviet Union will do everything in its power to reach it. It is known that the United States rejects any and all unilateral steps toward a reduction of its troops in Europe. Judging by the latest information, Washington is seriously contemplating the reduction of their number on the basis of reciprocity. Thus the whole matter is developing rather favorably. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that everybody agrees that the negotiations must be in keeping with the principle of maintaining the equilibrium of the military balance of forces, and of not impairing the security interests of all or any of the states affected by this issue.

An alternative is offered here, which could be acceptable to everybody. The European states with foreign troops deployed on their territories can strive to achieve the withdrawal of these troops already during the first stage of the disarmament agreements. For instance, this stand was adopted by Hungary; and certain politicians and the majority of the public in the European states is also inclined to agree with it. At the same time these states continue to regard participation in the political-military groupings to which they belong as the guarantee of their own security. The Warsaw Pact's proposal of mutual disbandment is also on the agenda of the day.

One must consider that during the period of the policy of confrontation, the European states regarded the presence of foreign troops on their territories as an irreplaceable means of providing for their own safety. The situation has now changed. The healthy idea that safety must be primarily provided for by political means and by one's own armed forces is pushing its way to the fore. Nevertheless, every sensible and sober person understands that all states must come to an agreement on this point—in other words, that it is necessary to establish political prerequisites for the withdrawal of foreign troops, and do so on the basis of legal treaties. Agreement has already been reached on the possibility to establish these prerequisites within the framework of current all-European negotiations.

Our Army Command assures us of the high level of combat readiness of Czechoslovak troops, and our Army is sufficiently large. Still, it is also a question of the quality of military armament, an issue on which the experts have the main say. Likewise, we have already mentioned that one must not neglect the protection of our state's sovereignty. We must also consider the fact that today West German Chancellor Kohl envisages a plan for the unification of Germany and that Bonn has at its disposal the Bundeswehr—one of the best and most modern armies in the world. Moreover, the armies of four states—the United States, Britain, France, and

Canada—are deployed on FRG territory, i.e. in our immediate vicinity. In other words, there are a number of connections and questions which have to be considered. Nevertheless, it is possible to conduct negotiations and to develop efforts to find a solution. The well-considered words spoken by Premier Adamec show that our government is determined to proceed in this manner.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Roundtable Focuses on Military Doctrine

LD1812220689 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 2053 GMT 18 Dec 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Representatives of parties, mass organizations, citizens' movements, and scientific establishments, today discussed starting points for a draft of the future military doctrines of the GDR, at the "Wilhelm Pieck" military policy college in Berlin. Defense Minister Admiral Theodor Hoffmann had convened the first roundtable on this subject. The discussion paper which was the focus of the debate was drawn up by a joint working group, which included experts from the Defense Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Institute for International Relations, and the Institute for International Politics and Economics.

Starting from the fact that the national military doctrine represents a significant basis for the necessary military reform in the GDR armed forces, the defense minister put forward a few fundamental positions: The National People's Army [NVA] is firmly committed to its constitutional duty to protect the GDR from external forces. It was trained and structured only for this purpose. The fight for peace and disarmament and the guarantee of an adequate defense capability is seen in the Warsaw Treaty as a stabilizing factor in Europe.

The admiral stressed that the NVA is the army of all the people and not of one particular party. It is open to all social organizations, to all of the people. This applies also to all property and is necessary for fulfilling the constitutional duty. He spoke in favor of dealing with the fundamental problems of military policy and of life in the NVA in the highest people's representative body. At the same time, he demanded that the law on community service be submitted shortly to the government and the People's Chamber. Minister Hoffmann proposed that a consultative council with participants from all social organizations be created.

In the discussion, which became controversial at times, it was asked whether the 1987 Warsaw Treaty doctrine underlying the national military doctrine is still up to date, and whether it is the right time to pass such a document before a new constitution, or how any misuse of the NVA for internal deployment could be ruled out. Speakers in the discussion advocated ideas on a security partnership cooperation between the NVA and the Bundeswehr. There was agreement that the solution of

political conflicts is not possible through military means and would jeopardize the existence of the GDR.

Government Dissolves 'Combat Groups'

LD1512121289 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1152 GMT 15 Dec 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The GDR Government has decided to terminate the activity of the combat groups. The Government Press and Information Office reported to ADN on Friday that all measures linked with this should be concluded by 30 June 1990.

GDR, FRG Discuss Disarmament

Fischer on Disarmament

LD1312205189 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1652 GMT 13 Dec 89

[Excerpt] Berlin (ADN)—According to Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer, the GDR has great interest in extending the notion of the treaty community to questions of security policy, disarmament, and confidence-building. In a talk with the representative of the FRG government for disarmament questions, Ambassador Dr Josef Holik, in Berlin today, Fischer spoke in favor of the GDR and FRG exerting their influence both bilaterally and also in their respective alliances with the aim of diverse disarmament steps.

According to the Foreign Ministry, the partners in the talks agreed that the prospect of a common European house requires faster progress in reducing the high concentrations of armed forces and armaments in Europe. Disarmament must not lag behind the tempo of the political changes on the continent. [passage omitted]

Consultations End 9th Round

LD1312181189 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1554 GMT 13 Dec 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The 2-day ninth round in the traditional consultations on disarmament questions between the GDR and the FRG ended in Berlin today. The GDR was represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Ernst Krabatsch, and the FRG by the disarmament representative of the Federal government, Dr Josef Holik.

In the talks there was agreement that everything must be done to prevent disarmament from lagging behind political developments in Europe, Krabatsch told journalists. "We discussed in a matter-of-fact way all areas of disarmament, and assessed where the main problems lie and what the two states can now undertake in order to advance disarmament." They worked on the assumption that the two states belong to different alliances, that there is, all the same, a broad spectrum of measures that can be advanced in disarmament negotiations. The GDR submitted a series of proposals to this end.

FRG Bundeswehr Planning Policies Viewed

AU1412123589 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 12 Dec 89 p 2

[Franz Knipping editorial: "Drop in Birthrate and Fighter 90"]

[Text] The spokesmen of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Greens in Bonn's Bundestag assessed Defense Minister Stoltenberg's presentation on the Bundeswehr planning in the 1990's as half-hearted and insufficient. The reproach was made against the background of two inseparably linked developments: the democratic changes in Europe's socialist countries as well as the disarmament steps they have initiated, the disarmament proposals they have submitted, and the readiness for disarmament they have demonstrated at the Vienna negotiations. What the opposition parties in Bonn expected and called for in view of the changed situation on our continent is a conclusive disarmament concept of the FRG Government.

However, such a concept is not in sight so far. Stoltenberg announced that the size of the Bundeswehr will be reduced from currently 495,000 to 420,000 active soldiers plus 50,000 reservists by 1995. If a result is achieved at the Vienna negotiations, he did not rule out a reduction to 400,000. This, however, he was told, is actually only a reaction to the fact that—as a result of the drop in birthrates due to the pill—the number of young men eligible for military service is declining anyway.

There are further indications of how difficult the Bonn Defense Ministry finds it to "take leave of the fixed enemy image, to overcome the thinking in terms of blocs, and to direct one's gaze to global requirement" (this is what FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU said recently). The military budget for 1990, which was adopted by parliament, sets a record with DM54.2 billion. Armament projects, which will devour billions of deutsche marks, have been started—such as the Fighter 90, the modernization of the Lance short-range missiles, and other similar projects. By the way, in view of all this it seems naive when in our country some groups call for the disbanding of the National People's Army and thus for the renunciation of defense.

The issue on the agenda is, of course, a far more comprehensive turning back of the armament spiral—in view of the common European home. In this respect, both German states have a key role. Therefore, Stoltenberg's statement that the field of defense policy must not be left out of intra-German dialogue, is to be welcomed. When, in addition, he signals readiness to comprehensively discuss security policy questions with the GDR within the framework of the existing alliances, one can only say: Please, as soon as possible and not half-heartedly. Because: A community of treaties between the GDR and the FRG without mutually coordinated positions on questions of disarmament and security is hardly conceivable.

GDR, FRG Armies To Meet Next Year

LD1212143989 Hamburg DPA in German
1226 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Text] Dresden (DPA)—High-ranking officers of the Federal Army and the GDR National People's Army will meet at the beginning of next year in Dresden for talks on security policy. This was announced Tuesday by Dieter Lutz, deputy head of the Hamburg Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy. Members of the institute have been paying a first visit to the Friedrich Engels military academy in Dresden, the highest military training center in the GDR, within the framework of an international East-West workshop.

Erich Hocke, a lecturer at Dresden Academy, stressed during a discussion with participants in the workshop that the GDR wants further contacts with the FRG also in the area of security policy. Both defense alliances and the two German states have to arrive at cooperative structures. "We are not the ones who are reticent in this area," Hocke said. The GDR Defense Ministry, according to Major General Rolf Lehmann, deputy director of the academy, has now worked out a draft paper on very liberal arrangements for foreign contacts by National People's Army officers.

The ministry said the academic institutes are currently working on strategies for military reform and a new national military doctrine for the GDR. According to Lehmann, the focus will be on the "mature citizen in uniform," and democratization and state legality will enter the Armed Forces. "The Army will no longer be the state within the state." Access to the Armed Forces should be open to all, irrespective of party allegiance and world view. However, it is difficult to push back the influence of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED], since almost the entire officer corps consists of SED members at present.

The draft of a new military doctrine calls for a system of cooperative security and the creation of a state of mutual incapacity for aggression. The two alliances should progressively be transformed into politico-military organizations. The military doctrine should, of course, be embedded in the overall doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, but at the same time should take account of the specific security interests of the GDR.

According to Hocke, so far some 30,000 soldiers of the National People's Army have had to be put to work in sectors such as transport and health, in order to fill the gaps left by the wave of emigrations by GDR citizens. "But this cannot be a permanent situation, especially as considerable social problems are associated with it," Hocke stressed.

Arms Deliveries to Ethiopia Halted*LD1112173989 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1714 GMT 11 Dec 89*

[Text] Addis Ababa (ADN)—The GDR has stopped all arms deliveries to Ethiopia. It was reported in Addis Ababa today that the fulfillment of such treaties had been cancelled.

In the past, the GDR had delivered arms and military equipment to the East African country on a commercial basis at Ethiopia's request. The GDR, for its part, emphasized its full support for a political resolution of the civil war in the north of the country.

Ten Thousand Demonstrate at Military Airfield*LD1012170889 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1541 GMT 10 Dec 89*

[Excerpts] Berlin (ADN)—Tens of thousands of GDR citizens gathered in the country's towns and villages for demonstrations over the weekend. [passage omitted]

On Saturday, some 10,000 from the three northern areas of the GDR called for changing the Kranskamp military airfield in the Rostock Area into a civilian establishment for the GDR's Interflug airline. This nonviolent demonstration was called for by representatives of the New Forum. They explained their viewpoint at a meeting attended by local cooperative farmers and army members. Major Armin Lai, a pilot, spoke as a representative of the National People's Army. He warned against illusions, since more than enough NATO airfields existed, from Iceland to Schleswig-Holstein. Only recently, an entire air squadron was disbanded in the GDR. This time had come for the FRG Government to understand that disarmament should not be a unilateral matter. Meanwhile, his unit had carried out numerous changes. Night flights therefore were being either halted or greatly reduced, and many reservists would be discharged within a few days in order to strengthen the national economy.

Deputy Defense Minister on MiG Reduction*AU1812133389 East Berlin DER MORGEN in German 9-10 Dec 89 pp 1-2*

[Frank Mangelsdorf and Hans-Juergen Nagel report: "This Is a Fact: The National People's Army Has 50 Fewer MiGs"]

[Text] Berlin—In October 1989 the Air Force of the National People's Army [NVA] cut over 50 fighter planes of the type MiG-21 SPS and SPSK; a fact that can be proved and verified. But our editors received letters which prompted us to make inquiries. Lieutenant General Rolf Berger, deputy defense minister and new head of the Air Force/Air Defense, answered for DER MORGEN the question "Have you reduced your stocks by 50 operational planes in real terms and according to the books?" as follows: "Yes, I categorically stand by

that. This can be proved by any investigation committee, whether from the People's Chamber or the prosecutor general."

With its unilateral advance concession on military reductions, the GDR disbanded the "Wilhelm Pieck" fighter plane squadron and withdrew 50 planes from its total stock and took them out of commission. The appeal to disband the squadron, the simultaneous decommissioning of 50 planes in Drewitz, as well as the way the dismantling was presented, gave the impression that, first, these were machines of this squadron and that, second, all MiG planes of this version (they can be distinguished by the number of the suspension for guided and unguided missiles and for cannons) will be scrapped in the future. This goes back to the methods used in the propaganda work by the government then.

The statements by the former head of the Air Force/Air Defense, Lieutenant Colonel Reinhold, to the international public did not make it clear that there were two sides to the decision and that the planes with which the disbanded squadron was originally equipped, namely a more recent MiG type, had been exchanged for the demonstrated planes. Of course, it was also not expressly stated that the "withdrawal" does not mean a complete scrapping, apart from the use of the engines in the brown coal industry and of other parts for training purposes, for spare parts or for other purposes." [passage omitted]

The instruction of the former minister for national defense to prepare part of the planes—24 to be precise—for so-called re-export (resale) was also a taboo subject then. Lt Gen Berger on this issue: "This decision of the former minister was suspended by the new minister for national defense. The task of the Air Force/Air Defense was only to maintain the condition of the planes. I can confirm that not a single one of these planes is the subject of a contract at the moment. They all are at Drewitz airport. If now the government clearly states that there will be no re-export, these planes will be scrapped." Colonel Horst Kleest adds: "After the process of writing off, documents are issued for any plane that is written off, documents that are withdrawn, that will be passed on to us and have to be stored for a certain number of years in order to be able to draw conclusions from certain events retroactively."

In connection with the arms trade, the search for contracting partners and the conclusion of contracts by trading partners, the term IMES trading company is mentioned—a company that is not listed among the GDR foreign trade enterprises in the Berlin 1989 telephone directory and that was repeatedly mentioned in the past days in connection with obscure arms deals. Once again, Lt Gen Berger: "I do not know the mechanisms necessary for such contracts. The Air Force/Air Defense is not involved in the commercial side. It is neither an independent contract partner nor does it carry out such deals on its own. The NVA has nothing to do with the transactions."

Postscript: An inquiry at the Ministry for Foreign Trade confirmed that the IMES trading company is not under the control of this ministry. The commercial coordination sector with which the company is connected could not be reached by telephone.

Cheney's Armament Statements Criticized

AU1512060289 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 8 Dec 89 p 2

[Franz Knipping editorial: "Cheney's Phantom of Threat"]

[Text] In view of the changes in Eastern Europe, the opportunities for dialogue and cooperation between East and West are better than ever. This position was adopted by the heads of state and government of the NATO states in Brussels, after the U.S. President had briefed them on his talks with Mikhail Gorbachev in Malta. Bush assessed the summit as useful and as an important step forward. He came out in favor of advancing disarmament of conventional armaments, strategic nuclear weapons, and chemical weapons.

The question of the practical consequences has not yet been answered. Is NATO thinking about revising its military strategy? Will it finally take leave of the lie of a threat from the East? Will it adjust to giving up its character as a military pact and to increasingly developing its profile as a political alliance in order to promote detente and cooperation across systems?

The answers were given by U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney in an interview published by the Bonn daily DIE WELT. First, he said: "For the current phase our NATO strategy is excellent. It offers a reliable forward defense through credibly, conventionally equipped armed forces and is supported by our nuclear capability up to the strategic systems."

Second, Cheney admits that the USSR and the Warsaw Pact have unilaterally reduced their armed forces, cut their defense expenditures, and are seriously willing to negotiate in Vienna. Nevertheless, he not only clings to the phantom of the alleged threat, he is blowing it up strongly. DIE WELT headline: "The Strategic Threat Has Even Increased."

Third, the Pentagon chief deduces from this that the capability of deterrence and the military efficiency of NATO must not be reduced in the future, either. "Only slight changes in the future distribution of troops and in the definition of the tasks" are conceivable.

The result: There are contradictions—to put it mildly—between the determination of positions made by the conference of the Western top politicians in Brussels and the assessment of the situation by the defense minister of the largest NATO power. Time will have to tell which views and declarations of intent are the binding ones in practice.

Defense Minister Vacek Guarantees No Coup

LD0712191689

[Editorial Report] Prague Television Service in Czech at 1618 GMT on 6 December broadcasts a 45-minute recorded discussion with new Defense Minister Miroslav Vacek. Also participating in the discussion are (Dr Hana Marvanova) and (Jan Chudomel), representatives of the Independent Peace Initiative. Stanislav Pohoral, press spokesman for the Defense Ministry; Miroslav Kocian of the Czechoslovak Socialist Youth Union; Major Milan Kubin from the youth section of the Czechoslovak People's Army; (Simon Panek) and (Marek Benda) from the central student coordination strike committee; Jaroslav Gajdoskik, chief of the undergraduate military training department of Charles University; and Jiri Krejci, chairman of the Czechoslovak Peace Committee.

Questions mainly focused on the internal life of the army; changes in the military training, which students must undertake as part of their course and which they see as a waste of study time; and the teaching of defense in secondary schools.

The defense minister was asked about the Soviet troops in the CSSR.

"[Unidentified speaker] Our general public has been acquainted with the stance on the events of 1968. We know the Warsaw Pact's position. What is the future of further deployment and perhaps also departure of Soviet troops from our territory?

"[Vacek] I think that it is an affair of governing authorities of our state to enter into talks about these matters. The reason is simple. A temporary stay of Soviet troops on CSSR territory is set by a governmental treaty between the CSSR and USSR governments. I would like to mention that it was signed—if I am not mistaken—by Dubcek, Cernik, and the former President Svoboda. These matters, therefore, must be settled by relevant authorities. I do not want to use this television screen to defend it.

"Recently, there was a report that the commander of the central group of Soviet troops said to a foreign news agency that 75,000 Soviet soldiers will leave. I have spoken to the commander of the central group of Soviet troops; he gave no such information to any of our foreign journalists. Nobody has made a statement so far that the above-mentioned information is false."

The new minister is asked about the current situation in the Czechoslovak People's Army:

"[Vacek] The situation is good. I am willing to take any of your representatives, of representatives of the strike committee, any of you, to whichever unit you point out—and their positions are no longer a secret, because of an order issued in July. I am willing to accompany you personally if we find a mutually suitable time. The situation is good."

The minister is then asked if he thinks that there is a possibility of a reverse of the democratization process by force:

"[Vacek] I'll give you an answer which will be damaging to me. Do you believe your politicians?

"[Unidentified speaker] Some.

"[Vacek] So, I won't name anyone. Please notice that I am not naming anyone. One of your representatives said that the Czechoslovak People's Army is not able—that is the instruments of power are not able to intervene, because they are led by quite incapable people who are not able to carry out a coup. I am that incapable person in the lead today who is giving you a guarantee, because I consider it improper [protože to povazuju za nescerizni]. I give you a guarantee of honor as a minister of national defense that the Czechoslovak People's Army is not in preparation of anything of the kind of which you probably—that is not quite the right word—suspect us."

HUNGARY

Opposition Deputies on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

*LD1512214989 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1500 GMT 15 Dec 89*

[Text] In the National Assembly, a group of opposition deputies discussed the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the legislature's dissolution. Janos Hollos reports:

[Hollos] To all intents and purposes, the government agrees with the proposal of Deputy Janos Sebok, that is, with the withdrawal as soon as possible of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary, said Ferenc Somogyi, state secretary at the Foreign Ministry. The debate was only over the fact that the opposition deputies would like this to happen by the end of next year.

The decisive majority of opposition deputies thought that the National Assembly should declare its own dissolution at the present December session, primarily because then there would definitely be elections in March.

Political scientist Mihaly said, in connection with this, that the country could easily lapse into a state of ungovernability after the elections.

Deputy Minister Interviewed on Defense Cuts

*LD1512175989 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0545 GMT 15 Dec 89*

[Text] [Unidentified reporter] We have been able to read in several papers that Hungary needs a small but effective army. Not only did I not understand this otherwise nice sentence, but the thought also occurred that if we now need a small but effective army it means that until now we have had a large and less effective one. This is how Deputy Minister of Defense Ferenc Szombathelyi replied to my worries:

[Begin recording] [Szombathelyi] Taking historical realities into account it is rational to organize an army in such a way as to enable it to carry out its main task: the defense of the country. And if this basic task is clear then we should adjust the modernization, too, to the defense tasks. It is possible, in my view, to create in Hungary today a smaller army which may be maintained at a modern standard in the future.

The army has done much in past decades to be a modern army but could not accomplish it.

[Reporter] I had no means to buy the most modern weapons, which, while incorporating the most modern technologies, are very expensive.

[Szombathelyi] Yes, that is true, too. In the past 15 years some types of weapons have gone up in price 8-15 times. (?In some respects our position has become impossible). The accommodation of soldiers, their social security, and the state of our barracks continue to deteriorate gradually.

Thus the question is whether, taking this into account, we should maintain an army of such a size—according to the announced figures, let us say 106,000 men—and that we continue to be unable to develop. We thought that this road was impossible to follow and therefore we should outline a more modern army in the long run with the same expense or no increase in the expense.

[Reporter] How much smaller?

[Szombathelyi] In addition to the announced 9 percent [reduction], a further 20-25 percent. This means reducing staffing levels, but it also means curbing military technology because there are military technology sections where this reaches 40 percent...

[Reporter, interrupting] The cuts [Leepites]?

[Szombathelyi] Yes. It is related precisely to the statement that we need a defensively featured army. Then we must calculate the large quantity of offensive weapons in such a way that within that we significantly reduce tank stocks, artillery stocks, rockets....

[Reporter, interrupting] Are rockets now offensive as well as a defensive weapons?

[Szombathelyi] Air defense rockets are unambiguously a defensive weapon, but, for example a ground missile—be it in any category, tactical or theater of war category—is fundamentally an offensive one, because if it has a range of 70 km or 100 km then it does not defend its own territory.

The economic difficulties appeared to us in such a way that, in an optimum situation, it would be good if the army is able to spend the money allocated to it for maintenance, that is, people, technology, operations—and 40 percent, at least, for development. In our case development recently dropped below 20 percent or less. Thus, if we are unable to free money from the existing

expenditure to be able to develop then we have no chance to create a more modern army.

Here is an example: We have announced the withdrawal of fighter aircraft, too. The annual maintenance of a fighter plane, let us say a MiG-21, is about 10 million forints. So if we withdraw 10 of them, then 10 times 10 million begins to mean something. And we can use that sum to pay a bit more for the men and for modern tools. A more modern army is then not utopia.

[Reporter] If it depended on you, unambiguously, on which type of weapons you would spend immediately because there is a shortage even now?

[Szombathelyi] If it depended on me, my conviction is that the air defense system should be further perfected by means of greater finance and personnel allocations. Because the geographic region in which we live limits our thinking in military geography terms, too. Air defense continues to be very important. This does not exclude my putting into second place the tools which ensure military operations, that is, communications systems, and the arsenal needed to defend the land. I have in mind here antitank guns and other tools. [end recording]

Defense Budget for 1990 Cut 30 Percent

LD1512100289 Budapest MTI in English
0817 GMT 15 Dec 89

[Text] Budapest, December 15, 1989 (MTI-ECONews)—In 1990, Hungary's defence budget will be slashed by 30 percent in real terms as compared to this year, Minister of Defence Ferenc Karpati told members of the parliamentary Defence Committee.

35.8 billion forints (560 million USD) has been set aside from the budget for defence purposes, and 4.6 billion forints (72 million USD) will probably have to be added to this from army sources.

Following repeated reductions in expenditures in this area, defence got 40.650 billion forints (635 million USD) from state coffers this year, topped up by 1.6 billion forints (25 million USD) from its own resources. The defence budget will see a 12-percent cut-back next year, even in nominal terms, and inflation, put at 19.5 percent next year, will also take its toll.

Defence will not even account for 6 percent of next year's budget expenditure of 608.112 billion forints (9.5 billion USD). Of this year's 539.855 billion forints (8.425 billion USD) defence got over 7.5 percent. The effective force of the Hungarian Army, still 106,000 in 1988, will be reduced to less than 80,000 by 1991.

The Ministry of Home Affairs, also responsible for the Police Force and the Border Guard, had a budget of 23.5 billion forints (367 million USD) this year. The Ministry of Finance proposed 26.285 billion forints (410 million USD) for next year, 900 million forints (14 million USD) less than the Home Ministry asked for.

A reshuffle of government responsibilities this year has meant that the councils and preparations for the elections have also come under Home Ministry supervision.

MPs expressed the view that the amount earmarked for criminal investigation was too low, and recommended that more money be allocated for this purpose by robbing Peter to pay Paul.

Deputy Minister of Finance Peter Kunos told the parliamentary committee that a little more money was still available for Home Ministry use, from budget reserves, if necessary.

Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, Sandor Ilcsik, announced that the state security force will be further reduced.

Over the past five years, the effective force of the frontier guard has been cut back to a third.

Further Reportage on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

Defense Committee Discusses Issue

LD1212160389 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Text] [Announcer] The draft budget is a prominent point on the agenda of the National Assembly Defense Committee session, since it is expected that military expenditures will further decrease, moreover radically. Peter Marvanyi reports from parliament building.

[Marvanyi] According to Janos Seboek, deputy, the Defense Committee ought to propose that the National Assembly give the government a mandate to hold talks with the Soviet Government on the withdrawal of Soviet troops by 31 December 1990. This is what the deputy said, after a report by the state secretary for foreign affairs on the Vienna talks. According to Ferenc Somogyi, Janos Seboek is trying to force an open door, since the government has these issues on the agenda, and it is holding talks with the Soviets in this matter, although the state secretary was unable to give such a concrete date.

The other main topic of the committee session was the budget, or rather the budget pertaining to defense and internal [as heard] affairs. The session began with another agenda topic, a report on the weekend national summit and on the Vienna talks, but naturally, the budget was raised several times in both matters. In connection with the national summit, it was decided that the National Assembly ought to adopt the budget at the next parliamentary session. The deputies have not held a concrete debate on this. However, they were in agreement that Parliament should make it possible to call new elections.

Returning to Vienna: the state secretary for foreign affairs emphasized that the talks on conventional weapons had greatly facilitated the Hungarian Armed Forces reform announced on 1 December. However, the unilateral reduction cannot be explained by economic

constraint alone, but irrespective of this, by the changes in the international situation and by the favorable disarmament prospects.

Karpati on Air Force Unit

*LD1212222189 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 12 Dec 89*

[Interview with Defense Minister Ferenc Karpati by Peter Marai in Budapest on 12 December—recorded]

[Text] [Marai] Minister of Defense Ferenc Karpati has announced that Soviet Air Force troops will be withdrawn from Debrecen. Where will they be withdrawn to—because there are other Soviet air bases in Hungary—i.e., what will be the fate of Debrecen Airport?

[Karpati] They will return to the Soviet Union. I cannot tell where; that depends on their decision. It is known that an interpellation was submitted in Parliament this year. The population was really preoccupied with it because the airport there is essentially part of the town; it is surrounded by the town. The population is still irritated despite limits or regulations we have introduced.

[Marai] Excuse me, but there are other Soviet air bases which have also expanded into the residential area; I have in mind the Tokol base...

[Karpati, interrupting] The Tokol affair has been solved. They have withdrawn from there. There are helicopters there now. In Debrecen, too, some kind of smaller helicopter unit will remain; apart from that, the airport will be handed over to Hungarian domestic air transport.

[Marai] Janos Sebok proposed at the committee session that Parliament should authorize the government to hold negotiations with the Soviet Union about complete Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungary. Janos Sebok gave a concrete date too: 31 December 1991. Is this date conceivable?

[Karpati] I should not think that, at this stage, such a concrete date could be assigned by anyone, nor do I think that it would be successful if the Hungarian Parliament tied some kind of fixed date to the withdrawal. For this reason, I made this proposal, together with the Foreign Affairs Committee, because it has definite international implications in connection with the Vienna Armed Forces reduction negotiations. It is well known that one of the important subjects of these Vienna negotiations is that the number of foreign troops stationed in Europe—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—should be decreased significantly. This is a matter to be raised at negotiations. I hope that in this, too, a successful decision will be made soon. However, at this stage, viewpoints are rather far apart.

Delegate to Arms Reduction Talks Interviewed

*LD1112222289 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1900 GMT 11 Dec 89*

[Interview with Istvan Gyarmati, deputy leader of the Hungarian delegation at the Vienna conventional arms reduction talks, by unidentified reporter; date and place not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] Istvan Gyarmati is deputy leader of the Hungarian delegation at the Vienna talks on conventional arms. Next week, the fourth round of the Vienna talks will end. This year, there were two announcements that the Hungarian Armed Forces were being reduced. Is a further reduction expected?

[Gyarmati] I believe that the current announcement, which provides for a 35 percent reduction by the end of 1991, as compared to the beginning of this year, can be viewed as an unavoidable, very important and positive first step. We think that the agreement on conventional armed forces will be concluded in Vienna in 1990, which also means that, in continuation of the reductions carried out up to now, we will have to implement a further reduction in the Hungarian Armed Forces, together, of course, with the reduction of the armed forces of the other 22 member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This also means that after the first agreement is concluded, the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary will become possible, and it also means that a process will get underway which, within a relatively brief time, could lead to the disintegration of the two military alliance systems.

[Reporter] For the sake of precision, what date would you give for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops?

[Gyarmati] I believe that this would be simultaneous with the implementation of the first agreement, thus, there would be a realistic possibility for this by the end of 1993.

[Reporter] There have been recent suppositions in the Hungarian press that there would be a vacuum, after the departure of the Soviet troops, which would be of a size so as to make the country defenseless vis-a-vis a possible Romanian attack.

[Gyarmati] In my view, that is absolutely not true, partly because the presence of the Soviet troops does not serve in any way as a guarantee against a Romanian attack, partly because even after the reductions, a comparison of the Hungarian Army with the Romanian Army shows that it would be able to beat off an armed force which has a capacity much greater than that of the Romanian Army. Alongside this, allow me to say, without discussing Romania's intentions, that the Romanian military capability, the Romanian military threat against Hungary, has not increased in past years. To my knowledge the Romanian Army has not increased, but decreased, and it is the least reinforced and worst equipped sections of the Romanian Army which are

stationed at the Hungarian borders. Therefore, I do not believe that there might be a threat of the real danger of a Romanian attack.

[Reporter] At the everyday person's level of awareness, it is not a real attack or possible threat which causes fear, but the confused system of political relations which has come about in Romania and in Yugoslavia. Most recently, the initiative of the Hungarian Government was to create a demilitarised zone along the Yugoslav-Austrian border [with Hungary]. In such a situation, when the danger of the disintegration of the state has arisen in Yugoslavia, when serious tensions have been accumulating between Serbia and Slovenia, or could I even say in the system of relations between Serbia and Vojvodina, many people query how realistic, for example, is such a Hungarian initiative?

[Gyarmati] I do not even believe that (?nothing at all) might threaten Hungary's security. Indeed, the part of the current [word indistinct] armed forces reform, which earmarks a reduction of the predominance of the part of the army which is stationed in the west [of Hungary], serves precisely the objective that armed forces should be more evenly distributed in the country's territory. Until now we had exclusively counted on attacks from the West. Now, this distribution also means a more balanced preparedness. My conviction is that the Hungarian Army can have no task whatsoever in a neighboring country. Its task, exclusively, is that should a military conflict develop in a hypothetical neighboring country, it should keep this far away from the Hungarian borders. The Hungarian Army, at present and after the reductions, will be able to do this.

[Reporter] The Hungarian Army, as regards weapons, is fully, unequivocally Soviet-orientated, though I presume we can also procure light weapons from elsewhere; from Czechoslovakia, from here or there, but they at any event are socialist in origin. In the coming period, might there be problems related to component supplies and other problems, which might basically make the Hungarian Army vulnerable?

[Gyarmati] I think that as long as it is in the Soviet Union's interest that the Hungarian Army should remain effective, it will ensure the replacement of these components.

[Reporter] This, however, also implies that if it does not have this interest, it will not ensure these. How can we prepare ourselves for such a situation?

[Gyarmati] This also means that if it does not have this interest, it is not certain that it will ensure these. This is not precluded. We can prepare ourselves for this situation, on the one hand, by trying to offset this out of our own resources, by utilizing the means being reduced, and on the other hand I cannot—and do not want—to preclude that in the future we will gradually alter this one-sided system, and that we might seek some kind of cooperation, if not with a more developed NATO country, then with neutral countries.

[Reporter] Many people might be horrified at what I ask, but is it conceivable that, for example, we might devote a portion of the loans taken in the international monetary market to modern, Western military technology? Are loans given at all, now, for such objectives? For security objectives?

[Gyarmati] In my conviction this is inconceivable, because we have not received such large amounts in loans that there remains enough for this. Also, it is obvious that if we were to utilize a loan in this manner, it would shake the trust of the international monetary world to such an extent that it is better not to even think of the consequences.

[Reporter] Have the recent East European developments basically altered our situation? I am thinking that in the GDR, six [word indistinct] were supposedly called back, which obviously is a drastic consideration. The Czechoslovak leadership is asking the USSR to reexamine the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia; I will not continue.

[Gyarmati] I believe that the changes exert a positive impact on Hungary's situation, on the one hand because the danger within the Warsaw pact, of which we earlier were afraid, that reform-orientated Poland and Hungary might become isolated, has ceased to exist, and now an entirely different country is being isolated within the Warsaw Pact. On the other hand this is so because every European change which reduces the danger of military conflict is favorable for us.

MTI Notes Reduction in Military Budget

LD0512161589 Budapest MTI in English
1137 GMT 5 Dec 89

["The Incredible Shrinking Hungarian Military Budget"—MTI headline]

[Text] Budapest, December 5, 1989 (MTI-ECONews)—The recently-announced cut in Hungary's Armed Forces will probably mean military expenditures are slashed by 20 percent next year.

The Hungarian defence budget has been shrinking from year to year.

In 1988, Hungary spent 42 billion forints (807 million USD) on defence. This year's military budget was 43.9 billion forints (730 million USD), a drop of 19 percent in real terms, and during the year, even that sum was cut to 39.8 billion forints (660 million USD).

The 37.8 billion forints (590 million USD) envisaged for 1990 mean a further 20 percent cut in the defence budget. This will be done through a hefty troop and arms reduction package.

The recently-announced arms and troop cuts will actually reduce Hungary's Armed Forces by a total of 30-35

percent instead of the 9 percent cut decided on in January this year.

Earlier this year, the Hungarian People's Army mustered 106,800 men, and the aim is to cut this number back to

70,000 by 1991. Compulsory military service will be reduced to 12 months from the present 18.

The number of tanks and artillery guns will be slashed by 40 percent and anti-tank weapons by 20 percent. There will also be fewer aeroplanes.

EGYPT

Official Discusses Military Production

JN1212204189 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic
10 Dec 89 p 6

[Report by Faruq al-Shadhili]

[Text] Kuwait this week will receive the second batch of Fahd armored vehicles which were modified to suit the Kuwaiti field of operations. It will also receive 400 jeeps for its police force.

Eng Muhammad Nur Yusuf, director general of the Arab Industrialization Organization [AIO], reports that the organization has received orders with a total value of more than 100 million Egyptian pounds to produce spare parts for factories of both the public and private sectors and for investment companies. This is in line with the instructions of President Mubarak, head of the AIO higher committee, to use the capabilities of the organization to stop imports and encourage domestic production, he said.

In his statement to AL-AKHBAR, Eng Yusuf stressed that this does not interfere with the efficiency of military production, affect the satisfaction of the Armed Forces' weapons and ammunition requirements, or the needs of Arab and African countries. The AIO, he said, produces the Gazelle, Alpha Jet, and Al-Jumhuriyah aircraft, the anti-armor "Song Fire" missiles, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, field artillery, howitzers, light weapons, and many types of passenger vehicles used by the Army and police.

The AIO will today receive a French delegation to discuss prospects for cooperation, especially after the AIO succeeded in manufacturing spare parts for the Mirage 2000—the most modern jet fighter—and the Gazelle and Alpha Jet aircraft. Authorized by French companies, the AIO factories provide repairs for French planes in the Middle East.

Runway Bomb Being Developed; Armored Car Built

JN0212192189 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic
1 Dec 89 p 1

[Report by Yasir Rizq]

[Excerpt] AL-AKHBAR has learned that a bomb that can destroy airfield runways is being developed at the "Qadir" complex of the Arab Industrialization Organization. Arab and African states have shown interest in acquiring this type of bomb, which may be installed in all types of Eastern and Western aircraft.

The bomb has proved highly destructive against runways, roads, concrete structures, and bridges.

Meanwhile, Engineer Colonel Husayn 'Abd-al-'Ali, board chairman of the Qadir Complex of Advanced

Industries told AL-AKHBAR that a new type of the armored car "Fahd" has been produced and named "Fahd—Commander in Chief." It has been designed for use by force commanders to observe maneuvers and parades and to hold meetings in outlying areas. The car has been fitted with reinforced glass on the sides and front to afford the greatest possible amount of visibility. The car has also been equipped with an air-conditioned compartment insulated from the driver's cabin. [passage omitted]

INDIA

India Proposes Talks on Antisatellite Weapons

52500008 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English
26 Oct 89 p 13

[Text] United Nations, 25 October (PTI)—India has expressed great concern over the development of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon systems and has proposed that multilateral negotiations be undertaken for a comprehensive ASAT ban treaty.

Addressing the first committee of the United Nations general assembly here, the Indian Ambassador, Mr Kamallesh Sharma, said that the de facto moratorium observed by the U.S. and the USSR since 1985 should be formalised and negotiations would help convert this voluntary restraint into a universally binding commitment.

He said that India strongly supported the idea of greater international co-operation in the field of outer space which has been recognised by the international community as the common preserve of mankind.

Mr Sharma said that developments in space research and technology in the field of communications, meteorology and remote sensing offer a glimpse of the benefits possible for all countries, particularly developing countries, provided outer space is kept free of all weapons.

He felt that the political momentum that will be created by a successful strategic arms reduction treaty (START) can only be carried to its logical conclusion if the arms race is capped and the negotiations are held multilaterally to bring in the other nuclear weapon states who have so far remained outside the process.

Mr Sharma hoped that states which were party to the non-proliferation treaty would take advantage of the 1990 United Nations session to look at the genesis of the treaty and take decisive steps towards a more broad-based regime as part of a comprehensive system of international peace and security.

He felt that the preparatory process for convening an amendment conference to convert the partial test ban treaty into a comprehensive one should begin. The conference is to be [as published].

Meanwhile, the ad hoc committee could commence negotiations on a treaty and develop the necessary institutional mechanisms to resolve any ambiguous situations that might arise, he said.

IRAQ

Paper Denounces U.S. Stand on Missile System

*JN1312114489 Baghdad INA in English 1020 GMT
13 Dec 89*

[Text] Baghdad, Dec 13, INA—AL-THAWRAH daily of Baghdad denounced the U.S. Administration stance versus Iraq's success in launching rocket al-'Abid capable of putting satellite into orbit.

The paper was surprised over the U.S. silence versus what was taking place in nuclear reactor Dimona which produces atomic bombs according to many sources including the American one.

The paper stressed that the United States had wanted to protect its interests by securing the Zionist entity's occupation of the Palestinian territories and the continuity of this occupation.

The paper referred that the key American goal was to stamp out the Palestinian surging uprising which started stirring up anxiety of the U.S. Administration.

'Arafat Congratulates Saddam on Missile Launch

*JN1212170489 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1600 GMT
12 Dec 89*

[Text] Baghdad, 12 Dec (INA)—President Saddam Husayn received today Mr Yasir 'Arafat, President of the State of Palestine.

During the meeting, the president reaffirmed Iraq's firm support for the Palestine cause. His excellency also praised the Palestinian Arab people's intifadah against the Zionist occupation forces.

Yasir 'Arafat congratulated President Saddam Husayn on Iraq's achievement in launching the al-'Abid satellite-carrier rocket system and in manufacturing two different systems of surface-to-surface missiles, named Tammuz-1. He described this as a great historic achievement that has given the Arab nation prominence in the realm of space science and has placed it among the developed countries.

The meeting was attended by Latif Nusayyif Jasim, culture and information minister and acting foreign minister, and Mr 'Azzam al-Ahmad, State of Palestine ambassador in Baghdad.

ISRAEL

U.S., FRG To Supply New Submarines, Missiles

*JN1612211289 Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD AL-USBU'I
in Arabic 14 Dec 89 p 1*

[Text] AL-ITTIHAD has learned that a tripartite agreement will be signed soon among the United States, the FRG, and Israel whereby Bonn will supply Israel with two new offensive submarines of the Dolphin type at a cost of \$550 million. Washington will finance the deal in full. The two submarines will be built in the United States in accordance with an official license from the FRG Government.

AL-ITTIHAD also learned that the two submarines that Israel will receive during 1992-1993 are within the framework of the strategic cooperation program between Israel and the United States to build the Israeli Naval Force. The program costs \$3 billion and includes supplying the Israeli enemy with three missile-support ships of the Sagar-5 type, which are currently being built in the ship-building yards in Haifa, in addition to miscellaneous naval arms and equipment, including surface-to-surface antiship Gabriel III missiles, surface-to-air antiaircraft Barak missiles, and reconnaissance helicopters for the purpose of monitoring ships and submarines.

LEBANON

'Aziz Cited on Peace With Iran, Rocket System

*JN1312211889 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1900 GMT
13 Dec 89*

[Text] The United Nations, 13 Dec (INA)—Tariq 'Aziz, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, has declared Iraq had welcomed the mission of Jan Eliasson, special envoy of the UN secretary general, and cooperated with him in good faith.

At a news conference at UN Headquarters, 'Aziz said Iraq had addressed several questions to the Iranian Government through the UN envoy on major issues concerning the settlement with the aim of better understanding the Iranian stance. 'Aziz added Iraq sought to tackle the pressing issues concerning peace, as the 16 months following the cease-fire agreement has not brought us any closer to peace.

Tariq 'Aziz indicated these questions focus on matters pertaining to withdrawal and to Iraq's sovereignty over the Shatt al-'Arab. He added the Iranian stance on these issues will govern and shape future ties between the two countries. He went on to say these questions also focus on Iran's concept of peace, security, and good neighborliness with Iraq and the region; the Iranian position on the prisoners of war [POW's]; and the Iranians' views on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution No 598 as a peace plan.

'Aziz pointed out Iraq has not received any real clarification indicative of a serious change in the Iranian stance vis-a-vis any of these issues. He asserted the Iranian Government has remained vague and continued to pursue a selective approach. He added Iran is not committed to the major issues conducive to peace.

'Aziz went on to say Iraq still believes Resolution No 598 is a peace plan, and that its implementation requires direct negotiations under the auspices of the UN secretary general to reach a common understanding by both sides on all the paragraphs contained in this resolution and the deadlines for implementing them.

The Iraqi foreign minister said the Iranians still are procrastinating on committing themselves to implementing the 8 August 1988 agreement reached through the good offices of the UN secretary general. He added Iraq has proposed forming five joint committees involving Iraq, Iran, and the UN General Secretariat to discuss major, pressing issues concerning peace, aimed at creating proper political and psychological circumstances conducive to peace.

'Aziz added Iraq proposed these committees alternately meet in Baghdad and Tehran, and that they have a 3-month limit to conclude their work and accomplish their tasks. He indicated the Iraqi proposal stipulated these committees would prepare for a ministerial meeting under the auspices of the UN secretary general. The proposal did not rule out high-level meetings in the presence of the UN secretary general at venues and dates agreed upon by the two sides.

In reply to questions posed by reporters, 'Aziz said Iraq's stance is based on the belief the major step now is to hold fruitful, documented direct negotiations between Iraq and Iran to reach a common understanding of Resolution No 598 as a peace plan. He added: When we get into this phase, we would be able to talk about an agenda and also about agreements to implement Resolution No 598.

When asked about sovereignty over Shatt al-'Arab, 'Aziz said withdrawal and Iraq's sovereignty over Shatt al-'Arab are of the same nature.

Asked whether Iraq has any conditions concerning these two issues, 'Aziz replied: We have not talked of any conditions. Our stand is we have to sit at the negotiating table to discuss things. However, we would like to state the issues of withdrawal and sovereignty over Shatt al-'Arab are of the same nature, and that they must be discussed together, within the same framework.

'Aziz branded Iran's handling of the POW's issue as scandalous, and indicated this stance is a flagrant violation of the obligations enshrined in the 1949 Geneva Convention. He added all states are legally and morally obligated under this convention to work to ensure the immediate repatriation and exchange of all POW's. This convention stipulates the issue must be discussed in isolation from the other paragraphs contained in Resolution No 598, 'Aziz said. He pointed out "this is the

clear meaning of the Geneva Convention. This also is the stand of the International Committee of the Red Cross. If this meaning is not heeded, the POW's will remain hostage to political considerations, as has been the case with the Iranians."

The foreign minister called upon the UN secretary general and the UN Security Council to act quickly to ensure the release and exchange of more than 100,000 Iraqi and Iranian POW's, who have remained captive despite the elapse of 16 months since the cease-fire agreement because of this scandalous Iranian stance.

In reply to a question on the successful test launch by Iraq of a satellite-carrier rocket system, Tariq 'Aziz said this scientific accomplishment is designed for peaceful purposes. He added Iraq, like other nations, has the right to acquire technology and use it for peaceful purposes.

On Iraq's development of a missile system that has a range of 2,000 km, the foreign minister said: We have to take our defense needs into account, as Iraq still is threatened by Iran. We still are in a state of no-war, no-peace. Besides, the Iranians have not demonstrated sufficient readiness to achieve a comprehensive and full peace. Consequently, we will do our best to acquire the necessary defense equipment required to defend our country in case the other side contemplates the resumption of hostilities.

PAKISTAN

General on Construction of Laser-Guided Missiles

BK1612001789 Hong Kong AFP in English
1921 GMT 15 Dec 89

[Text] Islamabad, Dec 15 (AFP)—Pakistan has begun assembling the world's most deadly laser-guided RBS-70 anti-aircraft missiles, the official ASSOCIATED PRESS OF PAKISTAN (APP) said Friday [15 December]. It quoted the commander of Army-Air Defence, Major General Agha Masud Hassan, as saying that the RBS-70 missiles could hit "any flying object"—aircraft, helicopter or remotely piloted vehicle within a radius of five kilometres (three miles)—"with 100-percent capability." The laser-guided missile cannot be jammed or "disillusioned" by any evasive tactic of an enemy aircraft, APP said.

Maj. Gen. Hassan said the weapon was easy to operate and tests proved that it was "almost impossible" for any aircraft to protect itself once within the missile's range. He praised Pakistan nuclear scientist Abdul Qadir Khan, who he said had already "gifted" the shoulder-fired Anza-3 anti-aircraft missiles with a range of 4.2 kilometers (2.6 miles) and a weight of 9.5 kilograms (21 pounds), for his help in this field.

Pakistan has successfully mounted both Anza and RBS-70 missiles on armoured personnel carriers to make them self-propelled and easily maneuverable.

Pakistan has also acquired the latest U.S.-built radar, called the low-altitude air-defence system (LAADS). APP said the last laads consignment arrived here here just 10 days ago.

It said that LAADS could identify any craft flying at low altitude within 60 kms (37 miles) and could instantly transmit data and a picture of the flying object to the command post and gunners on a television screen.

Announcement on 1990 Withdrawals From Hungary
18010016 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Dec 89 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed: "Report from the USSR Ministry of Defense"]

[Text] In conformity the earlier decision on further reductions of Soviet troops, temporarily located on the territory of the Hungarian Republic, in 1990 a series of military units and subunits, including one aviation regiment, one motorized-rifle regiment, two separate tank battalions and other units will be returned to the Soviet Union.

In total, this involves: 6,000 servicemen, more than 40 aircraft, 120 tanks, 180 pieces of armored equipment and more than 400 motor vehicles.

UN General Assembly Passes Resolutions on Arms Control

90WC0021B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 17 Dec 89 Second Edition p 5

[Text] A package of resolutions on disarmament and international security was passed on Friday at a plenary session of the UN General Assembly.

Documents prepared in the First Committee (political issues and issues of security, including disarmament) of the UN General Assembly, convincingly indicate that eliminating the threat of nuclear war, reducing nuclear arms, and disarmament continue to be considered tasks of priority importance by the community of nations. Resolutions were passed on nuclear disarmament, on bilateral negotiations on nuclear arms, on ending the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and preventing nuclear war, and on a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons.

In one of the resolutions passed, the Assembly again stated its deep concern in connection with the continuing testing of nuclear weapons. This document reaffirmed the conviction that concluding a treaty to achieve a ban on all test explosions forever by all states is a matter of paramount importance. There were 136 delegations voting for the resolution; 13 abstained. Only three countries voted against it—the United States, Great Britain, and France.

Another resolution contains an urgent appeal to take steps so that a treaty on a universal ban on nuclear testing can be concluded in the near future. The General Assembly is convinced that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and that it should never be unleashed. This document, like others, welcomes the implementation of the INF Treaty and also the fundamental understanding reached between the USSR and the United States regarding an agreement on a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms.

Resolutions have been approved which contain an appeal to conclude as soon as possible a convention on banning the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. A separate resolution devoted to preventing an arms race in outer space. Only the United States voted against this document, approved by 153 votes.

For the first time resolutions were passed on such problems as conversion of military resources, defensive concepts and policy in the area of security, and objective information on military questions.

Just as in the discussion in the committee, voting at the plenary session demonstrated the high degree of unanimity of the member countries of the UN on disarmament issues.

Japan's Military Build-Up Seen as Going Against Tide

90WC0021A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Dec 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by A. Biryukov, TASS political observer: "Tokyo and Malta"]

[Text] The results of the meeting between the leaders of the USSR and the United State in Malta on the whole were welcomed positively in Japan not only in social circles, but also on the official level. "This meeting went beyond the realization of the 'cold war' and therefore deserves the highest assessment," is how Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu characterized it. Minister of Foreign Affairs T. Nakayama regarded it as "an important step in the transition from confrontation to cooperation in relations between the East and West." The Tokyo stock exchange reacted with an increase in the stock quotations of companies doing business with the USSR. This unusual phenomenon for Tokyo was regarded by observers as a reaction to the prospects that have opened up for strengthening detente and developing international cooperation.

However, the palette of reactions to the Malta meeting would be incomplete if we did not mention the attitude towards it of those who stubbornly adhere to the old dogmas. A senior official of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that although "Japan welcomes progress at the talks between the United States and the USSR on arms reductions," the question of its own armed forces "is a separate issue that does not concern the overall process of disarmament." In particular, he spoke out against beginning negotiations on reducing naval arms, calling on the United States "to maintain its naval might as a counterbalance (?) to the land forces of the Soviet Union." S. Nishihiro, deputy chief of the National Defense Agency, expressed himself even more clearly, stating that his agency has no intention of reconsidering plans for building up Japanese armed forces, despite the fundamental changes in the relations between the East and West. Judging from the newspaper YOMIURI SHIMBUN, the only thing the military

department is concerned with right now is "how to explain to the population the need to increase defense spending and secure its understanding when sentiments in favor of lessening tension are expanding."

But the people in Japan indeed do not understand why in the new situation this needs to increase military spending by 6 percent for the 1990 fiscal year. And this is at a time when the size of the overall budget is increasing only by 3.6 percent. Why will this spending, in excess of 4 trillion yen, exceed for the fourth time in a row in recent years the limits once set for them at 1 percent of the gross national product?

The speeches by the deputies of opposition parties in parliament reflected this legitimate bewilderment. They noted that the Japanese government is trying merely to observe the positive changes in the world instead of playing its role in developing the trend toward detente in Asia. Deputies from the Socialist Party, M. Kubota and E. Ito, talked precisely about this. As T. Kanzaki, deputy from the Democratic Socialist Party, noted, among the leading countries Japan is increasing military spending particularly considerably, which seems strange. The government, he emphasized, should demonstrate aggressiveness, calling for a reduction in this spending and disarmament in Asia, and also take the initiative in preparing conditions for disarmament negotiations.

As an influential country, Japan undoubtedly has every opportunity to take on such a mission. Its history and its present role as a leading economic power oblige it to do so.

New U.S. Cruise Missile AGM 129A

90UM0159A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Dec 89 First Edition p 3

[Text] According to the foreign press, the U.S. Air Force received over 1,700 AGM-86B air-launched cruise missiles between 1982 and 1986, having a maximum range of 2,600 km, a 30-m firing accuracy and a 200-kiloton nuclear warhead. Their main carriers are the B-52H, B-52G and B1-B strategic bombers. However, as early as 1983, the General Dynamics firm started to design an advanced air launched cruise missile which, compared to the AGM-86B, should have a higher firing accuracy and lower radar and thermal profiles. It was to possess the following characteristics: a launch weight of around 1,250 kg; a body length, height and width of 6, 0.45 and 0.86 m respectively; the wing span of 1.75 m, a flight range of over 3,000 km, a nuclear warhead equivalent to 200 kilotons of the TNT.

It was planned initially for the new missile, which was called the AGM-129A, to be adopted by 1989, but following the failures of its first tests, it was reportedly put off until 1992. JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY reports that a number of design defects have been detected in the missile again this year, as a result of which only 50 percent of the launches, mostly from the B-52H bomber (see photo) have been successful.

Elimination of Last SS-23 Launcher in Stankovo

90WC0016A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian
29 Oct 89 p 3

[Article by N. Dubovik, SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA special correspondent: "On Friday, at 15:17"]

[Text] On 27 October, the elimination of the SS-23 missiles and the launchers to them was completed in the Soviet Union.

Near the village of Stankovo, within 50 kilometers from Minsk, an unprecedented event was taking place. The last of 388 SS-23 shorter-range missile launchers was being dismantled. Thus, one of the types of nuclear weapons has been fully eliminated in the Soviet Union as provided, specifically, by the INS Treaty.

We can fully understand the feelings of the architect before whose very eyes the house built according to his design is torn down. We can also understand the feelings of the missile launcher crewmen who blew off every speck of dust from the missiles but now, using powerful cutters specially designed at the Paton Institute, chop and cut these launchers.

...And here it is, the last part of the mechanism. I do not know how this thing is called. Without it the transporter vehicle which moves the ominous weapon can, for example, bring beets to market or haul lumber through Siberian roadless terrain.

Applause rang out when this mechanism was removed from the launcher with the aid of a welder. The officers and personnel eagerly posed for the numerous photo correspondents and television reporters, and gave interviews.

"We have eliminated only about 4 percent of the nuclear arsenals," said Officer V. S. Kuchin. "However, even in this I see a great contribution to the common cause of strengthening peace."

[Correspondent] Work on the elimination has been completed. What will happen to the personnel? Will the officers leave the service?

"We have been asked that question quite often," chimed in Officer A. M. Dyakov. "Since we have accumulated a technical arsenal on elimination, and in the future there is the possible reduction of other weapons and the conclusion of new agreements, I hope no one will be left without a job. The experience which our fellows have accumulated will come in very handy."

[Correspondent] Yet in that case you could no longer be called combat officers.

[Dyakov] We are military men. Over a year ago we received an order, which we fulfilled precisely on time. Since 1 August of last year, when the elimination of the launchers began, and to the present day, the American inspectors, who are present here constantly, have not had a single complaint, and not a single point of controversy

has arisen. All the work was performed in strict accordance with the requirements of the INF Treaty and the memorandum to it.

[Correspondent] I see how skillfully the soldiers perform their duties, and I cannot help but get the impression that they were called up to eliminate the launchers, and not to service them!

[Dyakov] Here two-thirds of the personnel are conscripts. They had to recall their civilian specialties as welders, fitters, electricians, installers, and crane operators. Dismantling groups were formed, and duties were assigned in accordance with the technical documentation which came from the manufacturing plants. And do not think that this work is easy.

[Correspondent] Pardon me for a somewhat immodest question. How much does this cost...

[Dyakov] Pardon us too, but we have no one who can answer that question for you.

The Americans also shared their impressions. The head of the U.S. inspection team, Thomas Brock, said at a meeting which was held after the dismantling of the last launcher, that he and his colleagues receive great satisfaction from the opportunity of participating in this historic moment, and evaluate highly the desire for peace by the Soviet and American peoples. He thanked the hosts for their hospitality and mutual understanding. He awaits with great impatience their continued joint work for a better future.

The Russian translation of Mr Brock's short speech was, perhaps, not brilliant from a literary standpoint, but everyone understood his presentation, as confirmed by the friendly applause.

It seemed to me a symbolic moment when a sergeant came up to the tow vehicle which was covered with autographs in Russian and in English, and left his signature. We got to talking. Gennadiy Poluyan was our countryman, from Grodno Oblast. In a few days his term of service would be ending. His specialty as a fitter had been useful to him in the army.

About a year ago, when I first visited the launcher dismantling site, only a few tens of them had been destroyed. And now this was the 388th. There were no more. And there never will be. Just a few hours earlier, the last missile had been blown up in Saryozek, in the Kazakh SSR. The transporter vehicle will go to the national economy, while the small scraps of metal, and even the twisted nuts and bolts, had been taken away as souvenirs by the overly curious journalists. I too could not resist the temptation. And here it is—a little piece of some panel. There are two words stamped on it: "open" and "closed". At one time they had some meaning for the specialists. But now there seemed to be an entirely different meaning to these simple words. We tried to catch up with and surpass America in everything. Missiles were no exception. And now the road to the arms

race is being closed. Yet our hearts remain open for good deeds and for peace. So that public rubles will be used to make not launchers, but more of the refrigerators, automobiles, televisions, and disposable syringes which we so badly need...

The Americans do not need to come here to serve only as inspectors. Let them come simply as guests. After all, it cannot be that the American people have nothing better to spend their money on than weapons! They too have a shortage. It is called simply: the shortage of communication with the Soviet people.

Ideological Aspects of Nuclear Deterrence Examined

90UI0123A Moscow *POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIYE* in Russian No 14, Sep 89 pp 81-89

[Article by Timofey Romanovich Kondratkov, doctor of philosophical sciences and professor: "Ideological Aspects of the Struggle Against the Nuclear Threat"]

[Text] On the threshold of the third millennium mankind is facing a terrible danger unparalleled in history—the possibility of destroying all life on earth several times over. After becoming a permanent factor, the nuclear threat never disappeared. It is leaving an indelible mark on the thinking, life, and actions of people, classes, parties, and states and arouses vehement protests by peaceful forces against arms buildups and ideological and physical preparations for war. The peace movement, uniting millions of people in Europe and on other continents, came into being under the influence of this threat. Its members are united and held together by a thorough understanding of the need to avert a nuclear disaster and secure the survival of mankind. A nuclear war must never be started. Mankind can, should, and must be delivered from the nuclear nightmare forever.

The peaceful policy and initiatives of the Soviet Union, the socialist countries, and all peaceful states allowed the process of disarmament to begin. It was also promoted by reciprocal moves by the U.S. administration and the support of realistic politicians in other countries and of the progressive world public. The treaty between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, which was signed in December 1987 in Washington and then went into force, was the first tangible step toward nuclear disarmament and the demilitarization of human life.

The progression toward a nuclear-free world, however, is taking place in the atmosphere of a complex struggle in all spheres of social life—political, economic, scientific, technical, and military. It has also become acute in the ideological sphere, effectively influencing the speed and nature of social development and the peace and security of nations. In this struggle, common human interests are combined with class and national interests. It should unite and connect, and not disunite, the fighters for

peace and against the nuclear threat, make the disarmament process irreversible, and allow mankind to enter the 21st century in peace.

Interpretations of the Essence of Peace in Various Theories

The nuclear threat, which is hanging over mankind like the sword of Damocles, has heightened the interest of Western ideologists, politicians, and military leaders in political issues and questions of war and peace and has forced them to begin investigating them and seeking ways of means of keeping the peace and preventing war. To this end, more than 300 institutes have been established in the postwar years as part of the International Peace Research Association, the services of impressive scientific forces have been enlisted, around 150 magazines have been published, and the number of books, brochures, and articles on this subject matter has snowballed each year.

The desire for a more thorough understanding of peace and its qualitative opposite—war—is indisputably positive. This kind of research plays an important part in explaining the pernicious effects of a nuclear conflict to the broad masses and in promoting their organization and activity in the struggle to keep the peace. The recommendations of scientists can also assist politicians and statesmen in the search for constructive approaches to the cardinal issue and in the development of the new political thinking, without which world peace cannot be secured. Only the new political thinking, M.S. Gorbachev stressed, "can motivate all participants in international relations to take immediate measures to prevent the nuclear disaster that could mean the extinction of the human race."

Peace research came into being more than a quarter of a century ago and became a separate field of knowledge, represented in our day by various currents. Heated debates on various aspects of the issue often break out among these currents. For example, the advocates of the "science" of peace, or irenology (from the Greek "ierene"—peace, and "logos"—studies), believe that research in this field should begin with an analysis of the essence of peace and the search for ways of keeping the peace. On the other hand, the representatives of the polemological school (from the Greek "polemos"—war), which came into being in France and other Western countries, define the purpose of their studies with the phrase: "If you want peace, learn more about war." The road to peace, in their opinion, lies primarily through studies of the nature of war. In other words, there is no "peace" even among the researchers of peace who belong to the different currents engaged in heated debates.

Quite understandably, the research is conducted on the basis of the bourgeois view of the world and methodological pluralism, primarily on the basis of "pacifist values." Many political scientists define peace in line with Kantian traditions as a "presumptive ideal." a

"matter of intelligence," or an "act of will." This naturally affects the nature, depth, practical results, and social value of the research.

The main objective of the representatives of the largest theoretical current is the elaboration of a new theory of peace applicable to nuclear realities. One of them has been called "negative" peace. The theory was put forth in the initial period of research. It is explained in negative terms: "Peace," wrote American Professor J. Galtung, "in a negative and limited sense, means the absence of war."¹

There is no question that peace exists only in regions where there is no war, and that there can be no peace where wars are being fought. Peace, however, represents more than just the absence of war, as the advocates of the negative theory define it. It has a broader and more substantive meaning than mere non-war. It embodies the negative description of peace (the absence of war) and the positive description, enumerating the positive features and characteristics distinguishing it from armed conflicts and wars.

By the same token, war, the opposite of peace, is frequently given an equally one-sided interpretation. In Western literature, there are more than a dozen theories of war: sociological, biological, psychological, geopolitical, ecological, ethical, multifactorial, and others. In this varied kaleidoscope, the biological interpretation of social processes is experiencing something like a "renaissance." Its advocates regard war as a natural phenomenon, allegedly rooted in the aggressive nature of the human being, in his blood. Wars are inevitable, according to the authors of "Aggression und Gewalt," a book published by Western researchers, because it is "human nature" that causes them to break out periodically and irrepressibly.²

Similar views are expressed by the previously mentioned J. Galtung, who defines war as "organized aggression." He equates war with any conflict in human society or nature. In line with this, Galtung divides wars into three categories: "megawars" (the possible nuclear war, artificial changes in climate, tidal waves, earthquakes, etc.), "macrowars" (the two world wars), and "microwars" (partisan actions, terrorism, etc.).³ This interpretation underestimates the connection between armed violence and the policies of classes and states and does not paint an accurate picture of war, of peace, or of their relationship.

Peace, like war, is a sociohistorical phenomenon and a developing process. It is a specific system of social relations between classes, nationalities, nations, states, groups of states, and various social systems, based on the pursuit of policy by non-violent means. An understanding of peace requires more than the establishment of its connection with politics. It also requires the disclosure of its dependence on other spheres of social relations—economic, ideological, and moral. It is this that makes the determination of its physical basis and its

sociopolitical and moral-legal appraisal (the just and democratic peace and the unjust and undemocratic peace) possible.

"Positive" peace is equated with the concept of social "harmony," "justice," and "freedom." The three-volume book "Politikwissenschaft" published by West German political scientists, for example, says that freedom is a reliable guarantee of peace and that peace without freedom is a "graveyard peace."⁴ The authors, however, discuss the concept of "freedom" in the abstract and do not relate it to the interests of progressive classes and the popular masses.

Western sociologists analyze peace from the "negative" and "positive" standpoints in the context of foreign and domestic relations. Some of them allege that only a "negative" peace, or a "cold peace," is possible between states of different social systems. "Positive" peace is supposedly impossible because of the deep-seated conflicts between them and the absence of a "positive" foundation. This is an erroneous theory because peace is not the mere absence of war. It is a process with a positive content; it is an international order where good-neighbor relations and cooperation prevail instead of military force.

According to Western researchers, the stability of international peace depends directly on domestic peace. According to them, the latter primarily signifies conflict-free relations between various classes and strata in the bourgeois society and a partnership between labor and capital. In a book on war and peace, West German officer G. Rose writes that people must forget their differences and unite against the nuclear threat: good and bad people, the exploiters and the exploited, the poor and the rich, revolutionaries and conservatives, believers and non-believers. "All of those who see each other as enemies, opponents, and rivals," he stresses, "must become allies in the struggle against the common threat."⁵ World peace, peace among nations, according to this author's line of reasoning, can be maintained only through the achievement of "social peace" in the capitalist society by means of its "pacification" and with the aid of class integration and cooperation.

Another current of peace research took shape at the same time as the theoretical current—"scientific" (from the English word "science"), or applied, peace research. It is distinguished by psychological, technocratic, moral, and other interpretations of peace and of peacekeeping methods. The psychological school, for example, associates the possibility of keeping the peace with the psychological reorientation of the human being, the development of a personality devoid of aggressive impulses, and the surmounting of the "enemy image." The main role in this process is to be played by "peace education," which is supposed to change the "hearts and minds of people" and make them peaceful.⁶ This is how the psychologists hope to curb human belligerence and consolidate peace,

but it is completely obvious that education does not have the strength or resources to guarantee international peace and security.

Some Western sociologists who were dissatisfied with the state of peace research launched a series of "critical studies." They advise the more thorough investigation of social conflicts and assign priority to the elaboration of a general strategy of peace. They suggest different ways of maintaining "international law and order": the establishment of "universal democracy" and the achievement of "fundamental social justice." In their opinion, these measures should be carried out in democratic ways and should secure peace on the national and global levels.

The peace research which has been conducted for more than 30 years in the West has produced a great deal of concrete documented information of scientific interest, but even the Western sociologists admit that its results have been quite meager: It has not been able to make peace more lasting. This has been impeded by many factors, including philosophical and methodological ones. West German political scientist E.O. Czempel writes about the "methodological impotence"⁷ in this kind of research in his book "Friedensstrategien." The factors also include the lack of scope and new ideas in the political thinking of the sociologists and the fragmentation or "atomization" of the theory of research, which sometimes leads to abstract ideas with only a weak relationship to the actual struggle against the nuclear threat.

'Nuclear Peace'—The Road to the Abyss

The development of programs for the guarantee of peace is an important area of peace research. One U.S. institute specializes in constructing and publicizing models of the future "world order." These global and local models, which cover the political, economic, and ideological spheres, reflect their authors' acknowledgement of the pernicious effects of the escalation of the arms race and preparations for nuclear war. Models of this kind are vulnerable, however, because they are built without sufficient consideration for the main tendencies in the development of the world sociohistorical process and are based on their creators' biased and sometimes false opinions of the sources and causes of the nuclear threat. It is completely obvious that these programs cannot offer precise points of reference in the fight against the forces of contemporary militarism.

The most popular models of world peace are based on three versions of the political ideal. The advocates of the first suggest the creation of a single mammoth world state on the ruins of the sovereign national states which are supposedly the source of wars. This world state is to be headed by a "world government," which will establish "general order" and eliminate armed conflicts and wars. "Moral considerations" are the only guarantee that this state will not become a tyrannical global dictatorship.

The second political model is the opposite of the first. Its advocates believe that the main reasons for the absence

of lasting peace are the existence and rivalry of large states—the “superpowers.”⁸ In line with this, they propose the “Switzerlandization” of the world political structure, the fragmentation of the giant states, and their replacement with several smaller states. In their opinion, this will secure world peace and establish order in international relations.

The supporters of the third idea believe that world peace will be the result of convergence, of changes in the policies of capitalist and socialist states which will bring them closer together, alleviate conflicts between them, and accomplish “universal integration.” The utopian nature of this political program for the achievement of peace, and of those described above, is completely obvious, because they do not suggest any realistic ways or means of attaining world peace.

The ideological model occupies an important place in research. Its authors regard war as the product and continuation of clashes between hostile ideologies. Keeping the peace would necessitate the cessation of struggle between opposing ideologies and the accomplishment of their “coexistence.” For example, “*Baendigung der Macht*,” a book by sociologists, politicians, and military leaders in the FRG, says that “the acknowledgement of the coexistence of various social systems must be supplemented with ideological coexistence to avoid a worldwide East-West conflict.”⁹

The ideological model, like the political one, does not offer an accurate view of the ways of keeping world peace. After all, the acute ideological struggle and conflicts between the two views of the world are an unavoidable process reflecting the differences between the world systems—capitalism and socialism. This struggle is governed by the general laws of the development of social existence and the rules of class struggle. It does, however, have features distinguishing it from political, economic, and other forms of struggle. One of the most important features is the impossibility of extending the principles of peaceful coexistence to this struggle. What is needed here is the resolute repulsion of the “crusade” against socialism, the exposure of imperialism’s acts of ideological and psychological sabotage against peaceful forces, and the provision of these forces with a scientifically sound program of action in defense of peace.

It is significant, however, that the ideological struggle does not preclude the peaceful coexistence of the two social systems. It must not be carried over into the sphere of intergovernmental relations, cross boundaries threatening dangerous conflicts, or reach the stage of ideological warfare. “Ideological differences,” M.S. Gorbachev stressed, “cannot be transferred to the sphere of intergovernmental relations or influence foreign policy-making, because ideologies can be polar, but the interest in survival and in the prevention of war is a universal and higher interest.”

The religious model of peace, reflecting the antimilitaristic feelings of believers and religious leaders and their

participation in the peace movement, is being preached just as insistently. The sources of the threat to peace, the theologians assert, can be found in the “sinful nature” of human beings and their deviations from God’s divine plan. Peace is interpreted not as a sociopolitical issue, but exclusively as a religious issue, which supposedly can be resolved only on the basis of biblical precepts. The only road to peace lies through the cultivation of faith. The authors of the previously mentioned “*Baendigung der Macht*” assert that God will bestow peace on the world only “when all people observe his commandments and when all people prove their faith through genuine acts of love.”

Economic, technocratic, and other programs for the exclusion of armed violence from society are advocated along with the political-ideological and religious models. Some bourgeois sociologists hope to found the edifice of world peace on a “global economy,” reinforced by technical and technological achievements of the highest order, so that capitalism can become a society of “universal prosperity,” free of military conflicts. Others propose the creation of a “scientific-technical civilization,” in which the interpersonal relations based on capitalist exploitation and violence will disappear from the social arena and “preparedness for war” will be replaced by “preparedness for peace.” Still others dream of building a supra-national computerized system to process huge amounts of political data and draw up the appropriate recommendations of ways of surmounting conflicts and keeping the peace.

Programs for the establishment of peace with the aid of stricter international laws, the moral education of children in the spirit of peace, expanded trade between countries, the controlled growth of the economic strength of states, and other methods are being proposed.

Various pacifistic theories of peace are popular in the West, including “nuclear pacifism.” The pacifists profess different views, but they have a common aversion to the use of armed violence to settle political differences. They regard the use of any weapon as an immoral act. Preaching peace at any price, the pacifists oppose wars involving the use of nuclear weapons and all other wars, including just wars. Marxist-Leninists reject the pacifist ideology, but they support those who take action in the struggle for peace instead of confining themselves to verbal objections. “It makes a difference to us,” V.I. Lenin stressed, “whether we are dealing with the members of the bourgeois camp who are inclined to find military solutions to problems or with the members of the bourgeois camp who have pacifist inclinations, even if it is the most wretched ideology and will not, from the communist standpoint, survive even the slightest hint of criticism.”¹⁰

It is easy to see that the many different theories, models, and programs of world peace the Western researchers have produced are frequently of an abstract and speculative nature. They do not reveal the real causes of the danger of war and are intended to rationalize and

maintain the capitalist order. This is the reason for their weakness, vulnerability, and impracticability. Nevertheless, the theories, models, and programs of the Western researchers of peace are of an antimilitarist nature and condemn armed violence and war. This is their positive side.

It is no coincidence that rightwing conservative ideologists, politicians, and military leaders are doing everything within their power to denigrate peace research by portraying it as "pacifistic opium," a "nuclear allergy," superficial "yellow journalism," and a "capitulation ideology" and accusing it of "disturbing the peace" and of undermining the defensive potential of the "Atlantic community" and contributing to the successes of Soviet foreign policy. Attempts have been made to isolate peace research from the antinuclear movement, to erect barriers between them, to weaken them from within, and to sow the seeds of dissension.

Imperialist groups and their conservative ideologists are countering the complex spectrum of theories, models, and programs refuting violence and war with the idea of "nuclear peace," which is the successor to the old idea of "violent peace" with its categorical imperative, "if you want peace, prepare for war." In the opinion of conservatives, a world without weapons is a pacifist's utopia. Only a peace based on a "balance" of power and on the buildup of nuclear, space, and conventional weapons seems realistic to them. The elimination of nuclear weapons and the retention of only conventional weapons, in their opinion, would be a step backward, thrusting mankind back into the old system which gave rise to conflicts and wars for thousands of years. "We can dream of a world without nuclear weapons," M. Thatcher said, "but reliable defense cannot be built on dreams. In the absence of more trust than exists now between the East and West, a world without nuclear weapons will be less stable and more dangerous for all of us." Vice-President D. Quayle of the United States expressed the same opinion. When he addressed the annual convention of the National Conservative Political Action Committee, he spoke of the current administration's adherence to the theory of "peace from a position of strength" and of its determination to carry out the plans for the modernization of strategic and conventional weapons and to make use of the "weaknesses of our opponents." The leaders of France, in turn, have announced that they have no intention of halting the buildup of their nuclear potential. This is the logic of contemporary conservatism, which suffers from a shortage of the new political thinking and new approaches to nuclear realities.

The theory of "nuclear peace" is particularly dangerous now that it has acquired the nature of government policy. It constitutes the ideological basis of the official foreign policy and strategic aims of the United States and its allies. Evidence of this can be found in the NATO bloc's current military doctrine of "flexible response" and its overseas sister, the "new military strategy" for

the 1980's and 1990's, supplemented by the "competitive strategy." The latter presupposes the achievement of U.S. military supremacy over the USSR with the use of the "Stealth" technology, which will make aircraft and cruise missiles "invisible" to radar, and with the help of the new discoveries in the field of superconductivity and projects related to the "Strategic Defense Initiative" ("Star Wars"), which the Western press calls the "new Maginot Line."¹¹

The architects of these doctrines feel that world peace can be maintained by means of the mutual intimidation of the nuclear powers, a "balance of terror" which will keep rival states from taking the fatal step. They see the state of peace as a constant atmosphere of intimidation, secured by the continued growth of the weapons arsenal, to which more and more lethal types of weapons, including space weapons, will be added. The doctrines assigning the arms race the role of a stabilizing factor in international relations and a guarantee of peace will not consolidate U.S. and NATO security, but will heighten the danger of destruction instead, will doom people and states to live in constant fear of the horrors of an irrevocable tragedy, and will turn them into nuclear hostages. The authors of "Chancen des Friedens," a book published by a group of Western researchers, make the accurate observation that doctrines based on "mutual intimidation" pose the "greatest threat of nuclear war."¹²

Guided by the postulates of their doctrines, rightwing conservatives in the United States and the NATO militarists are trying to change the military-strategic balance in their own favor. The military-strategic equilibrium which was established between the socialist world and the capitalist world in the last few decades, however, is suppressing the aggressive appetites of the fans of military ventures. The maintenance of military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO did much to restrict the aggressive plans and abilities of imperialism to start a nuclear war and also did much to strengthen the position of our motherland and of world socialism in the international arena.

Therefore, the military doctrines based on the model of "nuclear peace" are dangerous. They take foreign policy and strategic aims beyond all reasonable and rational limits, imprint them with irrational and inhumane features and turn them into a lethal threat to all mankind, and intensify the resistance of peaceful nations and states.

The Road to a Nuclear-Free World

The only reasonable alternative to the "nuclear peace" publicized by conservative ideologists, politicians, and military leaders is the nuclear-free, non-violent world which is the theoretical product of the new political thinking and substantive practical moves in the international arena. The substantiation for this program can be found in the documents of the 27th party congress, in

General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986 and his speech of 7 December 1988 in the United Nations, and in other documents. This is a massive program reflecting the realities of the nuclear space age. It is a reliable foundation for the peaceful future of our planet. It is designed to change the world situation for the better, allow man to enter the third millennium without nuclear weapons, release people from the fear of a global holocaust, and raise civilization to a qualitatively new level.

Socialism, which is devoid of exploitation and oppression, rejects war as an instrument of policy and a means of settling international conflicts and ideological disputes. Its ideal is a world without weapons and violence, a world in which each nationality, large or small, will be free to choose its own pattern of development and its own way of life. It is a reflection of the humanism of communist ideology, its moral values, and its ideals.

In contrast to the imperialist theories and doctrines which view war as the driving force of history and acknowledge only a peace teetering on the brink of nuclear destruction, our program of peace denies the fatal inevitability of war and substantiates the possibility of its prevention. It embodies all of the strength of the ideals and principles of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which V.I. Lenin called the "first victory in the campaign to eliminate war."¹³ Lenin's Decree on Peace put forth a clear and precise plan of struggle for a just and democratic peace. Since that time our country has been fighting for more than 70 years for the establishment of peace throughout the world, for the freedom and independence of nations, and for the restraint of aggressive and militaristic forces. This struggle is particularly important today, now that the issue of war and peace has essentially turned into a matter of the life or death of human civilization.

The historic objective of the specific period of time covered by the Soviet program of peace is universal and total disarmament under strict and comprehensive international control and the limitation and contraction of the sphere of military preparations. The most important link in our program is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by means of the cessation of the testing and production of all types of nuclear weapons, the refusal of all nuclear powers to use such weapons first, and a nuclear freeze followed by the reduction and complete elimination of nuclear arsenals. It calls for the destruction of American and Soviet intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in line with the treaty between the USSR and the United States, the radical reduction of strategic offensive arms, the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, and the negotiation of a nuclear test ban and an agreement on the prevention of the militarization of space.

The establishment of peace will also be promoted by the cessation of the production of other weapons of mass destruction, including space weapons, their subsequent elimination, a ban on the development of new weapons

of this type, the reduction of the armed forces of states, the reduction of troops and arms in the most explosive regions of the planet, the elimination of military bases on foreign territory, and the just political settlement of regional conflicts.

A comprehensive international security system occupies an important place in the group of measures intended to secure peace. In the nuclear space age the security of one state cannot be guaranteed to the detriment or at the expense of the security of other states. Security can only be mutual, it can only be common. It must be achieved through joint efforts and political means, and not through armed force. It must be secured by the negotiated reduction, and not the buildup, of weapons. Common security presupposes unconditional respect for the rights of each nation to be free and independent and will not permit imperialist diktat and interference in the internal affairs of other nations.

In accordance with its program for a nuclear-free, non-violent world, the Soviet Union decided to reduce its armed forces unilaterally. In 1989 and 1990 armed forces personnel will be reduced by 500,000 men. By the terms of an agreement with our Warsaw Pact allies, the USSR will withdraw six tank divisions from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary and dissolve them by 1991. The assault landing units and other combined units and smaller units, including assault crossing units, will also be withdrawn from the groups of Soviet troops in these countries along with their weapons and materiel. The Soviet troops in these countries will be reduced by 50,000 people, and the armaments will be reduced by 5,000 tanks.

All of the Soviet divisions remaining on the territory of our allies will be reorganized. They will have a different structure than they have today. After the removal of the tanks, it will be an unequivocally defensive structure. The number of personnel and the number of weapons in the European part of the USSR will be reduced at the same time.

In all, the Soviet armed forces in this part of our country and on the territory of our European allies will be reduced by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat planes. In these 2 years the USSR will also reduce the armed forces in the Asian part of the country considerably. By agreement with the MPR Government, many of the Soviet troops stationed there temporarily will come back home. The most important foreign policy move of recent years was the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Our country will maintain its defensive potential, however, at the level of reasonable and reliable sufficiency. The USSR Congress of People's Deputies advocated the continued qualitative development of the Soviet Armed Forces in line with current structural principles.

The preservation of peace and the prevention of war—nuclear and conventional—are the aims of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states and the national

military doctrines elaborated on this basis. A document on the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact countries, approved by the Political Consultative Committee in May 1987 in Berlin, the capital of the GDR, conclusively declared the strictly defensive nature of socialism's military strategy and the truly innovative and comprehensive nature of its proposals. Demonstrating a strong sense of responsibility, the Warsaw Pact states announced that they will never take military action against any other state under any circumstances unless they are the targets of an armed attack. They will never use nuclear weapons first. They do not have any claims to the territory of any other state in Europe or elsewhere. They do not regard any state or people as their enemy. Balance and parity were and are the main factor of military-strategic stability. The allied socialist states will not strive for more security than other countries, but they will not settle for less either.

The program for the nuclear-free, non-violent world is not simply a scientific theory. It is a guide for action. It does not pretend to have a monopoly on the truth. It calls for a constructive dialogue on this issue concerning the future of the human race. Attempts to underrate it or denigrate it, which could take different forms, will not be allowed either. Galtung, for example, called it "unrealistic."¹⁴ Statements of this kind are groundless. They are contrary to the facts and are refuted by the measures which have been taken and are being taken with the aim of curbing nuclear militarism and preventing the extinction of human civilization.

The achievement of peace is a realistic objective. The experience of the last few years suggests the possibility of a world order based on the principles of freedom of choice and a balance of interests, on the condition of the reduction of arms and of military confrontation. The Soviet Union is proving this with its actions and its foreign policy.

Footnotes

1. J. Galtung, "Stabilitaet oder Unsicherheit?" in "Sicherheitspolitik kontrovers," Bonn, 1987, p 54.
2. "Aggression und Gewalt," Wuerzburg, 1985, p 53.
3. "Global Militarization," Boulder, 1985, p 2.
4. "Politikwissenschaft," Stuttgart, vol I, 1987, p 91.
5. G. Rose, "Kehrt um.... Denn wird duerfen das Boese nicht wiederholen," Frankfurt, 1987, p 7.
6. "Lexikon. Ruestung. Frieden. Sicherheit," Munich, 1987, pp 97-98.
7. E.O. Czempiel, "Friedensstrategien," Paderborn, 1986, p 27.
8. R.M. Lawrence, "Strategic Defense Initiative," Boulder, 1987, p 3.
9. "Baendigung der Macht," Herford, 1986, p 24.

10. V.I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 45, p 70.

11. J. Connel, "New Maginot Line," London, 1986, p 176.

12. "Chancen des Friedens," Baden-Baden, 1986, p 14.

13. V.I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 44, p 149.

14. "Sicherheitspolitik kontrovers," p 57.

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Garthoff Book on ABM Treaty Interpretation Reviewed

181600181 Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 89 pp 135-136

[Review by D. Klimov of the book "Policy Versus the Law. The Reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty" by Raymond L. Garthoff, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1987, 117 pp]

[Text] The reinterpretation or what is also commonly called the "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty is examined in the monograph "Policy versus the Law. The Reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty" by Raymond L. Garthoff, a leading associate of the Brookings Institution and a participant in the Salt I talks (in the process of which this treaty was drafted).

The reinterpretation idea was born in close connection with attempts at the outright repudiation of the ABM Treaty. "Without a doubt," the author notes, "the unilateral reinterpretation of the Treaty is the easiest way of modifying it. To amend it would require the assistance not only of the U. S. Senate but of the Soviet Union as well. Repudiation of the treaty would cause serious negative resonance in NATO countries and would have a most negative impact on the Soviet Union, including the almost certain termination of the arms control process between the USSR and USA" (p 5).

As we comment on this situation, we note that the SDI idea was met with skepticism in U. S. political and scientific circles. Many scientists and members of congress did not share President Reagan's optimistic views of the program from the very beginning. The fate of the ABM Treaty evoked the special concern of both one and the other. Thus while congress supported SDI as a research program, it clearly indicated that it would not allow it to go beyond the framework of the treaty. The White House justifiably feared that the unilateral repudiation of the treaty would result in the still greater hardening of positions on Capitol Hill which had already made significant cuts in SDI allocations. The fate of the entire program might be at stake.

The idea that the ABM Treaty might be interpreted differently than initially intended was first expressed by

Donald Brinnan of the Hudson Institute in 1975, i. e., almost immediately after its ratification and the signing of the appropriate protocol (1974). This idea was next expressed independently of Brinnan in 1977 by A. Baker and W. Harris of the Rand Corporation. Even though R. Garthoff does not focus special attention on this point, he nevertheless notes that the idea was not made public until April 1985 by the Heritage Foundation, an organization that traditionally occupies right-wing, conservative positions in the U. S. political sector (p 6). The idea was publicized only when it was really needed to cover up work being performed within the framework of SDI.

The justification for the "broad interpretation" was prepared by Abraham Sofaer, chief legal adviser at the Department of State. The first attempts here were made by a certain Philip Kunsberg who took up this question at the request of Richard Pearl, an assistant to the erstwhile secretary of defense, and Fred Ickle, an under secretary of defense. P. Kunsberg wrote a 19-page report that radically reexamined the customary interpretation of the treaty. Thus it was said that it allowed not only development and testing but even the deployment of ABM defense systems based on new physical principles (p 7).

The problem was subsequently addressed by A. Sofaer. He also spoke out in favor of a "broad interpretation," but in his report confined himself to the statement that the treaty allowed only development and testing. Thereafter the Pentagon (or more precisely, Pearl and Ickle) decided to immediately reject the absurdly radical interpretation submitted by P. Kunsberg (p 8).

On 6 October 1985 R. McFarlane, the then national security aide to the president, stated that the White House had arrived at a new definition of the main circumstance stemming from the ABM Treaty. He did not say that the administration had reexamined the treaty and begun interpreting the circumstances differently. However he declared that the ABM defense systems based on the new physical principles "are allowed and authorized by the ABM Treaty" (pp 2-3). This was essentially the first official announcement of the "broad interpretation."

R. Garthoff writes: "In the event the new interpretation were to take effect, it would create significantly greater potential for development and testing under the SDI program" (p 5). Lt Gen J. Abrahamson, former director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, stated in a speech to congress: "The time will obviously come when we enter the development stage. This stage will demand that we engage in more intensive testing and then we will have to modify the treaty so that it will not be an obstacle" (p 5).

R. McFarlane's statement was, strictly speaking, a kind of first trial balloon in the administration's attempt to impart official status to the reinterpretation idea. This attempt was met very cautiously and even negatively by

the American public and the congress. But the justification for it had already been prepared by A. Sofaer and had been made public by him several days before R. McFarlane's statement. The book cites an interesting fact: on the same day that A. Sofaer submitted his report, on the anniversary of the day the ABM Treaty took effect, six former U. S. secretaries of defense (H. Brown, C. Clifford, M. Laird, R. McNamara, E. Richardson) came out with a statement. In this statement, they emphasized that the ABM Treaty "was making a significant contribution to the strengthening of American security" and warned both sides against actions that might undermine it (p 9).

Voices of protest have also been heard in the Senate. Thus, on 1 December 1986, Carl Levin (D-Michigan) made public a 12-page letter against the adoption of the "broad interpretation." Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) sent a letter to the President on 6 February 1987 in which he warned that the adoption of the latter without first consulting congress might lead to a "constitutional confrontation" (pp 15-16).

Concern over the intention of official Washington to adopt the "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty was expressed by many U. S. allies: M. Thatcher, prime minister of Great Britain; H. Kohl, chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany; and Lord P. Carrington, the erstwhile secretary general of NATO. Concern was expressed by Japan, Canada, and other countries (ibid.).

R. Garthoff makes special mention of these examples which have become widely known today, showing one more time how insolvent the idea of reinterpretation was initially. He thus reinforces his prejudice against adopting an untraditional interpretation of the treaty.

In his recapitulation, the author writes that the decision-making process in the White House vis-a-vis the reinterpretation is "random and inadequate." "There was no internal discussion of the justification of the new interpretation," he writes. "The obvious negative consequences of making such a decision were not taken into account. There was no consultation within the administration. There was no discussion with the President before the new policy was adopted and made public. There was no consultation with congress. There was no consultation with allies who were not even informed about this. There was no consultation or even appropriate notification of the other side—the Soviet Union" (pp 18-19).

"The United States Constitution," R. Garthoff reminds us, obligates the President "to see to it that the laws are strictly observed." And in accordance with Article VI of the Constitution, the ABM Treaty is the "supreme law of the land." Thus, the question of interpretation requires more serious official analysis rather than rash political decisions" (p 101).

"The reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty," we read, posed numerous problems, influencing not only the future of the treaty, SDI, and strategic arms limitation

and reduction, but also the development of relations between the USSR and USA, the international situation, and the internal political life of the nation, violating all democratic traditions in accordance with which policy is coordinated with the provisions of the law. The United States cannot allow itself to be found in the position of a Vietnam village, about which an American captain said the following: "We have to destroy it in order to save it," the author concludes (p 107).

In a sense the monograph under review continues a series of books, articles, pamphlets, and speeches by various U. S. political and public figures on the question of reinterpretation. Its very advent is evidence of the seriousness with which this problem is perceived in internal political debates. The opinion of a direct participant in negotiations concerning the ABM Treaty is of higher significance. (Incidentally, of all the participants in the negotiations, Paul Nitze is the only one who supports the idea of reinterpretation to this very day).

Detailed analysis of the movement of the treaty through the American Senate, sound factual material, the author's evaluations and judgments contained in the work form a common flow of unremitting criticism of the idea of the "broad interpretation." In this sense, R. Garthoff's monograph has obvious practical significance for the entire discussion of such an important problem.

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Semipalatinsk Test Range Conference Held

90WP0001A Moscow STROITELNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 184, 10 Aug 89 p 4

[Article by B. Kuzmenko, STROITELNAYA GAZETA correspondent: "Test Range With No Secrets: Meeting Participants Demand Nuclear Test Ban"]

[Text] Semipalatinsk—The recently published appeal of the USSR Supreme Soviet to the U.S. Congress regarding a moratorium on nuclear explosions and a cessation of nuclear tests mentioned that the need to strengthen an international regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to find a workable method of eliminating threats of nuclear war are felt more acutely now than ever before. The question of a complete cessation of nuclear tests, as proposed two decades ago, are becoming more urgent with each passing year.

The demands for a complete cessation of nuclear tests, as voiced at the first USSR Congress of People's Deputies showed that the time has come to take practical and immediate actions.

It is difficult to grow unused to the multitudinous "not supposed to's" which until relatively recently literally permeated the entirety of this country's public life.

During those years, secrecy tightly sealed up numerous questions whose answers were known to everyone in the world but us.

The words of Lieutenant General A. Ilyenko smacked of nostalgia for that time:

"It is not for us to decide whether to shut down or not to shut down the test range."

He said this in his address at a scientific and practical conference which was held in Semipalatinsk and devoted to public health and the ecological situation in the city and oblast. It evoked a stormy reaction from the conferees, whose mood was reflected by A. Popov, secretary of the Soviet Committee of the world-wide "Doctors Opposed to Nuclear War" movement, who responded as follows to the test range chief:

"It certainly is up to us, the people!"

The passion raging in the conference hall was serious. And this is understandable. For the first time in the 40-year existence in Semipalatinsk of a test range where nuclear weapons are tested, the problems associated with this facility were discussed openly. The entire oblast center followed the work of the conference. Each meeting began with a reading of telegrams from labor collectives. They included messages from workers at the Semipalatinsk Cement Plant, the Prefabricated Reinforced Concrete Production Association, the Semzhilstroy [Semipalatinsk House-Building] Trust and other organizations. All the telegrams concluded with the same thought: We demand that the test range be shut down and moved to another area. Here, the hall echoed with applause which was interpreted as a challenge to the practice of many years of concealing the very fact that this secret facility even existed.

The mass discontent of the oblast's population overflowed when on 12 February of this year, radioactive inert gases were released and covered certain population centers following regularly-scheduled tests. The residents of Semipalatinsk supported the society of the entire republic, and formed the Nevada-Kazakhstan Movement, which set its goal as the total worldwide ban of nuclear weapons tests. The Chernobyl tragedy greatly influenced this active resistance movement.

Considering this situation, which has become very complex, a comprehensive interdepartmental commission of scientists and experts was formed under the direction of the national government and sent to the oblast. It consists of 22 functional groups whose work has brought in specialists from Moscow, Leningrad, Obninsk, Alma-Ata and Semipalatinsk, as well as representatives of the public and the press. The commission spent three weeks analyzing government statistical accounts and studying material, some of which was 30 years old. They also evaluated the ecological situation as well as the population's health over the course of many years. The commission examined all the existing archival materials

concerning the radiation situation and radiation doses, and 40,000 people were examined.

These facts were presented in the opening address delivered at the conference by A. Tsyba, commission chairman, director of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences' Scientific Research Institute of Medical Radiology. He was heard out in total silence: the conferees, which included a great many representatives of the public of the oblast and republic as well as the Altay Kray, were not as interested in how the work was done as in its results. But not everyone turned out to be prepared to perceive these results objectively. The next speaker—M. Orlov, head of the USSR Goskomgidromet [State Committee on Hydrometeorology] Scientific Production Association Laboratory—now felt this. His notion that the presence of the test range in the Semipalatinsk Oblast had no noticeable effect on the radiation situation of the surrounding territory was met with outright distrust.

This feeling gradually grew in strength. Passions in the hall became heated and every now and then claps of protest rang out, drowning out the speakers' voices when their information conflicted with the mood of the majority. V. Stepanenko, a scientist from the Institute of Medical Radiology, who had not been allowed to finish his speech, felt this for himself. During the intermission, he spoke with perplexity:

"I reported on the radiation effect of the 1949-1963 period of atmospheric and ground testing. There used to be so many reproaches about suppressing these data! Nowadays all the seals have been removed. The commissions have been provided with materials which used to be considered secret. The information is complete and objective. But the people in the hall are not prepared to comprehend it.

"I think they are capable of understanding. You see, the people of Semipalatinsk were 'fed' rumors instead of accurate information for so many years that many of them ended up with a unique psychological version of a 'bitter taste in the mouth'. Their lack of information regarding the results of the dosimetric monitoring beyond their locality, the effect of radiation on people's health and the effect of the seismic factor gradually heightened their psychic and emotional stress. People stopped believing even obvious facts. The public saw the onset of serious, primarily oncological, diseases as simply the result of the radiation effect. No one, for example, paid any attention to the fact which was brought up in the course of the polemics that the 300 municipal boiler houses are literally polluting the atmosphere of the oblast center. The concentration of various harmful substances in the air exceeds the maximum allowable limit 1.5-2-fold."

Many of the speakers, both local doctors and public spokesmen, accentuated the emphasis on the high indicators of patients among the population, and directly linked these figures to the activities at the test range, but avoided questions of prevention and the poor level of medical aid

or made light of them with patter. The fact is, health care in the oblast is really in a catastrophic state. It suffices to say that even in Semipalatinsk there is not a single standard hospital. For the oblast as a whole, every other medical institution is in need of capital repairs. There are not enough doctors of different specialties, and this is why in many of the rayons, it is difficult not only to set up medical treatment, but even to keep records of certain diseases. It was no accident that M. Korin, a professor at the Semipalatinsk Medical Institute commented:

"We should not try to blame all health-care flaws on the test range. No one denies the harmful effect of the tests on a living organism, but our miscalculations are our miscalculations."

But these objective approaches to the problem have clearly been inadequate. The prejudice toward the scientists' conclusions have constantly been felt. They have even had their lack of objectivity, their group egoism and their attempt to suppress the truth held against them. Unfortunately, these attacks have a certain validity. The commission members, when preparing themselves for a scientific and practical conference, thought the discussion would be among others like themselves, i.e., specialists, and anticipated no general interest. Their reports were frequently of a purely scientific character and were replete with special terminology, which most of those present did not understand.

And then a totally isolated case occurred when Lieutenant General A. Ilyenko categorically denied that a nuclear device had been tested for the second time this year on 17 February, even though this had been reported by TASS.

Unfortunately, the conference practically by-passed such an important aspect of the problem as the influence of explosion-related seismic soil vibrations on buildings and structures. But in fact, underground jolts are quite appreciable at times. Thus A. Glushchenko, director of the cement plant, told me that cracks appeared in the walls of his home following one such detonation. The cracks were large enough for him to shake hands with his neighbors in the next apartment.

Some of the speakers mentioned the fact that the tests conducted on the range are gradually destroying walls and foundations and causing deformations in reinforced concrete structures, but the matter had gone no farther than an admission of this fact. Was this intentional?

At a press conference, Professor A. Tsybe was asked this question. He responded that he had appealed as a commission representative to KaSSR Gosstroy, requesting that a technical appraisal be conducted or the necessary data be provided, if such data were available, but that he had received no reply.

...Today, on one of Semipalatinsk's central streets a dosimeter, which constantly shows the radiation level in the city, is displayed in the window of a pharmacy. There are always a great many people standing at the window,

wanting to see with their own eyes what the test range radiates. And this too is a desired breakthrough in the front of past secrecy.

When this material had already been ready to print, news arrived that a mass meeting had been held near the Semipalatinsk Test Range. The meeting was organized by the Nevada-Semipalatinsk public antinuclear movement. Meeting participants, who spoke openly in favor of a full

cessation of any nuclear tests, included not only residents of Kazakhstan. And this is as it should be—these people have been united by a single fine goal—the struggle for peace without nuclear threat. The participants of the meeting supported the USSR Supreme Soviet's appeal to the U.S. on questions involving a moratorium on nuclear tests. This is a pragmatic example of how people's diplomacy augments the efforts of parliament and government. These efforts are certain to bear fruit.

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NATO's Woerner Interviewed by GDR Radio

*LD1812224989 East Berlin Domestic Service
in German 2110 GMT 18 Dec 89*

[Text] [Announcer] In the NATO headquarters in Brussels there was at the end of last week the winter meeting for this year of the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty. Far-reaching decisions on future cooperation between East and West were taken there. Following the meeting, Knut (?Hintler) and Detlev Rohdert had the opportunity to interview the NATO secretary general, Manfred Woerner.

[Begin recording] [Reporter] Mr Secretary General, this is your first opportunity for an interview with GDR radio. How do you feel about it?

[Woerner] I am pleased about it, that is without question. I am after all a German and you are also a German. That is for me a reason to be really happy about it.

[Reporter] in connection with that: the recent NATO council meeting here in Brussels dealt with the reforms in the GDR. NATO said it wanted to support these and other reforms. How is that to happen in practical terms, are there already concrete thoughts on it?

[Woerner] Yes, there are. There are three fields in which we are trying to support the reform movements in the countries of central and Eastern Europe. The first one is, by political contacts, the expansion of the CSCE process which also seems to be the suitable framework. That is the political level. The second level is the economic, the industrial level. NATO itself is, of course, not active here, either the European Community does it, or the member countries on a bilateral basis, or in the Group of 24, which has happily declared itself ready to extend its aid. So, the second area is the economy. Finally, the third area is the disarmament area. We want to try with all our strength to come as quickly as possible to disarmament agreements, which then allow the Soviet Union and all participating states to invest their resources, their money, more in civilian projects. Those are the three areas [words indistinct].

[Reporter] How do you imagine cooperation with the countries of Eastern Europe in the nineties? Is NATO ready to reflect differing interests thereby, or [words indistinct] mold central and Eastern Europe according to the Western model?

[Woerner] No. We are for these countries deciding on their own paths, [words indistinct], the people should have the option [to express?] their will [words indistinct] democracy [words indistinct] every state is taken seriously [words indistinct] and it is democratically organized and if such a decision falls to the state of Central and Eastern Europe for free self-determination, then it is of course self-evident that we will respect the decision and accept it.

[Reporter] Perhaps coming back to this once again, Mr Secretary General, many people say that NATO and also the Warsaw Treaty have hitherto tended to conduct a confrontational policy and have had a confrontational function. How could this grow into the function of dialogue which you have just mentioned? You yourself have said that NATO could not continue to work in the same way as it has to date, so how capable of dialogue is NATO?

[Woerner] NATO was, and is capable of dialogue. If you think of our Harmel concept from the year 1967, it was not built only on the idea of defense, but also on the idea and the intention of dialogue and cooperation. The goal remains that of replacing confrontation gradually and as completely as possible by cooperation. We have no problem at all with this. There are, of course, between the Warsaw Pact, or the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and NATO, fundamental differences, but we can see that there are efforts in the Warsaw Treaty to change its character, and we ourselves stress increasingly our political role, although we retain our defensive character. If the Warsaw Treaty develops as some intend, i.e. developing, on the basis of self-determination, a purely defensive alignment, an equal partnership of sovereign states, then I can really imagine that one day it will be possible to have worldwide cooperation.

[Reporter] Let's look to the future for a moment: Will NATO and the Warsaw Treaty survive the 1990's? What will they be like, in your opinion?

[Woerner] I can only give you the answer for NATO, of course, because I would like to leave it up to the Warsaw Treaty countries to decide on their own future. As far as NATO is concerned, we believe that we can adjust to the development, that we will change, but that we will continue as an alliance, with a dual role for the foreseeable future. One role is the instrumental motor of change, the second is to ensure the necessary stability and the necessary security for the process of transition. And finally we feel that it is also in the interests of the Warsaw Treaty that the presence of the Americans and the Canadians is retained here, and NATO is, of course, a transatlantic organization. So I feel that it can play an important role in the future and it will not stand in the way of the change of course.

[Reporter] Where does the NATO secretary general stand on a possible confederation between the GDR and the FRG, and what does he think of Helmut Kohl's plan, which has, if I understand it correctly, caused some unrest within NATO?

[Woerner] The last comment is certainly an exaggeration. You are asking the NATO secretary general and not, I presume, the private person and the German citizen, Manfred Woerner, who, of course, has a very clear personal position on this. As NATO general secretary I say to you that there is no doubt that this alliance is determined, and will remain to be so, to overcome the division of Europe and therefore also of Germany. But

we know, and the alliance has stated this very clearly, as recently as at its September conference, we know that this can only occur in a gradual, peaceful process, and that the principles of self-determination would play an important role in this, that this, of course, must happen with respect for all the international treaties and commitments—and that, before all else, it must happen within the framework of a complete and united Europe.

[Reporter] U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney recently gave an interview to the OSNABRUCKER ZEITUNG saying that the Soviet Union has become more friendly, less hostile and threatening to the West than at any time in the past decade. Would you agree with such an assessment?

[Woerner] Yes.

[Reporter] And yet, Secretary General, NATO wants to maintain its policy of nuclear deterrence. Does this not result, as before, from distrust of the Soviet Union?

[Woerner] I would not see it like that. Firstly, I believe that none of us likes nuclear weapons. But we cannot go back. So it is up to us to bring lasting stability to the role of preventing war. So we want to maintain a minimum of nuclear and conventional weapons, contractually agreed and accepted as reciprocally as possible, purely for defensive purposes, so that no one need fear any use of military power. I think this is the basis of the stability that we need, that we in NATO strive for. This is the goal of our disarmament measures and disarmament negotiations.

[Reporter] Mr Secretary General, I would like to remain in this area for a moment. There is the view in NATO on the modernization of nuclear short-range potentials. These weapons would then however hit those countries [words indistinct] with which you, NATO, now wish to cooperate and which you wish to support. Is that not a contradiction?

[Woerner] It is not a contradiction because the difference between your question and my answer is that we have nuclear weapons as political weapons, not with the aim of conducting war and firing them but to prevent shots from being fired. They have had this effect. I suspect they will continue to have this effect. That applies moreover not just to these weapons but you could say that for all short-range weapons, with a certain amount of justification. I say again, this Alliance is characterized by the fact that it will never turn to weapons first. It would be impossible to commit 16 democratic states and their parliaments to an offensive war. It is a completely impossible affair and so there is no potential to attack. For this reason I can only say: It is not our intention to conduct a war. It is our intention to prevent it. You mentioned the question of modernization. It is quite simple. First of all, the Soviet Union has 14 times more, or even 16 times more. Well, that is a considerable superiority and it is now time to start to dismantle them. We have unilaterally withdrawn 2,400. Secondly, in the

Alliance we have clearly said that a decision on modernization will be made in 1992, with a view to the conditions prevalent then. I cannot anticipate such a decision, I do not know how things will look in 1992. We are working on a lasting peace order and I think that all people of goodwill are agreed on this. If such a lasting peace order exists, I believe one can say that we will be satisfied with considerably fewer weapons.

[Reporter] Mr Secretary General, please allow a concluding question. You expressed recently in an interview your interest with regard to East-West cooperation for the solution of mankind's problems. How do you imagine such cooperation and did you have NATO and the Warsaw Treaty in mind when you said it?

[Woerner] We will discuss within NATO such measures, offers, projects, and coordinate our policy. It is our aim, as you rightly said, not only to see an undivided Europe, our aim is global cooperation. We want to incorporate the Soviet Union, the states of the Warsaw Treaty, into this cooperation because we believe the great problems for mankind of tomorrow, or even of today—think of overpopulation, hunger, think of environmental protection, terrorism, drugs, and all these problems—we can only solve them if we work together, the industrial states of the West and the East. Now, that can happen within the framework of the United Nations, or with joint projects, it is, I think, not right if one only considers the framework of the Alliance for this, or even exclusively, but we will use our Alliance to work out a policy or a concept on this. [end recording]

Hurd Addresses NATO Foreign Ministers' Meeting

*LD1412143289 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1355 GMT 14 Dec 89*

[Report by Geoff Meade, PRESS ASSOCIATION, in Brussels]

[Text] NATO must maintain a "robust defence capability" despite needing to match the new mood across the Berlin Wall, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd warned today.

He backed Washington's call to her West European military allies to play a more political role but emphasised the need to preserve a nuclear deterrent and a "significant" U.S. and Canadian presence on European soil.

Mr Hurd, addressing NATO foreign ministers in Brussels, nevertheless agreed it was time to step up the political side of NATO and sent a clear signal to the Russians.

"We don't wish to exploit or undermine the legitimate interests of other people, including the Soviet Union as it pursues perestroika," he told a press conference.

Earlier this week, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said the European Community would in future play a central role in shaping the new Europe.

Mr Baker was at today's talks when Mr Hurd said the American approach was "entirely right."

He said the increasingly political role of NATO would overlap with the role of the EC, but insisted: "It should not cause great difficulties. We should not waste time agonising about that. It is not a problem."

The talks revealed how the entire European military and political question has merged in the wake of moves toward democracy in Eastern Europe.

Focusing on the key question of possible German reunification, they were little different from the negotiations at last week's Common Market summit, and will be repeated once more when EC foreign ministers meet in Brussels next week.

Today, Mr Hurd acknowledged that NATO would have to "adapt and change" but refused to be drawn on the prospect of further symbolic weapons reductions in the wake of latest developments.

Force levels would have to be adapted, but in line with existing talks and proposals now under consideration in Vienna.

It is up to negotiators around the table for the conventional force reduction discussions to tackle the question of modernisation and adjustments to the levels of short-range weapons, he said.

At today's talks, the NATO allies settled a minor dispute between Greece and Turkey which had delayed the tabling of a treaty on arms cuts.

The treaty, based on proposals for arms cuts produced by President George Bush last May, will now be formally presented at the arms reductions talks in Vienna later today.

NATO Chief on Soviet, German Issues

90EN0125A Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC in Polish 24 Nov 89 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Manfred Woerner, NATO secretary general, by Henryk Kurta in Brussels, date not given: "I Like and Understand the Poles;" first two paragraphs are TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC introduction]

[Text] Manfred Woerner, secretary general of the Atlantic Alliance, gave an interview to our correspondent in Brussels. This is the first press interview by the NATO secretary general to the Polish press.

Manfred Woerner has been the general secretary of NATO since July 1988. He is 55 years old. From 1982 through 1986, he was the minister of defense of the FRG.

He has the rank of lieutenant colonel in the air force reserve (he has 1,200 flying hours). He studied law in the FRG and France.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] As the general secretary of NATO, what do you think about the changes currently under way in Hungary and Poland, as well as in the Soviet Union and in particular the German Democratic Republic?

[Woerner] The development of events in Poland and Hungary, as well as in the Soviet Union, fascinates me. It is obvious that I am following what is happening in the other part of my country, in the GDR, with special feelings.

I think that Hungary and Poland are setting a splendid example of the path which should be followed toward democracy and in the defense of the interests of their own people. I would add that this example is significant for the entire world, and in particular for the NATO countries.

I cannot but welcome warmly and support the choice of this path which leads toward democracy, freedom, and respect for human rights. This is in keeping with the principles of self-determination; the peoples themselves have a right to decide on the choice of the road which they wish to follow.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] What do you think about the Soviet proposal to eliminate all military blocs before the year 2000 in conjunction with the changing situation in the Communist bloc?

[Woerner] To begin with, I must note that at issue here is the old Soviet proposal. It introduces nothing new. However, before I say more on this subject, I would like to say a few words about NATO.

This is an alliance of 16 free and sovereign peoples. Each people belonging to this alliance has a right to remain in it or leave it. This is a completely defensive alliance. It possesses military assets only with a view to preventing wars and defending our states. We will never be the first to use weapons.

Ours is not an exclusively military alliance aimed at defending our freedom, preventing conflicts, and maintaining peace. NATO also is a political alliance which binds the destinies of the free countries of North America and Western Europe.

NATO has its own philosophy according to which the defense policy makes a dialogue and cooperation possible, makes it possible to move toward a Europe united in democracy, freedom, and respect for human rights. This goal was confirmed yet again in the course of the latest NATO summit.

We favor the changes, we support them, and we ask ourselves what our place in all of this should be. First of all, we believe that NATO should not be treated as an obstacle in the way to detente, to a better policy of

cooperation, or in the way leading toward the unification of Europe. To the contrary, NATO should be considered an instrument which does not only favor changes but also is a guarantee of stability. Our alliance makes changes easier in its capacity of an institution defending peace and freedom.

Going back to the question about the Soviet proposals, I must say that due to the considerable superiority of the Soviet potential we cannot unilaterally reduce our defensive assets. We must maintain our alliance at such a level that it is capable of defending peace at present as well as in the future. It is obvious that the alliance must maintain the ties established across the Atlantic.

Let me stress once again that NATO which was a factor of political rapprochement and stability will continue to be such an indispensable factor in the immediate decades to come.

As far as the Warsaw Pact is concerned, recently certain voices have been heard (for example, what the Poles are expressing) concerning the need to make changes within the structures of the pact. Several weeks ago, Mr Shevardnadze also acknowledged that structural changes in the pact are necessary; in this event, it could become more of a political alliance to which new elements could be introduced.

If this is to mean that the Warsaw Pact will fully respect the sovereignty and the right of its member countries to self-determination, if this means that the pact will renounce its role as an instrument of political pressure and control over these states, and will not interfere in the changes occurring in them, if the right of each member to decide on its own affairs is respected within the pact, finally, if the Warsaw Pact changes its military orientation so that it stops being offensive and becomes defensive—then favorable prospects for new security structures in Europe will open up.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] You have referred to stability. Do you believe that if some states of the Warsaw Pact were to leave it this could be harmful for the equilibrium attained?

[Woerner] As the general secretary of the Western alliance, I am not in a position to speak on the topic of existing relations between members of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. However, I repeat that self-determination is our goal; due to this, we believe that Poles, Hungarians, and other members of the pact have to decide on their own whether they want to stay in the pact or leave it.

As the general secretary of NATO, I should not be the one to offer advice and make assessments. Other individuals more competent than I know best what is to be done in the interest of their peoples.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] What do you think about the fact that the Soviet Union continues to enhance its armaments quantitatively and qualitatively?

[Woerner] It appears to me that in this matter we are dealing with a certain ambiguity as far as the Soviet military policy is concerned. On the one hand, Mr Gorbachev announces unilateral arms reductions which are being implemented. To my mind, these decisions are the result of economic necessity which compels cuts in military budgets.

However, the Soviet Union spends between 15 and 18 percent of its GNP for armaments whereas the average expenditures of the NATO member countries amount to about 3 percent of their GNP, and the expenditures of the United States to about 6 percent. If this rate is maintained the reform aimed at creating a more competitive and productive economy in the Soviet Union will fail. This is why I believe that Mr Gorbachev tells the truth when he says that he wants to reduce expenditures for armaments and change the structure of industry in order to partially demilitarize it and devote it to better consumption.

However, we see that the Soviet Union continues to produce more tanks than the West, that it produces more submarines, that it modernizes its strategic forces, such as the SS-24 and the SS-25, still further, to mention just a few things. Due to all of this, I refer to the ambiguity concerning Soviet policy, and I cannot find a clear explanation for this contradiction.

Our goal is to secure an agreement on arms control and to arrive at the lowest equal level; this is exactly what we strive for in the course of the talks held in Vienna on conventional arms. This is what we want as far as the reduction in half of strategic arms is concerned. In that same spirit, we are fighting in Geneva on the matter of a complete ban on chemical weapons.

I am an optimist because I am convinced that we can come to an agreement. However, only at the negotiating table will we be able to verify whether the Soviet Union indeed strives to reduce its arms.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] Now I am addressing a citizen of the FRG: After the statements made by President Mitterrand and Lech Walesa concerning the situation in the GDR, do you believe that you are witnessing the beginning of a process leading to the unification of Germany?

[Woerner] I would ask for an opportunity to answer this first as the general secretary of the alliance the goal of which is to overcome the division of Europe and the division of my own country. I think that we are looking at a historic moment for Europe and my country.

Personally, I have two hopes and wishes. The first is that my fellow countrymen from the GDR will be able to decide their fortunes for themselves. I hope and I wish that they could exercise the right to self-determination. My other desire and hope is that the entire process will run its course in a peaceful and evolutionary manner.

Finally, I am expressing my hope that the people who hold power in the GDR will follow the example of Poland or Hungary and will offer their fellow citizens the

same free choice and similar reforms because, to my mind, this is the only way possible.

It is obvious that as a German I hope and have an interest in Germans being able to live in a single state one day because it is undeniable that we are a single people.

[TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] The French-German reconciliation has undoubtedly changed the face of Western Europe. Do you believe that the German-Polish reconciliation could change the face of all of Europe?

[Woerner] I believe that the unity of Germans may only be achieved in a broad European context. The greatest Europe cannot emerge without a reconciliation of the East and West of Europe. The reconciliation of Poland and the German people, the reconciliation which is already under way, is one of its fundamental elements.

I am convinced that the visit to Poland by Chancellor Kohl amounts to a specific step along the path of reinforcing the reconciliation of the Poles and all Germans. This reconciliation is also important for all of Europe and its interests.

I am grateful for the comparison of this reconciliation with the reconciliation which occurred between France and my country because it provides an exemplary model. I was 11 years old when the war ended, and in 1954 and 1955 I attended college in France. At that time, quite a few Frenchmen still bore Germany ill will. At present, I am happy to see how the views of not only the young people but also of the older generation have changed. Now we are not just neighbors but also friends. This has become possible due to the opening of borders and interpersonal contacts which have accomplished more than politicians' speeches.

I believe that this excellent example could provide a model for relations between the Poles and the Germans. I do not say this as the general secretary of NATO, but as a German who likes and understands the Poles, their bitter experience and emotions. All of this belongs in the past, and at present we must look to the future working for a Europe based on democracy, freedom, and self-determination which are the only durable safeguards to prevent wars.

[Note by TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC] We hope to be able to present a statement by a competent representative of the Warsaw Pact as well.

DENMARK

Finnish, Norwegian Foreign Ministers' Arms Talks
LD0912123889 Helsinki International Service
in English 0930 GMT 9 Dec 89

[Text] [Announcer] Finland and Norway have expressed the hope that sea-launched weapons be included in East-West arms limitation talks. In a statement made

during the visit to Norway by the Finnish foreign minister, Mr Pertti Paasio, his Norwegian opposite number, Mr Kjell Magne Bondevik, says that in the long run sea-launched weapons could not be excluded from the arms limitation agenda. He added, however, that the inclusion of sea-launched weapons in arms reduction talks should not be allowed to interfere with the international talks on conventional weapons now going on.

With more details of the Finnish foreign minister's visit to Norway, this report:

[Riggins] Speaking in Oslo, the Finnish foreign minister, Mr Pertti Paasio, said that in Finland's view it was not sensible to exclude Northern Europe from the arms control process at a time when progress was underway in Vienna in the talks on reducing conventional forces in Central Europe. Mr Paasio added that the development of balanced security in Northern Europe demands that greater attention be given to the buildup of weapons at sea.

The Norwegian foreign minister, Mr Bondevik, stated that in his opinion sea-launched weapons should not be brought into the talks currently going on in Vienna on the reduction of conventional armaments in continental Europe. He said that those talks should first be concluded and, if a balance were reached in conventional weapons and if NATO adopted an agreed negotiating stand, then East-West talks on naval forces could be considered. Norway is, of course, a member of NATO, whereas Finland, being a neutral country, is not a member of any military alliance.

During his 2-day visit to Norway, which ended on Friday [8 December] Foreign Minister Paasio had meetings with King Olav and with the new Norwegian prime minister, Mr Jan P. Syse, who is due to visit Finland next week. Mr Paasio also met Norway's former prime minister, Mrs Gro Harlem Brundtland.

[Announcer] That report read by Cheryl Riggins.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Changes in East Europe, NATO Role Assessed
AU1312101489 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 12 Dec 89 p 6

[Article by Jan Reifenberg]

[Text] Brussels, 11 December—When the NATO foreign ministers hold their winter meeting in Brussels on 14 December, they will also have to think about how the Alliance can develop its crisis management during the coming months and how—in view of the changes in East Europe—it can help stabilize the situation while promoting reforms. Nobody can predict what will be left of the Warsaw Pact. What is certain is the fact that it is no longer an instrument of maintaining Soviet supremacy, but only a military organization with weapons and troops that are quantitatively superior to those of NATO. However, probably the only politically reliable

factor is the Soviet forces that are deployed in the Soviet Union and in the East European countries.

That these troops have remained at their bases since the changes in Hungary, Poland, the GDR, and the CSSR, proves to NATO's Eastern experts that Moscow has given up the Brezhnev doctrine. Hints about increased readiness of the "Western Group of Soviet Forces" in the GDR hardly change anything about this fact. Keeping a closer watch on ammunition depots, in particular nuclear weapons deployed in the GDR, is understandable in view of the illegal acts committed against offices of the former State Security Service. But the last thing Moscow would want to do is use its troops to prevent such acts.

U.S. observers claim that in recent days they have noted an increase in radio communications between Soviet command centers and spare parts and ammunition stores in the GDR. As it has done in Poland since 1980, the Soviet Union has created its own intelligence network across the GDR. NATO experts consider it understandable that Moscow wants to avoid any incident now, and intends to keep the apparatus of the Warsaw Pact intact.

It is important for the Western negotiators at the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) to have adequate Eastern partners, so the first stage of the balanced reduction of forces between the Atlantic and the Urals can be achieved next year. Much as the internal reforms in the Soviet Union and East Europe are welcomed, and much as their impact promotes the openness and clarity of the negotiations, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact would harm the goal of the negotiations. Talks between individual countries would delay success, not to mention the possibility that internal quarrels—as have often emerged among NATO partners—will prevail. To begin with, the U.S. and Soviet forces deployed in Europe must be reduced. Everything else must develop from this core which is located in Germany. Apportioning arms reductions among the partner states in the West and in the East, meaning fixing the respective national percentages, will be one of the most difficult problems in any case. So far, the problem will be tackled within the framework of the respective alliances, and then consensus will be reached among the 23 negotiating partners.

In view of the changes in East Europe and uncertain future prospects, the alliance remains the most important instrument of Western cohesion, because it links the United States with West Europe's security. The former child of the Cold War now wants to become the "administrator of change" and is increasingly growing into its second, political role. The chiefs of state and heads of government stated this at their Brussels summit meeting, and because of events in the GDR it has been confirmed during President Bush's visit last week.

The Federal Republic's ties with the West and a dynamic European Community are considered by Bonn's NATO partners as guarantees against lone German actions. NATO has welcomed the statement of the Strasbourg EC summit

on the German question and the renewed obligation to solve border issues within the framework of the CSCE Final Act.

Those who believe that a long period of instability is forthcoming in East Europe see that they are right. People believe that the two German states will grow together much faster than British Prime Minister Thatcher assumes. U.S. diplomats believe that one would then have to reckon with a weakened Soviet Union and no longer with a functioning Warsaw Pact. However, NATO and the West would remain fully functioning, so that a unified Germany should turn to NATO, because nobody would want to have a neutral Germany in the center of Europe.

It remains to be seen how the public can be convinced of such ideas—a public that every day sees communist regimes collapse; freedom and human rights advance in Budapest and Warsaw, East Berlin and Prague; and the Germans' sense of belonging together manifest itself. All statements made since the opening of the Berlin Wall, since the beginning of the peaceful revolution in the GDR, also show the concern that the German question might appear on the agenda of the Alliance's policy sooner than expected. It is becoming clear how little confidence the governments of our Western neighbors still have in the Federal Republic.

Therefore, the NATO foreign ministers should formulate a landmark statement that would finalize the statements made in the course of the year, and would in particular link the double task of continuous defense ability with concrete prospects for positive action toward East Europe. The Soviet Union obviously has no interest in the dissolution of NATO. It needs the Western alliance in particular because of the German question, all the more so since the future importance of the GDR in the Warsaw Pact is open, whereas the function of the GDR as Moscow's buffer state remains unchanged. The West must constantly promote the reforms and must at the same time preserve its own security.

That is not a contradiction although it was easier to move along established paths, and some people long to return to the clear fronts of the Cold War. However, the "proper order" which was connected with it led to a state of paralyzation in East Europe, which is now bursting open everywhere. The task now is to draw the outlines of a future all-European security system capable of incorporating the changes in East Europe into a new European order. In this respect, NATO has a political advantage. It can ensure that new confidence grows from the change and that military confrontation will eventually be replaced by cooperation.

Stoltenberg on Gorbachev, GDR, Disarmament

*AU1512152889 Hamburg BILD in German 15 Dec 89
pp 1-2*

[Unattributed interview with FRG Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg; date and place not given]

[Text] BILD: Is Gorbachev under threat of being toppled by the Army?

Stoltenberg: Gorbachev is in a dangerous stage. Nevertheless, politically he is in a strong position because there are no other convincing alternatives. Up to now he has enjoyed the support of high military officials such as former Chief of the General Staff Akhromeyev. Yet recently a certain feeling of unrest has been noticeable at the lower level of leadership. The Red Army continues to consider itself to be a factor of integration for the USSR. Nobody knows whether this can produce the nucleus of an opposition that is prepared to carry out a putsch.

BILD: Egon Bahr, of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD], has demanded to rescue Gorbachev by taking even faster disarmament steps....

Stoltenberg: We are the first government which, in the framework of the new Bundeswehr concept, has adopted a dramatic reduction of more than 20 percent of its own Armed Forces by 1996. Some people here act as though this were not enough. Yet the risks for reform policy have become greater. This is why we have taken action and remain vigilant at the same time.

BILD: Mr Minister, might it not become true what Gorbachev said, namely that "those who are late will be punished by life!"?

Stoltenberg: Gorbachev has to be careful that what he said will not be applied to himself. This is particularly true for the sphere of economic policy. I am seriously asking myself why the USSR continues to produce and deploy modern armament products despite its superiority. It is the USSR that has a massive military superiority, not us.

BILD: You have mentioned risks, while the superpowers want to maintain stability—is there a danger of civil war or even a third world war?

Stoltenberg: The threat of a third world war is much less now than at any other time in the past few decades. Neither is there a danger of civil war. Still I see the risk that the feeling of unrest that exists among many people in the GDR, who consider the pace of reform too slow, might lead to conflict.

BILD: Will the Bundeswehr and the National People's Army soon cooperate and even exchange soldiers?

Stoltenberg: We are ready for specific cooperation in various fields as soon as there is a government in East Berlin that has been elected in democratic elections. After the May elections I can talk about this cooperation with the responsible GDR minister.

BILD: What is the point of having modernized short-range missiles that are aimed at a democratic GDR, at the CSSR, and at Poland, which is no longer communist?

Stoltenberg: The USSR continues to deploy highly sophisticated missiles. These are aimed at us. This is why

we stick to our position: We will wait for the disarmament talks to conclude and make our decision in 1992. Nobody will force us to rush a decision.

FRANCE

Foreign Minister on 'Baker Doctrine'

PM1812152289 Paris LE MONDE in French
16 Dec 89 p 5

[Report by Philippe Lemaitre]

[Text] Brussels—The Soviet foreign minister's visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels on Monday 18 December will be a major first. Eduard Shevardnadze, who is coming to sign the trade and cooperation agreement recently concluded between the USSR and the Community, took advantage of the opportunity to request a meeting with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner and with the permanent representatives of the 16 Atlantic Alliance countries. The request was welcomed by the alliance foreign ministers who held their traditional winter session in Brussels on Thursday and Friday.

The communique issued after that session cites word for word the text on the German question adopted by the 12 Community countries in Strasbourg last week.

Roland Dumas reaffirmed that the Strasbourg conclusions stressed the German people's right to self-determination but surrounded it with preconditions (respect for treaties, in other words borders, taking account of the position adopted by neighbors in Eastern and Western Europe). "The effort which we are asking the Germans to make (reassuring Poland about the inviolable nature of the Oder-Neisse line, not worrying the USSR), must be accompanied by our own efforts to take account of their sensitivity and to strive not to offend it," the French minister stressed.

Mr Genscher also supported the Strasbourg text, adding that the FRG had a very clear position on Poland's western border, and that it pledges to respect it now and in the future.

Trying to give Europe a new architecture, as U.S. Secretary of State Baker proposed in West Berlin, is regarded as premature by Mr Dumas at a time when we do not know how things will develop in Eastern Europe and, in particular, what will happen to the Warsaw Pact. The French minister, while understanding the U.S. desire to maintain its leadership and hence "to firmly anchor Europe in a new kind of alliance," distrusts NATO's tendency to control everything, "to concern itself with everything in all spheres." "Europe within the alliance but as a separate and responsible entity will have to assert its political and security role on the East-West stage," Roland Dumas said, expressing doubts about the appropriateness of Mr Baker's proposal to conclude a treaty between the Community and the United States.

However, the French minister regards some aspects of Mr Baker's plan as positive: "The secretary of state praised the CSCE; we also think that it is a good forum."

The British do not have the same fear of seeing the United States showing too much interest in the Community's development: "There is no reason why there should be conflicts between the areas of responsibility of the Twelve and the alliance.... We should not waste our time discussing it," Foreign Office Secretary Douglas Hurd stated.

The Sixteen also succeeded in reaching agreement about the draft treaty on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe to be submitted to the Warsaw Pact. Finally, a summit meeting among the 35 CSCE countries at the end of 1990, advocated by Mr Gorbachev, has almost been accepted in principle. "Such a meeting cannot be limited to a mere ceremony for signing the first treaty on conventional forces in Europe. It must have a large agenda and be well prepared," Roland Dumas said. The final decision will be made in Ottawa in February at the start of the "Open Sky" conference bringing together the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.

Mitterrand Interviewed on Europe, Changes

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[Interview with President Francois Mitterrand by Jean-Pierre Elkabbach, Christine Ockrent, Alain Duhamel, and Serge July at the Elysee in Paris, from the "Press Club" program—live]

[Excerpts] [Question] Good evening, Mr President. You have not spoken to the French people like this for a long time. Now in the past 3 months, we have passed from the fixed, reassuring, and comfortable postwar order to the 21st Century. In 1989, that is this year, the shock of liberties—its procession of daily upheavals in Eastern Europe, today again in Prague, causes at the same time wonder and also a feeling of uncertainty, even of anxiety about the unknown. And furthermore, Mr President, we are told from different sides that we have seen nothing yet and that this will continue. Well, do you—who are in command—also think that it will continue like this?

[Mitterrand] Yes, I think so. The pace has been rapid: in certain countries there should be a slowing down, but I think that the movement which is taking shape as a whole will continue.

[Question] The French are already experiencing giddiness over this: in France as it is should one be frightened?

[Mitterrand] Frightened of what? Of the victories of freedom? It is enough to be resolute.

[Question] One must also acknowledge that our society is at this moment being shaken by a threefold fear which comes from a long way off: first, the fear of a great Germany bringing insecurity; the fear of Islam or a type

of Islam which might be fundamental and conquering, in addition to its consequences for the immigrants in our country and the National Front which takes advantage of the hesitations of governments; and then the rising fear of inequalities and poverty. Well, to be exact, this evening the French people are expecting you, Mr President, to chase these ghosts and fantasies away and say where they are going and where you are leading them in this world in turmoil. Alain Duhamel, Serge July, and Christine Ockrent will be taking part in this special edition of Europe Number One's Press Club which is being produced with Antenne 2 live from the Elysee.

Let us begin first with Strasbourg: the European Council in Strasbourg was one of the most important sessions of the past 10 years. The almost general opinion of Messrs Kohl, Gonzalez, and Delors, and Mrs Thatcher has been that it was of historic importance. Well, quite simply, how do you interpret it for Europe, for the French, and for you yourself?

[Mitterrand] As for Europe, we have made progress and we have made progress at a time when one might have had doubts for the reason that you have just stated—everything that is happening in the East does all the same stir up people's minds, many hopes are taking shape and they may thwart each other. Nevertheless, progress was made and this proves that the market was something good, not just over the past 6 months, but I would say for more than 30 years. This proves that Europe is compelling recognition. So, if I had to say a word about this subject—and one should not deal with them all at the same time—I would say that we set ourselves a few simple objectives. The first was to set a date for the holding of an intergovernmental conference—that is what it is called—in order to decide on economic and monetary union; a currency for Europe, for the community; and, in the last analysis, a central body, a bank. Several years will be needed to attain this but it was necessary at least to signal its start. We shall open this type of debate next year, before the end of 1990. Second, I wanted, we wished, to initiate what is called a Social Charter: one cannot build Europe simply for heads of businesses or for the flow of capital. Of course we have to build Europe for everybody, hence, for the workers, for the citizens as a whole. And I also wanted us to make progress on what is called the single market, that is to say because we are all going to find ourselves without borders in 1992, we must at least prepare things. The last point: on 18 November, during the meeting of the European Council here at the Elysee, I announced, I said it was necessary to help the East, and in particular, create a development bank for Eastern Europe. That was decided.

[Question] Well, Mr President, we are now going to see things in detail with Alain Duhamel first and then Christine Ockrent:

[Question] Before we embark on each of the points that you mentioned, can one say that a political Europe is now in sight?

[Mitterrand] It has been in sight for a long time, it was in the minds of the founders. It was explicitly anticipated at the European Council in Stuttgart a few years ago. We had perhaps forgotten it a bit but it seems to have become topical and what was decided at Strasbourg will allow the route to be marked out.

[Question] On that route, Mr President, can one say that the results of Strasbourg, which everyone is saluting as rather of a success, also strengthen the political role and function of the president of the Commission which seems more and more to personify Western Europe vis-a-vis the other Europe?

[Mitterrand] The president of the Commission, Jacques Delors, works very well, he is admirably competent, he believes in it, [words indistinct].

[Question] He is French?

[Mitterrand] He is French but he could be another nationality; he is French and I am very happy about that. Well, if his role is confirmed by the progress of operations, all the better.

[Question] Yes, Mr President, on the matter of the Social Charter are you not in the end a bit disappointed; you would have liked a system which was all the same somewhat more constraining, with more formal guarantees as far as wage earners were concerned, whether in France or the rest of Europe. Did the fact that it simply constitutes good intentions not disappoint you a bit?

[Mitterrand] It is not only good intentions. If I had set myself a program in accordance with my thinking on what a social statute for the workers in Europe and in these 12 countries should be, of course it falls a long way short of that, but I do not have any illusions about it. I am a socialist and I cannot get it into my head that I can carry along in one swoop many countries which would be reticent towards a form of contract for the workers as a whole which would be in accord with my own way of thinking. In relation to the state of mind of many of our allies, I have no reason to be disappointed, on the contrary; because after all, you say it is just a framework. No, it is more, much more than that. But finally a lot more could be added.

[Question] And will you fill in this framework over the years?

[Mitterrand] This has already been decided, since the commission, which you just mentioned, has already prepared papers on 42 measures, including 17 directives. Thus, gradually, this framework will be filled in.

[Question] But it will be a la carte, that is, each partner will choose what suits itself.

[Mitterrand] No, it is the commission which will propose; the directives are submitted to the European Council. A la carte would mean that each time, the European Council would have to decide on one measure to another.

[Question] And in France, will this make the fight against unemployment easier, since this is the main worry of the French?

[Mitterrand] No, you cannot say that. The makeup of Europe, the progress of the Community, economic and monetary union will be of great service in the field of work, since the Commission and Mr Delors think that we shall have in the coming year a gain of five million jobs in the 12-member European Community thanks to this coming together of our economies. That is good, it is promising. However France is a social country which is very advanced in relation to most of the others, so European progress will take time to reach the French level.

[Question] There was a crisis, or a malaise at any rate, with Bonn, a certain chill. How did you convince Mr Kohl?

[Mitterrand] What problem are you discussing with me, because if you mean?..

[Question, interrupting] I mean the intergovernmental conference to follow up the progress toward an economic and monetary Europe.

[Mitterrand] It is certain that at a particular moment, Federal Germany would have preferred to postpone the decision to open the intergovernmental conference on currency, the creation of a currency.

[Question] What made them change their minds?

[Mitterrand] First, what pushed them towards wanting [word indistinct]. I think many circumstances. I think the German public's state of mind; Chancellor Kohl said that if Germans were to be given a vote on it, it would fail. As for business circles, you know Germany has great economic power; it does not have an equal power of a political or military nature. It is not negligible, but that it is not the same thing.

[Question] And its Deutsche mark?

[Mitterrand] The mark is its economic power, its foreign trade is very active and very powerful. I also think there is a whole background of reactions in Germany saying why should we give up being the only ones having this situation and share decisions with others who are in a worse position?

Then there is the problem of the elections. Due to this state of mind, to undertake elections, as will be the case in early December 1990—and it is in December 1990 that this conference will open—created a mix of dates which could turn out to be awkward for the team in power. This is my interpretation. However this was not a ground swell, since it was enough to explain clearly; I told Chancellor Kohl that I believe it is necessary. In any case, I shall put the issue to the European Council and I shall ask each country to give its view. We took on a decisive responsibility, you must admit, to make Europe

advance along all these routes. We shall continue. Chancellor Kohl accepts it completely because he is determinedly European. We have no right to doubt it.

[Question] Is he a complex partner?

[Mitterrand] Complex, but are we not all complex?

[Question] Ambiguous?

[Mitterrand] No, not ambiguous; we are all complex, but he has problems that you spoke of, that arise, and they arrive en masse.

[Question] Is it correct, for example, that you were not notified about the 10-point plan for the reunification of Germany?

[Mitterrand] At the time when the chancellor proposed it in the Bundestag, no.

[Question] Was that a mistake?

[Mitterrand] He has no obligation to inform me; it is a specifically German matter. Well, it is of concern to France all the same. Without being questioned about it, I still concerned myself with it.

[Question] Do you feel now, after the European Council meeting, that the German obsession with reunification will be manifest all the time, at every stage, month after month, before European problems

[Mitterrand] The problem of German reunification is always there.

[Question] But more now than 6 months ago.

[Mitterrand] Perhaps you would like us to pause for a few moments to learn about the decision made in Strasbourg? After all, our listeners must know what we are talking about. It was not on the agenda. It does not lie directly within the sole competence of the Community, but, of course, it is a movement with a certain force, and one cannot imagine 12 European countries being there and not talking about it. It is their business and, furthermore, they are involved in European equilibrium.

[Question] Indeed, Mr President, one has the impression that Federal Germany has succeeded, from its own point of view, in obtaining a free rein from the Community for its reunification, and in the statement, on the other hand, there is no mention anywhere of the borders and particularly of the Eastern border.

[Mitterrand] No, no, what you are saying is a bit simplified.

[Question] But that is how people are reacting.

[Mitterrand] [Words indistinct] things are not posed like that at all. Moreover, I have the text here.

[Question] Yes, but for French people who sometimes have bad memories.

[Mitterrand] You can see this page torn out; I tore it out from the official document, from the official document which I had to reveal to the press: It is thus the really official document. This is the original piece and I have marked the important paragraph: What does it say? We seek the strengthening of a state of peace in Europe in which the German people will recover its unity through free self-determination. This process, and allow me to stress that each phrase is important, must be carried out democratically and peacefully. Those are the two words I used on 2 or 3 November of this year at the end of the European Council in Bonn when I gave a news conference in the company of Chancellor Kohl. It was, moreover, the first question I was asked, democratically and peacefully, respecting agreements and treaties as well as all the principles defined in the Helsinki final act, and this includes the respect of borders. [indistinct cross talk omitted] To continue: In a context of dialogue and of East-West cooperation, a factor of peace. The last phrase: it should be placed in the perspective of European integration; it did not say community, it said European. This means this is not the first time that the first phrase, that is "The German people will recover its unity through free self-determination" has been used. There are already several international documents which include that phrase, notably the decision of the NATO meeting which was held in Brussels last May. So, it is not the first time. But in Brussels there was no follow-up. In Strasbourg there is a follow-up and this implies that if one can understand and recognize that it is legitimate that the Germans should have the desire, the need, the will to be reunited—the people of the two German states, the Federal Republic, and the Democratic Republic, the East and the West—that is not to say that the balance, the new German balance, can be built at the cost of balance in Europe. We must conserve all the chances for peace; respect for frontiers is an essential principle. Surprise has been expressed in the press that during the European summit on 18 November at the Elysee, no statement was made about German reunification and I said: We did not discuss it. But I did pose the question right from the beginning of the conference and I asked my colleagues, I said to them: What do you want us to talk about, do you want us to talk about this or that, and I read out a list. They replied to me, saying it is not worth discussing respect for borders; that goes without saying. It is even more worthwhile to say it.

[Question] All the same, at the pace at which events are happening, particularly in East Germany, and the fact that there is a legislative election in Germany in December—on 11 December 1990—do you not think that public opinion in the two countries can in the end, through an interplay of links, impose a de facto reunification of Germany, independently of the precautions which have been taken by the four Allies who were the victors in 1945, by the international treaties.

[Mitterrand] That is quite possible, that they will decide it. At that moment they will have to take account of the treaties; they will have to take account of the neighbors,

of the neighborhood; they will also have to take account of a certain number of relations which have been determined above all between those countries and the USSR. I am not master of the world: a master of the world who decides on the order of the universe in spite of what I hear said, in spite of what I hear said in (?current) programs. No, I am not the one who determines the movements of peoples. [indistinct cross talk]

What I simply mean is that if there are forces of that type which decide: they will have to be looked at straight in the face. It is also necessary, however, for our German friends to take account of the fact that a world war occurred, that that world war mapped out a certain configuration of Europe (?where) democracy and peace are called for. One also asks that the borders of Europe which were fixed at that time should not be upset because of what the debate will open. You know well because you are well-acquainted with the map of Europe, there are many others; for example, what will come from the provinces of Pomerania, Silesia, Mazuria, and even a bit of eastern Russia which has become Soviet, and the others? The first three I mentioned became Polish. What will become of them? It is clear that the Oder-Neisse border, which is the border between Poland and East Germany, should remain inviolable. But things are catching; you are aware of the debate on Transylvania between Romania and Hungary. Should I speak to you about Moldavia?

[Question] No, no [laughing]

[Mitterrand] There are border conflicts everywhere.

[Question] The question the French are asking today is whether we need to prepare ourselves to soon receive East Germany into the European Community in one way or another, and especially, how will the future of Europe change with this Germany which is evidently going to grow stronger? Is it not going to turn the way in which Europe works completely upside down? Do we need to be afraid of it or not?

[Mitterrand] That is a lot of things at once. First, for the moment, there are two states. If indeed elections in both countries upset the intention of the leaders, because the leaders of the [word indistinct] have already said they do not want reunification. [sentence as heard] Allow me to tell you, to remind you, that I am going to East Germany...

[Question] Can you confirm the dates?

[Mitterrand] (?There is no reason why not); 20 December. But in going to East Germany, I am responding to an invitation. Whose? Mr Honecker's. So I told Mr Honecker, yes, I will go. I consulted Chancellor Kohl, who said: It will be good if you go.

[Question] But I would like to be first?

[Mitterrand] No, no, things did not arise like that. At that time, the Wall still looked solid. So I consulted the chancellor, and he said it was an excellent idea. I had

confirmation of the invitation, then, exit Mr Honecker. Along comes Mr Krenz, who immediately confirmed the invitation. There was no reason for me to back down, all the more so because there was a development which I considered a happy one in East Germany. So I said yes. Then, exit Mr Krenz in turn. So I am waiting to see what the new leaders intend to do. I think they are probably favorably inclined toward this sort of meeting.

So you asked me—I have not forgotten your question—whether this will lead us to bring East Germany into the Community. The question has not arisen. I think this will lead the two German states—before any sort of popular upheaval, if it happens—this will lead the two German states to a series of interstate agreements: increased commercial and economic agreements of all sorts, on border crossing—it already exists, but it will be very much stepped up—up to confederal (?formulae). That is what is likely to happen; the rest much less so.

[Question] Is it a good thing or a bad thing? Should we be afraid?

[Mitterrand] I have just replied on being afraid about this, that we do not have the right to fear events which are intrinsically happy ones. How can one complain? For how many years have we been calling for a little freedom? Many. If it means this, naturally it is disruptive, but it must be tackled squarely; we are familiar with freedom. Obviously freedom is a little disruptive, but as for myself I am not afraid of it. Naturally, I [words indistinct] to adapt to that situation.

[Question] So it is excellent that the East should be winning its freedom. But if the East is freer, does this mean that the West should be more threatened and less safe?

[Mitterrand] This is why at Strasbourg we added to the statement, already adopted in May at the NATO meeting, something indispensable about respect for borders and the Helsinki agreements. We are making the rounds like this, and arriving at the same result. Precautions have been taken and there is no reason why these precautions should not be respected, whatever happens among the German people or the peoples separated today by the creation of two German states.

[Question] People have the impression that necessarily, whatever happens and whatever the tempo, there will be a more and more powerful Germany within the Community of which we are members. Thus this is a new factor.

[Mitterrand] More and more powerful, yes. It is already powerful.

[Question] It is already, and will be more so.

[Mitterrand] You say this is a new factor, but the Germans do exist, do they not?

[Question] Yes, but for 3 months we have been even more aware of it.

[Mitterrand] Yes, but in the end no one could have thought that would be eternal, moreover, what treaty is eternal? This was also foreseen at Helsinki, not by me; this was long ago. Several sectors were foreseen in which the agreement between the East and West would be applied in the economic sphere, but also concerning freedoms and human rights. At the same time it was foreseen that immutable border frontiers, this is very nice to decide on, one does not want to build a paper border, a paper wall in place of the other one. Thus, it was provided that there could be changes and alterations democratically and by mutual agreement. They will be tackled when they are proposed.

What I know is that the plan that I defend everywhere before the new face of Europe revolves around three things: first, freedom—freedom, human rights, etc; second, peace—nothing must come today to hinder the march toward peace that started with the first agreements on disarmament; third, solidarity—East and West must march together toward the goal: Europe. That is my policy. [passage omitted]

[Question] You are on such good terms with Gorbachev. Is there a special alliance with the Soviets? Or with the British?

[Mitterrand] A special alliance? We have a very good understanding. It is not such a bad thing that there is an area of confidence with the Soviet Union. And it is true that Gorbachev shows a kind of concern about France because he obviously remembers that Russia and France have been for centuries the balance points at serious moments in history.

[Question] In fact Mr Mitterrand, we are witnessing the incredible: the breaking up of the communist regimes in East Europe. They cannot develop themselves; they break up. Well, to prevent Mikhail Gorbachev from being overtaken by this vacuum, paradoxically, should one not wish to maintain the old order, to maintain the order inherited from the last world war?

[Mitterrand] No. Here there is perhaps a certain mixture of notions. To maintain the old order in these regions, is the communist order, formed of extremely strict theories inherited from the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. As far as I am concerned, I would be happy to see all that gone. [words indistinct] It is another problem, that of borders, national borders. It is another problem. Let us say that it is better if borders remain as they are. I will just make a subtle remark: that it is true the border between the two German states is not exactly the same nature as the others. The other borders surround, not exactly, treaties are always badly put together, and there is always something of a sentiment of revenge, of the victor towards the vanquished; it is not always the same one which is the victor; it is not always the same one which is vanquished. Now in the end, the Treaty of Versailles following the 1914-18 war was not excellent in destroying the Austro-Hungarian empire, did not exactly fit the bill; and in the treaties or the semblances of treaties, or the agreements

which came after the 1939-45 war. [sentence as heard] Well, let us not create disorder everywhere. Borders generally correspond—except in cases of mistakes when they are drawn—to nationalist expression of peoples. I repeat the difference in the case of the Germans, because it was people who were separated by a very recent border.

[Question] We also have alliances?

[Mitterrand] But alliances are still there. The first reflection of my partners on 18 November was to say that it should be reminded that the alliances should remain as they are. Gorbachev told me the same. I think it is a good framework for discussion. You see, you can answer me, you have not done it yet. You have been fighting Yalta for a long time—Yalta being the term used, not exactly historically, but symbolically, by which we understand the division of Europe into two parts; the division of Europe in which each part falls under the influence of an empire. But Yalta is not borders which we know today. It is the division of Europe and the domination of two big powers. It is this domination that one should get rid of.

[Question] It is being done?.

[Mitterrand] It is taking its course.

[Question] Incidentally, on the issue of borders, Mr President, are you thinking of going to visit the Berlin Wall? [words indistinct]

[Mitterrand] Do you want me to make other speeches?

[Question] A big gesture in Berlin?!

[Mitterrand] A big gesture in Berlin! You have this on your minds. It is up to me to make big gestures. Is it up to me to rush there, to the wall, with Chancellor Kohl? I have read that in the papers, and under the pretension that [Mitterrand changes thought] It would perhaps be all very well, but I did not consider it to be opportune. It is a good thing in itself. I did not consider it opportune. Europe is not only formed of Germany and France all the same. Before the problems are brought up, as we are doing now—which means that I attach great importance to our dialogue—I wanted it to take place. I wanted it to take place so that after the Strasbourg conference, after having visited this week—on Wednesday it was Mr Gorbachev in Kiev—after having taken part—that was Monday—in the NATO Summit in Brussels, and many other things beforehand—in short, I wanted to explain to the French people, it was a good way of doing this. Thus it is not made up just of Germans and French. As for symbolic gestures, my dear Alain Duhamel you stressed this a great deal, allow me my freedom of assessment.

[Question]: You travel a lot. Is it not tiring?

[Mitterrand]: I have traveled a lot recently, because as president of the Council of Europe, I was eager to visit the 11 other capitals, and, well, all the same that means 11 trips—it is not far—Athens, Lisbon—that is further.

It is not very far, but it needed to be done, and in addition to my usual obligations.

[Question] Do you want the Soviet Union to be associated with the European bank...

[Mitterrand, interrupting] Yes, absolutely.

[Question] ...and does that finally make the Soviet Union—and this is perhaps the new path, or the new era, as Gorbachev himself calls it—does this make the Soviet Union a partner and no longer an adversary?

[Mitterrand] Yes, absolutely. It is a partner, and it should be considered as a partner. And, furthermore, quite a number of decisions were made in Strasbourg concerning the bank, about which we have already spoken, but also concerning the creation of a European institute for training East European executives, Soviet ones—this interests Gorbachev a great deal—and participation in various funds. And in a few days' time, during this month, an economic agreement will be signed between the European Community and the Soviet Union. It is a partner, and so much the better.

[Question] Will it be able to benefit from bank credit?

[Mitterrand] The bank is made for that purpose first of all, and the bank will not be the bank of the Community; that would not have been adequate. It will be the bank of all those who wish to take part in it. If the Americans wish to, if the Japanese wish to, for example, and the Canadians, of course, naturally they will be admitted to the board of directors of this bank, but also the countries of East Europe with which we will be dealing.

[Question] Who is going to manage it? Is it perhaps a little premature?

[Mitterrand] We have to choose.

[Question] A Frenchman?

[Mitterrand] A chairman and managing director. I have no idea; I have not broached this question. One should not mix up questions; I (?do not like) mixing up questions. It would perhaps be compromising if we rushed through the decisions too quickly.

[Question] Mr President, when one meets leaders of the countries of the East at the moment, they are naturally attentive concerning all the European measures in their regard and the cooperation funds that may come into being, but they often complain that French industrialists—I do not say the French state—but that the French industrialists are less active, less present, and in the end less efficient than the Germans or the Italians.

[Mitterrand] But what are you telling me? I am the one who complains about it.

[Question] Well, they do too, when one sees them they complain about it.

[Mitterrand] So much the better, so much the better—that way I have good support, because I am the one who complains about it. When people say to me, concerning training in this or that area, as Mr Gorbachev did—well, yes, I have received company heads and I am going to have 150 of my compatriots trained in particular industrial disciplines, and at the same time I have been asked for 3,000 for Germany—what I am saying is that is bad, that needs to be put right. [sentence as heard]

[Question] So you find that the French industrialists are too timid?

[Mitterrand] I have already seen Michel Rocard, and he completely agrees with me. It is not only necessary for the industrialists to do this—they are not timid, some of them are remarkable—there are not enough of them, there are not enough of them, and also the authorities have to get moving. Well, it is not convenient because the budget is expensive, but they have to do it, and I intend that it should happen.

[Question] In East Europe, the communist parties are losing the monopoly of powers. It is an extraordinary revolution 40 years after the war and so on. And one sees even that the movement is reaching the Soviet Union.

[Mitterrand] Yes.

[Question] Last Wednesday, you were seen in Kiev with Gorbachev. You appeared to be joking together, even laughing at one point...

[Mitterrand, interrupting] That happens when we see each other.

[Question] So, it is a matter of bonds of trust. What I mean is when there are no longer any cameras around, does he express his concern to you?

[Mitterrand] When there are no longer any cameras, well we have not talked very much in front of the cameras, just for short periods, a news conference. In general, our conversations are more discreet than that. He is a serious man, and how could he not be? He was well aware of what I said at the NATO conference last Monday. I said that in my view the revolution, which began in Moscow—thanks to Moscow, thanks to Mr Gorbachev, who liberalized the system, will travel around Europe and then will return to Moscow—and I said to him...

[Question, interrupting] He knows it?

[Mitterrand] Naturally, he knows it, and he is certainly preparing to adopt very important reforms. I believe that he said yesterday that in his view it was not yet the moment for a multiparty system. That is his business, but I believe that from the moment when all the countries of Europe—the communist countries, or those of communist origin—there will be a multiparty system there, a multiparty system is already being established except in Romania etc. [sentence as heard] From that point, how could the Soviet Union escape this development? Mr Gorbachev is a forward looking man; it is not

possible for him to have embarked upon this action without having thought about it. Now he has to be given some breathing space. It is a enormous country, an enormous country, and difficult to manage.

[Question] Do you have the impression that he is controlling the development of his country as well as when you met him 6 months or a year ago?

[Mitterrand] I found him to be even calmer and firmer than last July when he came to Paris, and I commented to him [passage indistinct]. He replied to me seriously, and he made the comment: When I have decided, after having decided, I am calm. So, he decided upon a certain direction, he weighed the consequences. Consequences may sometimes upset the intentions and the determination of even the most remarkable man, but the historic role of Mikhail Gorbachev must be stressed, and the winning of freedom owes much to him.

[Question] And he must continue to be supported really [words indistinct].

[Mitterrand] I intend that he should be supported, he must be supported. He is—how should I put it—the cornerstone of all of the current construction. It is he who permitted it and is its best proponent. As a result I will respond [word indistinct] express my feelings.

[Question] The liberation of East Europe, all the same, has been an exceptional test for his regime, and one has the impression that it has strengthened it. Do you have greater confidence in the economic future of the Soviet Union in particular?

[Mitterrand] The economic future has not been straightened out. Their future, the Soviet Union's economic situation has not become established, because it appears that there are a certain number of screens, perhaps brakes, between the decisions made by Gorbachev and the leaders he has appointed in the government, at all levels, and the grassroots. Furthermore, one does not redress a situation that has not yet meshed at all. And it is true that he is having a rough time with the awakening of the nationalities in his own country, in the Soviet Union, a hard time with the distancing of the former satellites. The German problem is springing up today. That is a lot. He is a man of caliber; history will tell.

[Question] Is there not a common interest, an urgent need to heavily fund Gorbachev's economic success?

[Mitterrand] We are already doing much for Poland, for Hungary. This aid is going to be extended to other countries as they make democratic progress. There is no absolute condition. There are already trade agreements with East Germany, and we will reach more of them. As for the Soviet Union, I am one of those who say, [indistinct interjection], it should be done.

[Question] And do we have the means? We meaning Western Europe? [words indistinct].

[Mitterrand] We do not have the means to do everything, and it is not for us to take the place of national efforts. We can do more.

[Question] Mr President, in fact, in some cases, one tends to give in to Gorbachev, especially when one knows him, when one knows a bit more about East European countries and the movement forming there, when one looks at the Soviet Union. Perestroika or not—one should not forget that there is a strong Soviet Army [Mitterrand laughs] which is extremely powerful and which is modernizing itself, it is even scraping its rusty armament.

[Mitterrand] There are some who forget—not me or you—that Gorbachev has also committed himself to disarmament. The first kind of disarmament was that of medium-range—more than 1,000 km, up to 4,000 or 5,000 km—nuclear weapons in Europe. That is already very important, and I approved it immediately. In Reykjavik, there was the question of—and since then it has remained in the planning stage—it was between Mr Reagan and Mr Gorbachev, of reducing the strategic weapons of these two countries by 50 percent, 50 percent, as each of them has at least 12,000 nuclear charges. You see what that could mean, but this plan, which appears to have been abandoned, has just been taken up again in Malta by Mr Bush and Mr Gorbachev. We have embarked upon chemical disarmament; it was Paris that that conference was held, right at the beginning of 1989, which decided to go ahead with chemical disarmament, and we are continuing to discuss it in Geneva. We have just begun, or rather, we have broached the serious part of the disarmament of conventional weapons, the disarmament of artillery, infantry, and certain planes, that was the decision of Vienna. Thus, weapons are fine, and I do not intend to get rid of those of France, which is a long way from having the potential or the kind of arsenal which the Soviet Union possesses. But disarmament is a good thing, and if the Soviet Union and the United States go very much further to reach a level of armament which will not represent a threat to anybody, then France will join that negotiation.

[Question] In fact, if the Soviet Union is no longer the enemy, there still is a kind of weapon which you have produced which today seems a bit obsolete. The LeClerc tank of which 1,400 models are to be produced is a tank intended for an offensive in central Europe. This type of offensive is not credible today. How can you justify the production of this tank?

[Mitterrand, laughing] Listen, all these events have occurred during these last 2 months.

[Question] I have anticipated...

[Mitterrand, interrupting] Yes, you have anticipated.

[Question] The question should be asked.

[Mitterrand] Many issues are not resolved in the East. We cannot review our capability of national and international defense on the sole basis of the events that have taken place.

[Question] But it is something irreversible.

[Mitterrand] So much the better if we do not have to rearm ourselves to work out a strategy with no relevance. So much the better! Give me a moment, let me examine things with the leaders of our Army, with the prime minister and the defense minister. We have in fact met to discuss the subject.

[Question] Already in France at the moment—and it will be the case next year if 1990 is a disarmament year—there will be great pressure in France to say now that things are improving, now that the Soviets are more peaceful, there should be less money for defense and the money should be put elsewhere instead.

[Mitterrand] They would be right of course, on the condition that the Soviets take a similar approach. But there is a Soviet as well as a U.S. arsenal that, before things are at the level of what we can do—we who after all have the third most powerful army in the world, thanks to the possession of nuclear weapons—before we reach the point where it would be our duty to intervene in negotiations, time would have passed. So everything will depend on the approach that is adopted by the Americans and the Soviets. [words indistinct] I was told that I should go to Malta. But they could not decide the future of Europe in Malta, and they did not try; they don't have the means in fact. They talked about things that interest them, these two empires. They particularly discussed disarmament. I would have refused if they had asked me to go. I do not intend to sit around a table when I have nothing to present and I do not want to present anything as long as these thousands and thousands of nuclear warheads remain facing us—300 and 400 [as heard].

[Question] In fact after Strasbourg, is it foolish to imagine that one day there will be Europe or somebody on behalf of Europe to discuss with East and West matters of our security?

[Mitterrand] The day will come I hope, the day will come I hope...[questioner interrupts Mitterrand, Mitterrand continues] This has not happened since 1945. I hope we are getting nearer the time that this would be possible because Europe of the community—because I did not finish my argument before as I do not want to take your time, I understand—I told you my aims for Europe, Europe as a goal. I said freedom, that is for the people to enjoy but also peace, which has to be guaranteed and then I said solidarity between East and West. But this is possible. That is mainly a comprehensive settlement of issues between Eastern and Western European countries within a solidarity and concord framework—this is possible only on the basis of—how to say it—I would say

more than an embryo...on the basis of the mold represented by the European Community. So the community represents here a determinant factor in the process you have suggested.

[Question] Which also means Mr President, possibly a community of defense, if one goes back to an old expression. Well, a European defense in which France could think to review its theory...

[Mitterrand, interrupting] We have been thinking about it for long time. We first thought about it in the years 1953-54 when the issues of building Europe emerged. It was not perhaps a bit cautious to put military problems before political problems...

[Questioner, interrupting] But then it could be speeded up...?

[Mitterrand] Of course one should not discard that, on the contrary one should seek it. To achieve that, difficulties should be overcome. For the moment there are two alliances. They are here. They will not collapse in one try. In fact it would not be a good thing. Then inside these alliances, there are countries which possess nuclear weapons and those which do not. There are those who wish to have particular agreements. Well, what I mean is that this is a complicated issue which could not be settled between the five of us this evening!

[Question] A last question on this topic. There are certain French politicians who say that if the phenomenon of German reunification makes progress, among the precautions which should be taken—and it was what you said that made me think of it—among the precautions to be taken, perhaps for example, a reunited Germany should commit itself not to hold atomic weapons in the future. Is this an idea which seems important to you?

[Mitterrand] But this is a fundamental concept, yes. I certainly do not intend personally—before fast-moving events of a considerable importance take place, this will be examined—to touch our nuclear arsenal in any way, which is just at the level to sufficiently ensure the defense of France, whatever happens. But among the basic rules—and the Germans are not asking for them—is this one: Germany must not have nuclear weapons.

[Question] However, is there not still a risk of neutralizing Germany?

[Mitterrand] Ah, this risk exists, it is moreover a constant line of the Soviet Union. It exists, but it is enough to say no, I mean. No is a good word; you can use it occasionally. You do not have to make it a constant refrain; because that would mean life is impossible, including at home. But no means something, does it not?

[Question] Do you say no, for example, to the departure of U.S. troops from Europe, or is there a level on the basis of which...

[Mitterrand, interrupting] The question does not arise. A few days ago, Mr Bush said in Brussels that it is understood that the United States does not intend to repatriate its armies.

[Question] Mr President, a last question on foreign policy, but one which deeply concerns public opinion in France, as you know. It is Lebanon. Basically the question is very simple; it is what many people are wondering on a common sense level: If Syria decides to attack the Christian stronghold, what will be done?

[Mitterrand] Before we come to that pass, we can try to prepare some others, which would be less catastrophic.

There exists one Lebanon and there are factions and sectors inside Lebanon. Today there is the Christian sector or stronghold of East Beirut. There are here and there some regions with Christian domination but generally controlled by foreign armies and Lebanon is in the greater majority, Muslim.

I note that people are often confused in France, when someone says 'Lebanon'; people think Lebanon means the very nice Maronite Christian people. I did not mean to say Maronite, there are Christians of different faiths, but they are the main ones. There are also our Muslim Lebanese friends, who are just as close as friends. When we do something for one group, we must do something for the other groups, so as not to seem to subscribe to the idea of some sort of partition of Lebanon. There is the very, very small Christian Lebanon and a Muslim Lebanon, more or less allied to Syrian power, in effect under Syrian domination.

[Question] Thus you are still very hostile to the idea of partition and of a lesser Lebanon?

[Mitterrand] Yes, yes, because it would not be viable. [words indistinct] For the moment, French diplomacy is striving to restrain an eventuality of this type, to prevent it.

Following the resumption of war on 14 March which saw the big clashes of the following months and until the cease-fire that is still holding...well with difficulties, we have tried to conciliate what are often opposites. But it was our intervention and other efforts but especially our intervention—I still remember the phone calls I made to Mr Bush, the phone calls I made to Mr Gorbachev and those I made to Arab leaders, the Arab League, those I made to all our partners to tell them that you have to prevent the military clash which might end by a massacre of the weakest obviously, the massacre of the Christian population of East Beirut.

[Question] But since then things have improved, there is an agreement...

[Mitterrand, interrupting] Cease-fire was reached. The cease-fire has lasted. Naturally it is a very temporary success. But let us take what we have got. There is the election of President Mu'awwad following what is called the al-Ta'if agreement, al-Ta'if is a town in Saudi Arabia.

Three Arab heads of state: the king of Morocco, the king of Saudi Arabia, the Algerian president drew up a plan, met, they were put in charge to do so in concert with the Arab League and worked out an agreement framework which was discussed by the Lebanese deputies and the Lebanese deputies subscribed to a set of measures called al-Ta'if agreement which aims to establish peace and excludes violence. We support this agreement. Following this agreement, the Lebanese parliament elected Mr Mu'awwad as president. We quickly sent our ambassador to President Mu'awwad. We recognized him. We congratulated him for his election and when he was assassinated, we sent a member of the French Government to his funeral. This demonstrates to which extent we recognized his legitimacy. I do not know why he died [as heard] but I can suppose that a man who wants to be conciliatory runs a big risk in that country. Then the members [of the Lebanese parliaments] elected al-Hirawi. President al-Hirawi started his term with very firm statements which could seem threatening. There was talk for a few days about the siege of east Beirut by Syrian troops. This was said by General 'Awn. It is perhaps true. I am not there, I cannot see for myself. In the present state of controversy, one should verify ten times the same information. In any case we intervened before President Hirawi whom we have recognized, who is the legitimate president to whom we sent our ambassador. I have perhaps lingered on, but it is necessary because I am asked; it touches the sensitiveness of the French people.

We told 'Awn...uhm, told al-Hirawi I get confused, because I wrote the same thing to 'Awn. I explained the French position to 'Awn and said that legitimacy belongs to the president and government emerging from parliament's choice in conformity with the Al-Ta'if agreements. But this does not authorize us—and this is what I told President al-Hirawi—to settle this problem through violence relying on a foreign army.

[Question] But if he is conciliatory, he is lost like his predecessor?

[Mitterrand] History does not always repeat itself; I hope not. But I informed General 'Awn that it is understood that violence is ruled out by the Al-Ta'if agreements, and that it would be a violation of the Al-Ta'if agreements to want to settle this problem by force of arms.

[Question] Is the context not favorable at the international level for there to be a diplomatic initiative, for example, French-Soviet. [words indistinct].

[Mitterrand] I could say that I sketched in Kiev the resumption of a useful and effective approach, which we already undertook a few months ago during the fighting in March and April. This is a good road, but not the only one. President Bush supports Al-Hirawi and the legitimate government of Salim al-Huss, but none of these people, whom we are discussing, want this to result in a massacre in East Beirut. I certainly hope all this will be enough.

You asked me what will France do. I will reply to your question with a question. Do you want France to send its Army there? Is this what you mean? Is that what many members of parliament who are asking us to act mean? They say that France should commit our Army in Lebanon. I say that France is still not...

[Question, interrupting] ...is not the protector of the Christians in Lebanon. Can we say it like that?

[Mitterrand] It is the protector of Lebanon, this is how we think of ourselves. This is not on the basis of a right, or a treaty. We consider we have a duty toward Lebanon as a whole, but we do not want to be party to the tearing apart of Lebanon. [passage omitted]

[Question] We see the passion with which you are handling the problem of immigration.

[Mitterrand] Yes, because I consider that rights are important but the immigrants—this should be stated simply so that the French people understand it—have to be taken back to their own countries. The word is not pleasant, but they have to be expelled.

[Question] Do we have the means? The government [words indistinct]

[Mitterrand] The means are the police. The border police must be strengthened; they have to be strengthened. And there are also other things which lead us again to another area. It is necessary for the bodies that are responsible for admitting immigrants to be not more serious, but more rapid. To be more rapid, their staff numbers have to be reinforced. And today I have noted that there were cases which took 3 of 4 years. In that situation, what do you do with the immigrant who was formerly illegal and who has been there for a long time, who sometimes has his family (?here).

I think that all this should be settled. All the cases that have not been settled for a long time should be settled in the space of 6 months, really.

[Question] So the procedure should be accelerated?

[Mitterrand] Absolutely. But for all the new cases, I expect the immigration office to be in a position to reach a decision in 3 months. For that, it is necessary to give it the means, and the government is determined to do that [passage omitted]

[Question] In a word, is the Rocard method in your eyes a sufficiently social method in its application, as it is being applied today?

[Mitterrand] Michel Rocard's social will cannot be challenged. The whole set of measures he is recommending, because he has his eyes trained on the franc, his eyes trained on the major balances, and this cannot be challenged. My own role is to provide stimulus and to tell him perhaps we need to balance things a bit more. We talk twice weekly, and always about this.

[Question] You are the social prod in the economic field?

[Mitterrand] I am the prod in all fields, because, after all, I am not responsible for day-to-day life and because I am very happy with what is being done, because the ministers are good ministers in general.

[Question] Thus, there is no need for a reshuffle?

[Mitterrand] I have not thought about it for the moment; that day will arrive some time or another, but it is not in my mind. I think the prime minister and the ministers are doing good work, but this does not detract from the fact that my role is to listen to all French people, and I certainly note the anxiety, the discontent, the anguish of some categories of French people and others. I felt that with the nurses, for example, I should not hide it. When I look at the work they are doing, the responsibilities they have, and their modest position... [changes thought] but still I am not accusing the prime minister.

[Question] Mr President, in spite of everything and in spite of ourselves, and almost in spite of you, we are reaching the end of this program. We are also together reaching the end of the 1980s and no one can get away from looking back, from weighing things up. For you the 1980s represent the peak of your political life. Well, for Francois Mitterrand, what is your most vivid souvenir of the 1980's?

[Mitterrand] [Passage omitted] I think that the work to build Europe is work that is very beneficial to France. I think that the reconciliation with Germany, which had already begun before my time and was consecrated by the symbol of the Verdun meeting, was something important. I think that France's availability to occupy its position, its rank in the world has been rather successful. Today the Community deals with the free exchange countries, it deals with the Arab countries; the 22 Arab countries or organizations will be in Paris on 22 September to hold discussions with the 12 countries of the Community. We are going to deal at Lome.

[Question] In September?

[Mitterrand] Sorry, in December. In December we are going to deal with an agreement for 12 billion ECU's [European Currency Units] for the African and Pacific countries; no, I would say all that...the battle for justice in the Third World, the battle for freedom in France and a certain number of international [word indistinct] which mean that today France is the friend of Germany and is also the friend of the USSR, it has its position in the Community, it speaks in confidence with the Americans, I think that that is plenty to be getting on with.

[Question] And your greatest regret?

[Mitterrand] But I have many of them.

[Question] Just one?

[Mitterrand] I have many. I am going to speak like my predecessor: I would like growth—he did not experience

growth—I would like growth to correspond to an improved well being for the majority of the French people, at any rate for those who live in difficult circumstances.

NORWAY

Defense Chief Against Weakening Northern Force

90EN0104A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
14 Nov 89 p 2

[Editorial: "Threat Against Defense Capabilities"]

[Text] In the midst of the joy over the historical development in Eastern Europe it is important now that we do not forget to secure our own defense capabilities. If we lose sight of the danger signals, there is the risk of ending up in an unbalanced disarmament which effectively undermines the capabilities of the Armed Forces to defend Norwegian sovereignty. The fact is that the nuclear disarmament on the European Continent has already made NATO's northern flank even more vulnerable.

The Chief of Defense, Admiral Torolf Rein, is correct in saying that the naval military capacity of the Soviet Union at the Kola Peninsula can be greatly reduced without threatening the country's security in any way. And he hits the nail on the head when he points out to AFTENPOSTEN that Mikhail Gorbachev has everything to gain by bringing the naval strength of the Western Alliance into the disarmament negotiations in Vienna.

The Soviet Union does not have any need for added provisions and relief forces across the Atlantic Ocean in a war situation. Instead, an enormous offensive potential has been built up at the Kola Peninsula which in any given situation can provide effective barriers to the transportation of the allied forces we depend on. And the buildup on the Kola Peninsula continues without any reduction in strength.

As Adm Rein points out, the planned introduction of a new aircraft carrier can "give an entirely new dimension to the capacity of the Soviet offensive in our vicinity." The presence of the Allied naval military forces in this region has always been focused on the indication that NATO simply cannot accept Soviet monopoly of either the Barents Sea or the Norwegian Sea.

We have no doubt that the United States is fully aware of what is at stake here for the Western Alliance—and our joint defense. It is all the more important that the Norwegian Government expresses clearly that the presence of the Alliance in the Northern region is in our interest. In relation to the gigantic offensive naval warfare forces the Soviet Union has at its disposal at the Kola Peninsula, the guest appearances of the Allies have been limited to a minimum.

The situation is such that mutual reductions will be anything but balanced. Just the opposite, they will have an destabilizing effect and consequently intensify the uncertainty.

9 'Kobben' Class Submarines To Be Modernized

36390103 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
2 Nov 89 p 4

[Norwegian Wire Service report]

[Text] Nine "Kobben" class submarines will be modernized with new electronic equipment. Six of the submarines belong to the [Norwegian] Navy, while three will belong to the Danish Navy. The modernization of the six Norwegian boats will be completed in 1992, and the price tag will be 450 million kroner.

At the same time the vessels will be lengthened by 2 meters, both to make room for the new equipment and to make living conditions on board more comfortable for the crews.

Military Expert on Soviet Forces in North

90EN0104C Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
20 Nov 89 p 2

[Guest commentary by military expert John Berg: "New View of the Soviet Fleet"]

[Text] In security policy, the tendency is to base analyses on individual general statements which have gained status as indisputable principles.

Two such statements are that "there is no numerical increase in the Soviet Northern Fleet, but a marked improvement in quality," and "the Northern Fleet must be viewed in the global context, although some forces obviously have a local role to play."

Neither of the two statements hold under scrutiny. But they contribute toward paving the road for the attacks the newspaper NORDLYS now directs toward a planned military buildup in northern Norway, as well as for the increased opposition against the plans for NATO exercises which we have seen already. The statements are based on a theoretical way of thinking which seems to be hard to overcome in Norwegian security policy.

Strong Increase

If we are to count vessels in the Northern Fleet, we must think in operative terms and separate the vessels that the Soviet exercises show us will participate in operations that may threaten Norway. Two examples can illustrate what an enormous increase we are facing.

If we look at nuclear-powered attack submarines with torpedoes, or both torpedoes and cruise missiles, the Northern Fleet had 53 such vessels 10 years ago, with a total tonnage of 300,000. Today the number has increased to 77, but the total tonnage is 500,000.

The increase has been even more pronounced in surface combatants armed with cruise missiles with tonnage over 7000. It is such vessels that represent the main bulk in the naval fighter units that can put Norway behind a "Mare Sovieticum." Some 10 years ago, the Northern Fleet had

nine such ships of a total tonnage of barely 100,000. Today, the number is 25 and the tonnage 300,000.

Global?

But our view of the Northern Fleet has not changed essentially in these 10 years. The most important new factor in our analyses is that we now presume that the highest priority task of the Northern Fleet is to protect cruise missile [bearing] strategic submarines which during conflict will be deployed as a reserve under the ice in the Arctic Ocean.

The role of these submarines can be viewed as a global role, and the defense around them will, of course, be viewed as such as well. But this is the very situation where we tend to think theoretically and strategically but where we should be thinking in operative and dynamic terms. The Northern Fleet does not need to be deployed in the Barents Sea to protect these submarines.

Let us, for example, imagine a conflict in which these submarines go under the polar ice. American nuclear-powered attack submarines go north to hunt for them. But at the same time, strong Soviet naval forces go south; they manage to sink an American carrier and several support ships, and threaten another carrier. No one will expect anything but that this will force the U.S. attack submarines to turn around and go south for assistance. The Soviet planners know this.

Consequences

A series of such scenarios can be listed, all of which have in common that they have great consequences for Norway and that they wipe out global/local dimensions. They all contain a multitude of moments of uncertainty which open the doors to unexpected developments. It is the tendency in Norwegian security policy to believe that it is possible to reason one's way, step by step, far into a conflict. In this case, it may suffice to call to mind that in August 1939 no analyst was even close to foreseeing how Europe would look in August 1940.

Along with journalist Anne-Mette Thunem, I have made the informational videotape "The Soviet Forces and Activities in the North" for the Armed Forces, based on a film the Intelligence Service has released. Three situations emerge that should be given attention:

First: Norway has basic information for a new approach in the analyses if the security policy environment and the Armed Forces find a suitable venue for transferring the information. It will not be difficult to drive NORDLYS and other critics off course with the help of the pure weight of the information.

Second: The program gives a picture of Norwegian intelligence, surveillance, and warning that completely pulls the rug out from under the critics of the service. That is the national services.

Europe

Third: Norway plays a very unique role in the information gathering in the North. The security policy environment should think this through in detail. Europe cannot formulate a truly independent security policy unless this policy also includes the northern flank. Europe cannot do this without Norway. Norway does not have to go to Europe with its hat in hand in this context; we have something to offer that Europe needs. If we develop our services and our entire defense effort with care in the North, and we play our cards right, it will become clearer and clearer to Europe that a united European security policy is not possible without Norway's participation. Even NORDLYS will gradually understand this perspective.

SV Backs Movement To Cut Defense Budget

36390106P Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
27 Nov 89 p 7

[Article by Hilde Harbo: "SV Wants To Drop the Rules for Export to the East"; first paragraph is AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Excerpts] "Norway should consider a partial dropping of the COCOM rules. The developments in East Europe show that we should have tossed these rules on history's scrapheap a long time ago," says SV [Socialist Left Party] leader Erik Solheim following the party's leadership meeting during the weekend. [passage omitted]

National Movement

SV's national leadership agreed to get a national movement started to cut the defense budget by 10 percent, to turn these funds over to environmental efforts, and later also to social goals. Solheim expressed hope that the movement would have results already in the national budget to be submitted next fall.

"The background for this initiative is that a few days ago the Storting agreed to give defense a real growth—even though the United States, the Soviet Union, and almost all other countries in Europe are disarming, and Europe is in a historic period of detente," said Solheim.

Opinion Poll

He also referred to an opinion poll Scan-Fact carried out for SV which shows that only 11 percent of those questioned want real growth for the Armed Forces. The same poll also shows that three-fourths of the respondents are for transferring 10 percent of the Armed Forces' budget to environmental goals.

The country's leadership also considered the situation in East Europe, and concluded that developments in the East give further arguments for SV's standpoint to wager on an all European solution instead of the EC. Solheim supported the party's foreign policy spokesman, Paul Chaffey, who yesterday demanded that Norway abolish compulsory visas for East Europeans who wish to visit this country.

SV Leader Criticizes Conservative Stance

36390107P Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
30 Nov 89 p 8

[Guest commentary by Erik Solheim, Socialist Left (SV) leader: "When Will the Conservatives Give Up the Cold War?"]

[Text] The wall is falling and the democratic wave is sweeping over East Europe with the Soviet Union's blessing. But obviously that sort of thing should not knock the Norwegian authorities off their high perches: Defense Minister Per Ditlev-Simonsen has, for example, found out that the threat from Gorbachev *is growing*, and wants to have more American advance stockpiles (AFTENPOSTEN, 25 November).

One cannot expect otherwise from the Conservative's hawks, who have invested their political existence in a worldwide picture consisting of *us* in the West and *them* in the East. And which accordingly gets panicked when everything falls to pieces in the course of a few short months.

But AFTENPOSTEN's Per Nordrum understood what it is all about. He was in NATO's headquarters to hear the organization's views on the new Europe. In a 27 November commentary he wrote the following:

'Rigid'

"Rigid arguments and conceptions characterized a background briefing for the press before the weekend. A deplorable seance which showed that NATO as an organization lacked the elementary abilities to sell itself when one no longer had the 'Berlin Wall' to drive one's head into."

A second picture: The revolution in Europe is reminiscent of a situation where two sides have both been pushed to the end of their ropes over a long period of time and one side suddenly loses its grip, so that the "winning team" lies strewn around, confused over what happened. West Europe's politicians are presenting themselves as largely unsure of the situation and and waiting, except for Defense Minister Ditlev-Simonsen, who stands firm and wants to continue the cold war.

The Third Path

In the Socialist Left Party we have never built our policy upon the basis of the balance of terror. We have stood for *the third path* in foreign policy—the fight for disarmament and against the bloc division of Europe. Seen in this way, we look upon what is happening today as a victory. For us the European revolution of 1989 gives the same perspectives as the French revolution of 1789.

Now we do not need further arms buildups and the EC process. Quite the opposite. We need whole Europe solutions which can unite this world's parts in political, economic, and cultural cooperation. And we need disarmament above all else.

Seriously, Per Ditlev-Simonsen: Why should Norway buy itself more arms—when the United States, the Soviet Union, and almost all Europe takes the consequence of the political developments and is disarming? Is your goal that Norway should end up like a little, heavily armed country in the backwater of a relaxed, disarmed Europe?

An opinion poll which Scan-Fact carried out in November shows that only one of 10 people here in this country agrees with you that the defense budget for 1990 must have real growth. Forty-four percent want the defense budget to remain the same, while 36 percent want that we should begin to cut down. Even among the Conservative voters the opposition to a real growth in the defense budget is massive.

SV believes that it is senseless that the defense budget should be guaranteed growth from year to year—especially the way things are developing in Europe today—while we must take away from the welfare state and only grant fragments to environmental efforts.

Therefore, we are now setting in motion a national movement for a cut in the defense budget. The goal in the first round is to transfer 10 percent—approximately 2 billion—to environmental efforts and social goals. A second poll that Scan-Fact conducted shows that three out of five people are in favor of this suggestion.

This shows, Per Ditlev-Simonsen, that people understand that the world is in flux and that they want to take the consequences of this. They see that there are many other things besides Russians which threaten our existence, and want to prioritize them. Now have you thought about putting the cold war on the shelf?

SPAIN

Foreign Minister on New European Security System

LD1412221789 Madrid in Spanish to Europe
2030 GMT 14 Dec 89

[Text] Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez said in Brussels today that a new security structure must be established in Europe as a result of the political changes in the East and the reduction of the military presence thanks to the disarmament agreements. Mr Ordonez, who is attending the meeting of NATO, added that the process of reforms in Eastern Europe is not over and therefore it is of interest to maintain the link between Western Europe and the two North American countries—the United States and Canada. The Spanish Foreign Minister emphasized the role of the European Community in the restructuring of the new Europe.

SWEDEN

Navy To Acquire Four New Submarine Hunters

PM0512145389 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET
in Swedish 25 Nov 89 p 8

[Report by Lars Porne]

[Text] Four new so-called hydrophone buoy ships, which will be used to eavesdrop using passive hydrophones, are to be added to the Navy's submarine-hunt force.

An order was placed with Djupvik's shipyard on the island of Tjorn Thursday [23 November] by the Armed Forces Materiel Administration. The order covers the construction of the four ships, the first of which is to be delivered in the 2d quarter of 1990. The other three are to be delivered in 1991. The contract price of each ship is 7 million kronor—a total of 28 million kronor for all four.

"There could then be further costs for equipment, such as hydrophone buoys and analysis equipment," Editor Wyn Enqvist of the Naval Staff Information Department said.

A few years ago the Navy bought advanced analysis equipment which processes the sounds registered by the buoys. This equipment was transported in containers on transport ships—not an ideal solution since these ships were needed for other operations.

Now the equipment is to be fitted on board the new ships. During submarine hunts the buoys will be anchored. They will listen and relay information to the analysis equipment on the new ships.

Three Provincial Army Regiments To Close Down

LD1512140689 Stockholm International Service
in Swedish 1030 GMT 15 Dec 89

[Text] The Riksdag decided on Thursday as expected to close down the three provincial regiments I 3 in Oerebro, I 11 in Vaexjoe, and I 17 in Uddevalla, and to move or locate together certain other regiments. Among other things, the Ing 1 in Soedertaelje will be moved to P 10 in Straengnaes. In addition, several army schools will be closed down. These changes will affect a total of 1,600 military personnel and 1,100 civilian employees.

TURKEY

General Staff on Missiles, Changing Threats

NC1812085189 Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish
13 Dec 89 p 14

[Report by Aydin Ozdalga]

[Text] While the way the honeymoon between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries is affecting Turkey is still being debated, the general staff has given MILLIYET an assessment of the latest developments. Brigadier General Hursit Tolon, secretary general of the general staff, has stated that

although the threat against Turkey from the north, that is, from the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, has significantly decreased, the threat from the south, that is, from Syria, Iraq, and Iran, has increased. General Tolon said that the missiles in the hands of the countries beyond Turkey's southern border, which have a range of 1,000 km, constitute a serious threat to Turkey. Turkey does not have similar missiles. Nor does it have an effective air-defense system against them.

Strategic calculations in the world were first disrupted by the INF agreement, which removed the medium-range missiles, and then by the wave of moves for freedom in the East European and Warsaw Pact countries. Turkey is one of the countries which has been most affected by these developments.

Turkey's basic defense policy is outlined in a document known as the "National and Military Strategy Concept." This document, which was drawn up by the general staff, makes an assessment of the threats which are directed against Turkey and establishes the military plans, priorities, and targets of the Turkish Armed Forces accordingly.

According to the assessments that were made over many years in the past, the most serious threat against Turkey was from the Warsaw Pact countries, the Soviet Union, and Bulgaria. The threat from Greece was next. This was due to the Cyprus problem and the Aegean dispute. The threat from Turkey's southern and southeastern neighbors, that is, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, came after all these.

To what extent have the assessments of the general staff been affected by the swift changes that have taken place during the past few months? Has there been any change in the way the threats are perceived? General Tolon's reply to this question was as follows:

"We are going through a stage in which work is being carried out on rearmament and disarmament at the same time. While the work for disarmament is aimed at maintaining security with arms which are less destructive, efforts are being made through planning to find new alternatives in order to maintain security at maximum level.

"If the disarmament process produces favorable results, then this situation will significantly reduce a potential threat, particularly from the north. Meanwhile, because of the additional capabilities that have been established in regions beyond Turkey's southern border—that is, including the missiles which have a range of more than 1,000 km—the fact that the countries which are located beyond Turkey's southern border are not participants in the process of disarmament and arms control, and the terrorist activities in the region, Turkey feels an increasing need for security in its southern sector.

"Undoubtedly, all this will significantly affect the structure, military composition, and nature and number of the Turkish Armed Forces. Work is being carried out on all this within the framework of the Turkish Armed

Forces. Alternatives are being established to meet the needs of the Armed Forces at the highest level."

What is the message carried in the general staff's views? We put this question to Retired Admiral Yilmaz Usluer, who is the chief editor of the M-5 DEFENSE AND STRATEGY MAGAZINE. He replied:

"What the general staff has said is very true. The Turkish Army, which for many years prepared itself against a Soviet onslaught, has now been confronted with an increased threat from the countries beyond its southern border. This comes at a time when the Soviet threat has diminished. The most important aspect of the statement was the vexed way the general staff explained that Turkey is confronted with missiles which have a range of 1,000 km.

"Turkey may have a conflict with Syria or Iraq in the future. There will be tension with Syria because of the Kurdish Workers Party and with Syria and Iraq because of Euphrates waters. Meanwhile, Iran must be kept in mind as well. That country will support the radical theocratic activities in Turkey."

Admiral Usluer recalled that Iran has been arming itself at a rapid pace for the past few years. He said:

"Syria maintains a very strong army in order to be effective in Lebanon and compete with Israel. The Syrians have received significant support from the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Iran and Iraq armed themselves and developed their missile technologies during the course of the Gulf war. A large part of Turkey is under threat from the missiles which are in these countries at the present time. These countries had Soviet missiles with a range of 500 km in the past. However, the general staff has disclosed that they now have missiles with a range of more than 1,000 km.

"Meanwhile, Turkey does not have an air-defense system against these missiles. Nor does it have missiles to retaliate against an attack. It had the Honest John missiles, with a range of 37 km. However, they have been dismantled. We were supposed to replace them with Lance missiles, which have a range of 120 to 470 km. However, we have not yet been able to acquire them. This is an unforgivable error. Let us not make a mistake by being carried away by the wave of peace. It is true that the possibility of a war between the military pacts is now lessening. However, ethnic and regional clashes will continue. Turkey is very close to the Middle East, in which the most intensive ethnic and regional clashes occur. In fact, the Middle East could be described as a powder keg. Attention must be focused on the views expressed by the general staff. The missile Iraq launched into space for peaceful purposes a few days ago indicates that that country has the required technology. No one should doubt that missiles for military purposes have either already been produced or are about to be produced."

Greece 'Persuaded' To Drop Objections on Mersin

TA1412165689 Ankara ANATOLIA in English
1620 GMT 14 Dec 89

[Text] Brussels (A.A.)—Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz said on Thursday that Greece had stepped back by taking a passive stance on the Mersin problem which was a major obstacle in disarmament talks in conventional forces in Europe.

Talks for reductions in Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) with the participation of twenty-three countries from NATO and the Warsaw pact in Vienna had been stalled due to Greece's demand that Turkey's southern port of Mersin be included in the disarmed areas.

However, NATO foreign ministers have agreed on a draft treaty today for the CFE talks, which did not mention the Mersin issue.

Diplomats say the row had not been settled but both Greece and Turkey had agreed to set it aside so that the draft treaty could be tabled on behalf of all NATO members.

Yilmaz told A.A. after the NATO ministers meeting that the Greek side had been convinced by the other allies to withdraw its objection.

"Greece might want to bring the issue onto the agenda in the future, but they will not achieve their aim... They have already stepped back," he said.

Changes in Europe of Strategic Importance Noted

90ES0250A Istanbul GUNES in Turkish
23 Nov 89 pp 1, 6

[Article by Esen Unur: "'Softening' Pressures Turkey"]

[Text] Istanbul—Democratization and the start of the process of ending the cold war in Eastern Europe will significantly weaken the strategic position which has been Turkey's most important trump card vis-a-vis the West.

Consequently, the foundation of Turkey's relations with the United States, its strongest ally, will change and reductions in military aid from the West will occur. In addition, it will be that much easier for the EC to say "no" to Turkey's application for full membership.

These are the thoughts of Western diplomats in Ankara on what kind of situation Turkey will be in as regards the events now occurring in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Despite this, diplomatic circles say that the presidential, prime minister, and assembly speaker elections have prevented the ANAP [Motherland Party] administration from giving the matter the attention its importance merits.

National Defense Minister Safa Giray said yesterday in a statement to GUNES, "You cannot just say, 'I'm reducing my arms count. I'm cutting expenses. I am discharging some of my soldiers,' before things settle down."

National Defense Ministry Under Secretary Vahit Erdem maintained that developments in the Soviet bloc "will not affect" Turkey. "Turkey's geopolitical status and importance are constant," according to Erdem.

Diplomatic circles in Ankara interviewed by GUNES do not share this assessment.

One diplomat told GUNES the following:

"It is impossible for the softening not to affect Turkey. It affects and will affect the entire world. The less strategically important Turkey becomes for America, the less America will do for Turkey. America has traditionally supported Turkey in its problems with Greece. This may not continue to be true. It may become more difficult to throw the Armenian bill out of Congress."

Another Western diplomat suggested that softening around the world would lead to cuts in the defense budgets of Western nations. "These cuts will lead to reductions in the military aid Turkey receives from the West," he said.

Diplomats say softening will also make it easier for the EC to extend the time it keeps Turkey in the "waiting room." One diplomat said:

"These developments will cause all countries to adjust their attitudes. The EC has to think about certain things it had never thought of before ... such as East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and so forth. With these countries coming to the foreground, Turkey may be pushed a little further into the background."

Government sources defend the view that recent developments in the Eastern Bloc will not affect Turkey's defense policy, while political leaders interviewed by GUNES offered new proposals.

True Path Party [DYP] General Chairman Suleyman Demirel spoke of the absolute need for Turkey to set a new state defense policy and said:

"Important changes are taking place in Europe. On the agenda is the question of reunification of East Germany and West Germany. Only Romania is left out. I wonder if the Soviet empire is abandoning Marxism. Can the Soviet Union handle this softening? Or will it go into another reaction? If it gets the idea that Marxism will be lost and goes into a reaction, everything will contract again and the world will enter another period of cold war. So this is where our situation gains importance. Turkey has to examine events carefully and reassess the threat."

Demirel said that it will be to Turkey's advantage if softening continues, and that it may be possible for

resources reserved for defense to be shifted elsewhere; he spoke of three important problems. Turkey's problems according to Demirel are:

- "Turkey's regime of alienation from the people must be corrected.
- "The social state has suffered in Turkey. There is no middle class left, but a division between rich and poor.
- "Industrialization has stopped in Turkey."

The DYP general chairman then made the following assessment:

"If softening continues in the East Bloc, we may be able to raise the standard of living and transfer resources to employment and industrialization. It is difficult to stay afloat under the present circumstances. The problem is whether the government believes in softening. If it does, it absolutely must revise its defense policy."

Democratic Left Party (DSP) General Chairman Bulent Ecevit, in evaluating developments in Eastern Europe from Turkey's standpoint, said that it now brings to the agenda a return from the concept of common security to the concept of national security and said:

"Naturally Turkey's importance from the standpoint of world security will diminish, but Turkey will continue to have its own security requirements. The part of these requirements stemming from the East-West conflict will shrink though I do not think one could expect a serious reduction in Turkey's security requirements relating to the conflict in its own region. Therefore, Turkey will feel it necessary to develop defense arrangements in the sense of national security rather than joint security."

Ecevit expressed the need for these arrangements to be taken up in the framework of a new national security concept and said, "Care must be taken to bear in mind that the resources that we would devote to national defense under rapidly developing world circumstances must not be allowed to weaken economic development."

The DSP general chairman pointed out that economic strength is the fundamental element of security and said:

"While developing our own defense industry on the one hand, we must increase the resources for defense ways and means that we receive from the outside, on the condition that standardization not be jeopardized on the other. Thus, we must avoid the danger of excessive reliance on a single source, a single foreign state in this regard."

National Defense Ministry Under Secretary Vahit Erdem, however, suggested that developments in Eastern Europe will not affect Turkey's defense policy.

Meanwhile, according to a report by Mithat Sirmen from the GUNES Ankara bureau, SHP [Social Democratic Populist Party] Group Vice President Onur Kumbaracibasi explained his party's view to GUNES as follows:

"It cannot and must not be thought that Turkey can remain outside this current development in which the whole world is approaching a period of disarmament and political soft-

ening, although there is no question of being able to fully assess the dimensions of the change and development taking place in Eastern Europe at the moment.

"We, the SHP, most certainly favor a lasting world peace. We certainly favor disarmament and believe in the benefits of it."

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